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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on the general equilibrium effects of unemployment
insurance (UI) extensions on the macroeconomy. In Chapter 2, I quantify the effects of
the increasing maximum UI duration during recessions on the drop in the correlation be-
tween output and labour productivity in the US since the early 1980’s. Using a search and
matching model with stochastic UI duration, heterogeneous match quality, variable search
intensity and on-the-job search, I find that the model can explain over half of this drop.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of UI extensions on the incidence of long-term
unemployment and on the unemployment duration distribution in the US. I extend the model
in Chapter 2 by allowing for further worker heterogeneity and for UI benefits to depend on
match quality during employment. I demonstrate that eliminating all UI extensions during
the Great Recession could lower the (long-term) unemployment rate by 0.9-3.4 (4) percent-
age points and the average unemployment duration by 27 weeks. Once UI statuses and
benefit levels are accounted for, unobserved heterogeneity of workers does not account for
much of the incidence of long-term unemployment.
In Chapter 4, I study the role of worker’s UI history and the responses of unemploy-
ment and its duration structure to UI extensions. Building on the model in Chapter 3, I
consider three unemployment statuses: insured, formerly insured and uninsured (who never
received UI). To make the model empirically consistent, I introduce a drop in job search ef-
ficiency amongst the insured unemployed workers. This feature increases the persistence of
unemployment, average unemployment duration and long-term unemployment, and mod-
erates their responses to UI extensions. Comparing to Chapter 3, the effects of removing
UI extensions during the Great Recession on the unemployment duration is revised down-
wards to a 24-week reduction. Finally, this extension removal improves welfare but the gain
subsides as the economy recovers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The effects of unemployment insurance (UI) extensions on the aggregate labour
market have long been studied from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
The generous UI extensions and the unprecedented rise in unemployment duration
during the Great Recession in the US have sparked a greater interest in quantifying
the effect of UI extensions on the macroeconomy, particularly unemployment and
its duration structure. This question becomes more complicated since the extensions
themselves were triggered by the state unemployment rate. Some studies find a
limited role of UI extensions whilst others find a more substantial effect of the UI
extensions.
The departure of unified results is mainly due to the methodology of these
studies which focus either on the microeconomic or macroeconomic impact of UI
extensions. This thesis develops a framework which helps reconcile these mixed
outcomes by studying a general equilibrium search and matching model where the
behaviour of workers and firms, and UI policies are realistically incorporated. This
framework is able to distinguish between the microeconomic and macroeconomic
effects of UI extensions. It allows me to study the mechanisms through which UI
extensions affect the macroeconomy as well as the policy experiments and welfare
analyses.
With this research agenda, this thesis consists of three chapters each of which
studies the impact of UI extensions on the macroeconomy from both positive and
normative aspects. In Chapter 2, I quantify the effects of the increasing maximum
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UI duration during recessions on the drop in the correlation between output and
labour productivity in the US since the early 1980’s. One distinctive feature of
the US UI system is the extension of the maximum UI duration that is triggered
when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold making the policy coun-
tercyclical. While the standard UI duration is 26 weeks, the extended UI duration
has increased from the average of 52 weeks during 1948-1985 to 78 weeks after
1985. Using a search and matching model with stochastic UI duration, heteroge-
neous match quality, variable search intensity and on-the-job search, I demonstrate
that the systematic change in the generosity of UI extensions can explain over half
of the fall in the procyclicality of labour productivity.
The increase in the generosity of the UI duration during the times of high un-
employment, often recessions, weakens the links between output and output per
worker via two channels. First, the generous UI policy raises the worker’s outside
option, making the workers become more selective with respect to the quality of
job offers. Second, the UI extensions lower job search effort of the unemployed
causing a slower job-worker matching. The former channel raises the overall pro-
ductivity in recessions. The latter prolongs the extensions as they depend on the
unemployment rate. With the UI extensions being more generous in post-1985 pe-
riods, the upward pressure on the labour productivity is expected to be stronger in
recent recessions than in earlier ones, and contributes to the fall in the procyclicality
of labour productivity.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of UI extensions on the incidence of long-
term unemployment and on the unemployment duration distribution in the US. Us-
ing a search and matching model with endogenous separations, variable job search
intensity, on-the-job search and worker heterogeneity, I allow for the maximum UI
duration to depend on unemployment rate and for UI benefits to depend on match
quality during employment. The model can account for a large fraction of the ob-
served rise in the long-term unemployment and realistic dynamics of the unemploy-
ment duration distribution during the Great Recession. A benefit of using a general
equilibrium model is that I can distinguish between the direct impact of UI exten-
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sions on the number of insured unemployed workers and the responses of job search
behaviour, match formation and match separation. I show that eliminating all UI ex-
tensions during the Great Recession could potentially lower the unemployment rate
by 0.9-3.4 percentage points primarily via the response of job separations. At the
same time, it could drastically reduce the long-term unemployment rate by roughly
4 percentage points and the average unemployment duration by up to 27 weeks via
the response of job search behaviour of insured unemployed workers. The microe-
conomic effect of UI extensions is consistent with the existing literature as its effect
on the unemployment rate is minimal. I find that once the worker heterogeneity in
UI statuses and benefit levels has been accounted for, unobserved heterogeneity of
workers does not account for much of the incidence of long-term unemployment.
In Chapter 4, I study the role of worker’s UI history and the responses of unem-
ployment and its duration structure to UI extensions. Building on Chapter 3’s gen-
eral equilibrium search and matching model with endogenous job separation, vari-
able search intensity with on-the-job search, worker heterogeneity and automatic
UI extension, I consider three unemployment statuses: insured, formerly insured
and uninsured (who never received UI). To make the model empirically consistent,
I introduce a drop in job search efficiency amongst the insured unemployed work-
ers. This feature allows the formerly insured, whose search efficiency has fallen,
to exert similar search efforts to the uninsured, and at the same time find a job
at a slower rate than do the uninsured. The fall in the formerly insured workers’
job finding rate increases the persistence of unemployment duration and long-term
unemployment. Furthermore, the drop in job search efficiency lowers the value
of being insured unemployed which has two implications. First, it lowers the job
separations of employed workers who are on the margin of returning to unemploy-
ment. Second, it increases the job search intensity of the insured (to avoid losing
the search efficiency), and thereby shortens the unemployment spells. This means
that the response of insured unemployment to UI extensions is expected to be more
moderated. Comparing to results from Chapter 3 where the search efficiency is con-
stant throughout an unemployment spell, UI extensions during the Great Recession
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still account for a 0.9-3.4 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate but its
effect on the average unemployment duration is revised downwards to an increase
of 24 weeks (instead of 27 weeks). Finally, I find that on average there is a welfare
gain from eliminating all UI extensions during the Great Recession of 0.14 percent,
which is a combination of 0.27 percent welfare increase for the employed and 1.27
percent welfare drop for the unemployed, and that the total welfare gain subsides as
the economy recovers.
Chapter 2
Unemployment Insurance and
Labour Productivity over the
Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction/Motivation
The labour productivity has become significantly less procyclical in the U.S. since
the early 1980’s. In particular, the cross correlation between output and labour
productivity has fallen from 70 percent in the 1948-1985 period to only around 30
percent thereafter.1 This change in the procyclicality of the labour productivity is
usually coined “the labour productivity puzzle”.
This paper explores the hypothesis that the fall in the procyclicality of labour pro-
ductivity is related to the systematic change in the generosity of the U.S. unem-
ployment insurance (UI) system. One distinctive feature of the U.S. UI system is
the extension of the maximum UI duration that is triggered when the unemploy-
ment rate is above a certain threshold making the policy countercyclical. While
the standard UI duration is 26 weeks, the extended UI duration has increased from
the average of 52 weeks during 1948-1985 to 78 weeks after 1985.2 This increase
in the generosity of the UI duration during the times of high unemployment, of-
ten recessions, weakens the links between output and output per worker via two
1This change in the correlation is depicted in Figure 2.1.
2Figure 2.2 summarises this increasing generosity of the UI duration policy in the U.S.
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channels. First, the generous UI policy raises the worker’s outside option, making
the workers become more selective with respect to the quality of job offers. Sec-
ond, the UI extensions lower job search effort of the unemployed causing a slower
job-worker matching. With the UI extensions being more generous in post-1985 pe-
riods, the upward pressure on the labour productivity is expected to be stronger in
recent recessions than in earlier ones, and contributes to the fall in the procyclicality
of labour productivity.
I extend the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model to incorporate
stochastic UI duration, match-specific productivity, variable search intensity and
on-the-job search. The cyclical behaviour of the average match productivity is key
in explaining the correlation between output and output per worker in the model.
By allowing for variable search intensity, I can separate the contributions of the two
proposed channels, namely, match formations and job search effort, on the fluctu-
ations in labour productivity over the business cycle. Lastly, searching on the job
is allowed so that the model can produce a realistic correlation between unemploy-
ment and vacancies.
I find that the countercyclical UI policy can account for 50 percent of the drop in
the contemporaneous correlation between output and labour productivity observed
in the data. By isolating the contributions of the two channels, I find that both
match formations and job search effort have a significant explanatory power over the
correlation between output and labour productivity. By shutting down one channel,
the other can explain around half of the drop in the correlation that the model can
produce. The model also generates realistic moments of key labour market variables
in the U.S., including the ratio of insured to total unemployment rates over the
business cycle. Lastly, I show that the model can generate the downward-sloping
duration-dependent job finding probability that is qualitatively similar to the data
due to different job finding rates among the unemployed.
I am not the first to investigate the source of the decline in the correlation between
output and labour productivity. Galı´ and van Rens (2014) suggest that decreasing
employment adjustment costs have generated a substantial fall in the procyclicality
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of the labour productivity. Berger (2015) explains the puzzle using a competitive
industry model with the countercyclical restructuring of firms where lower-quality
workers are more likely to be shed during recessions, and this occurs more often in
recent times due to the decreasing labour union power. Garin, Pries and Sims (2016)
use a model with aggregate and island-specific shocks as well as complete markets,
and show that the falling correlation between output and labour productivity is from
the relatively lower importance of aggregate shocks. McGrattan and Prescott (2012)
also study the sources of the labour productivity puzzle by considering intangible
capital and sectoral productivity shocks.
There are a number of studies showing significant effects of changes in the UI
policy on macroeconomic variables including the labour productivity and wages.
From a theoretical perspective, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that an increase
in both the duration and the level of UI benefits can increase labour productivity
and wages in a model with risk aversion and precautionary savings. Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999), using a search and matching model with risk-neutral agents and
two-sided heterogeneity, show that a positive replacement rate with unlimited UI
duration also leads to a higher labour productivity when compared to the case with-
out UI. Empirical results from Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) suggest that a higher
UI benefit level has a positive impact on re-employment wages. Caliendo, Tatsir-
amos and Uhlendorff (2013) find that a longer UI duration increases re-employment
wages, match quality and match stability.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 dis-
cusses the calibration exercise. Section 4 analyses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Setup
The model is based on the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model with the incorporation of aggregate productivity shocks, stochastic UI dura-
tion, heterogeneous match quality, variable search intensity and on-the-job search.
Time is discrete and of monthly frequency. Search is assumed to be random. There
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are a continuum of workers of measure one and a larger continuum of firms each
with either zero or one employee. They are infinitely-lived and risk-neutral, and
discount future utility flows or profits each period by a constant factor β ∈ (0,1).
2.2.1.1 Workers
Workers maximise the expected discounted lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
[
ct−ν(st)
]
where Et(·) is the expectation operator conditional on period t information, ct is
consumption and ν(st) is the disutility of job search effort which can be exerted
during both unemployment and employment. There are three types of workers:
employed (e), unemployed with UI (uUI), and unemployed without UI (uUU ).
An employed worker in period t with match-specific quality m works and receives
wage wm,t from her matched firm. She searches on the job with intensity sem,t that
costs disutility of νe(sem,t) = ae(sem,t)1+de , where ae and de are positive constants. At
the end of the period: (i) her current match is exogenously destroyed with probabil-
ity δ in which case she becomes unemployed immediately, (ii) her match-specific
productivity for t+1 is to be redrawn from a time-invariant distribution F(m) with
probability λ , and (iii) she meets a new vacant firm with probability p(sem,t)≡ pem,t ,
draws a new match quality m and decide whether to stay with the current firm. If
becoming unemployed in t+ 1, an employed worker in period t is eligible for UI
benefits in period t+ 1 with probability (1−ψ) ∈ (0,1]. (1−ψ) can be less than
1 to reflect how some newly unemployed workers are ineligible for or do not claim
UI benefits.3 The employed can always exit employment if desired at the end of
period t.
Given a set of state variables ω = {z,u,uUI,uUU ,em;∀m}4, an employed worker
with match quality m and last period’s employment status j ∈ {e,UI,UU} has the
3In the U.S., the average ratio of the insured unemployed to the total unemployed is 36% between
1967-2014.
4The states variables {z,u,uUI ,uUU ,em;∀m} are respectively the total factor productivity, the un-
employment rate, the insured unemployment rate, the uninsured unemployment rate, and the number
of employed workers in every level of match quality.
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following value function
W j(m;ω) = max
se(m;ω)
w j(m;ω)−νe(se(m;ω))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(match survives, same m)
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(no job-to-job transition)
W e+(m;ω ′)
+ pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(make job-to-job transition)
Em′|m′>m[W e+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(match survives, changing m)
Em′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(no job-to-job transition)
W e+(m′;ω ′)
+ pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(make job-to-job transition)
Em′′|m′′>m′[W e+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
+ δ︸︷︷︸
Pr(match destroyed)
(
(1−ψ)UUI(ω ′)+ψUUU(ω ′)
)]
(2.1)
where W e+(m;ω ′) ≡ max{W e(m;ω ′),(1−ψ)UUI(ω ′) +ψUUU(ω ′)}. Last pe-
riod’s employment status matters for the workers as it represents the outside option
they have when negotiating for wages. Given the recursive nature of the problem,
the time scripts are dropped and variables with superscript ′ are of the next period.
Variables with subscripts m and/or ω depend on the match-specific productivity
and/or the set of aggregate state variables. Eω ′|ω [·] is the mathematical expectation
operator over the distribution of ω ′|ω . Em[·] is similarly defined but taken over the
invariant distribution of m, F(m). UUI(ω) and UUU(ω) are the values of being
insured and uninsured unemployed respectively. The expression for the optimal
search intensity can be found in Appendix 2.6.2.
An insured unemployed worker in period t receives UI benefits b and leisure
flow h.5 She also exerts job search effort sUIt that comes at the utility cost of
νu(sUIt ) = au(sUIt )1+du , where au and du are positive constants. She meets a va-
cant firm with probability p(sUIt )≡ pUIt . A new worker-firm match draws a match-
specific productivity for their production in t+1 from the time-invariant distribution
F(m). They can dissolve the match and return to the unemployment/vacancy pool
5This flow h can be interpreted as the value of leisure, home production, food stamps, etc.
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if the draw is not good enough. An insured unemployed worker in t who fails to
be employed in t+ 1 loses her UI eligibility in t+ 1 with probability φ(ut) where
ut is the unemployment rate at the beginning of t. Since the inverse of φ(ut) is the
expected duration of receiving UI, I use this function to control for the UI duration
that changes with the unemployment rate in the U.S., and discuss its properties in
more detail in the next subsection.6 Insured unemployed workers that meet a firm
but decide to remain unemployed and continue to search for a job may additionally
lose UI eligibility with probability ξ .7 This parameter can be greater than zero to
reflect the job search monitoring in UI recipients.
For an uninsured unemployed worker, the setting is analogous except she does not
receive the UI benefits b and when failing to become employed she simply remains
unemployed without UI. She also exerts job search effort sUUt that comes at the
utility cost of νu(sUUt ) = au(sUUt )1+du , and meets a vacant firm with probability
p(sUUt )≡ pUUt .
The Bellman equations for the insured and uninsured unemployed workers can be
written as, respectively:
UUI(ω) = max
sUI(ω)
b+h−νu(sUI(ω))+β pUI(ω)Em′ω ′|ω
[
max
{
WUI(m′;ω ′),
(1−φ(u))(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI eligible|turn down a firm)
UUI(ω ′)+
(
φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI ineligible|turn down a firm)
UUU(ω ′)
}]
+β (1− pUI(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
(1−φ(u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI eligible|no meeting)
UUI(ω ′)+φ(u)UUU(ω ′)
]
(2.2)
UUU(ω) = max
sUU (ω)
h−νu(sUU(ω))
+β pUU(ω)Em′ω ′|ω
[
max
{
WUU(m′;ω ′),UUU(ω ′)
}]
+β (1− pUU(ω))Eω ′|ω [UUU(ω ′)] (2.3)
6This setting for the UI duration policy, first used in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), helps
reduce the state space greatly.
7The effective probability of an insured unemployed worker being eligible for UI next period
given she turns down a match formation is therefore (1−φ(ut))(1−ξ ).
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The expressions for optimal search intensity for unemployed workers can be
found in Appendix 2.6.2.
2.2.1.2 UI Duration Policy: φ(ut)
Empirically, there are three main types of UI duration policy in the U.S.: (i) the
standard UI duration of 26 weeks (ii) the automatic extension programme that is
triggered by the state unemployment rate (either total, insured or both) called “Ex-
tended Benefits (EB)” programme which extends UI further by 13-20 weeks, and
(iii) the ad-hoc programmes that are often issued in the recessions and also trig-
gered by the state unemployment rate providing additional UI ranging from 13 to 53
weeks. To capture these features, I combine the extensions in (ii) and (iii) together
and make them a function of the unemployment rate u.8 Specifically, φ(u) can as-
sume two values: a low value (implying a longer UI duration) for the recessionary
periods and a high value for the normal periods. There is a threshold unemployment
rate u¯ such that when u≥ u¯, the maximum UI duration increases and is represented
by φL, and when u< u¯, the maximum UI duration remains standard at 26 weeks and
is represented by φH , where 0 < φL < φH < 1. In summary,
φ(ut) = φL1{ut ≥ u¯}+φH1{ut < u¯}; ∀t
I assume this UI duration policy φ(u) is known to all agents; therefore, they expect
a longer UI duration when the unemployment rate is expected to exceed u¯.9 It is
useful to compare the UI duration policy modelled in this paper with that in Mitman
and Rabinovich (2014) who study the effects of maximum UI duration in the U.S.
on jobless recoveries, and Faig, Zhang and Zhang (2012) who study the contribution
of countercyclical UI duration policy on the labour market dynamics. Mitman and
Rabinovich (2014) assume all UI extensions are unexpected and perceived to last
forever by the agents. Although the model in this paper may not be able to replicate
8This is the reason why the unemployment rate is a state variable for the policy functions, and so
is the composition of employed and unemployed workers due to the endogenous destruction margin.
9As explained in Appendix 2.6.1, some UI extensions are not anticipated per se but due to the fact
that the U.S. government has always issued ad-hoc UI extensions during the recessions, it can be ar-
gued that in reality agents expect these additional ad-hoc UI extensions around recessionary periods
(particularly with a high unemployment rate), just not exactly when the policy is implemented.
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exactly the timing of UI extensions like in theirs, it can match quite well most of
the characteristics in the labour markets usually associated with the UI duration
policy, whilst preserving the agents’ rational expectation. Faig et al (2012) let the
UI duration policy vary with aggregate TFP shocks instead of unemployment rates
like in this paper.
In order to finance these benefits, the government collects lump sum tax τt from
all firms that are in production. The tax is set to satisfy the government budget
constraint in each period. Namely,
τt =
buUIt
1−ut ; ∀t
2.2.1.3 Production
Production Function The production technology of a worker-firm match in period
t with match-specific quality m is
ym,t = ztm
where ym,t is the output the match produces and zt is the total factor productivity
(TFP). The price of ym,t is normalised to unity.
Match-specific Productivity By assumption, the variations in labour productivity
in this model only come from the changes in the average match quality given the
aggregate state. A match-specific productivity drawn at the start of any worker-firm
relationship is distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters {β1,β2}.
The distribution function is
F(m) = m+Betacdf(m−m,β1,β2)
where m> 0 is the lowest productivity level. This idiosyncratic productivity m will
remain until the match is either destroyed (with probability δ ) or hit by a shock that
causes the match to redraw m from F(m) (with probability λ ) in each period.
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Aggregate Productivity Shocks There is only one exogenous aggregate shock in
the model which is the shock to the total factor productivity, z, whose natural loga-
rithm has an AR(1) representation with ρz being its persistence. Specifically,
lnzt = ρz lnzt−1+ εt
where εt is normally and independently distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σz > 0,∀t.
2.2.1.4 Firms
Firms maximise the expected discounted profits. They are matched with either one
or zero worker. A firm in operation (matched with a worker) in period t sells output
ym,t , and pays wage wm,t to the worker. It also pays lump sum tax τt . Analogous
to an employed worker, it faces an exogenous match-destruction shock and a shock
to redraw its match-specific productivity. Further, it becomes unmatched when its
worker takes up a new job offer.10 The producing firm can walk away from the
match if desired at the end of period.
Let J j denote the value of a filled job given its worker’s employment status last
period j ∈{e,UI,UU}, andV the value of posting a vacancy. The Bellman equation
for an operating firm is
J j(m;ω) = y(m;ω)−w j(m;ω)− τ(ω)+βEω ′|ω
[
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Je+(m;ω ′)
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Je+(m′;ω ′)
]
+δV (ω ′)
]
(2.4)
where Je+(m;ω ′)≡max{Je(m;ω ′),V (ω ′)}.
A vacant firm pays a flow cost of κ each period to post a vacancy. It meets a
worker with probability qt , and together they draw a match-specific productivity
10The probability that this event happens depends on the match-specific productivity they will
have at the start of next period.
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for t + 1 and decide whether to continue with the production. It cannot directly
choose the type(s) of workers to meet and therefore needs to take into account the
distribution of workers over the employment status and, if employed, match-specific
productivity as well as their search effort.
The value of posting a vacancy is
V (ω) = −κ+βq(ω)Eω ′|ω
[
∑
m
ζ e(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[Je+(m′;ω ′)]
+ζUI(ω)Em′[JUI+(m′;ω ′)]+ζUU(ω)Em′[JUU+(m′;ω ′)]
]
(2.5)
where
ζ e(m) =
(1−λ )semem+λ f (m)see
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
; see=∑
m
semem
ζUI =
sUIuUI
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
; ζUU =
sUUuUU
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
Free entry condition implies V (ω) = 0,∀ω .
2.2.1.5 Meeting Function
The meeting function M(st ,vt) takes the aggregate search intensity st and the num-
ber of job vacancies vt in period t as inputs, and gives a number of meetings between
workers and firms as output.11 The function has constant returns to scale, and is in-
creasing and concave in its arguments. In particular, I assume:12
M(st ,vt) =
stvt(
slt + vlt
) 1
l
(2.6)
Let θt = vt/st denote the market tightness. The worker’s meeting rate per search
unit is M(st ,vt)/st =M(1,θt) which I also call the ‘conditional’ job finding rate per
search unit since a positive match surplus is required for a successful match. The
conditional job finding rate for an unemployed worker of type i ∈ {UI,UU} is thus
11st is the sum of aggregate search intensity of employed and unemployed workers in time t.
12This matching function is similar to the one introduced by den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000)
with an addition of the variable search intensity.
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sitM(1,θt) = pit . Analogously, it is sem,tM(1,θt) = pem,t for an employed worker with
match quality m. The ‘conditional’ job filling rate for a vacant firm is M(st ,vt)/vt =
M(1/θt ,1) = qt .
2.2.2 Wage and Match Surplus
Wages are determined each period using a generalised Nash bargaining rule. The
bargaining power of a worker is µ ∈ (0,1) and that of a firm is 1−µ . Given (m;ω),
the generalised Nash bargaining rule implies three different wages depending on
the worker’s employment status last period j ∈ {e,UI,UU} due to their different
outside options. Namely,
w j(m;ω) = argmax
(
WS j(m;ω)
)µ(
J j(m;ω)
)(1−µ)
(2.7)
where WS j is the surplus from working of type- j employed workers. The worker’s
surpluses are as follows:
WSe(m;ω) = W e(m;ω)− (1−ψ)UUI(ω)−ψUUU(ω)
WSUI(m;ω) = WUI(m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )UUI(ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )UUU(ω)
WSUU(m;ω) = WUU(m;ω)−UUU(ω)
Given the above definitions, the total match surplus of a worker-firm match given
the worker’s previous employment status j is
S j(m;ω) = WS j(m;ω)+ J j(m;ω)
The expressions for these employment-history-dependent surpluses can be found in
Appendix 2.6.2. With the Nash bargaining rule, we have WS j(m;ω) = µS j(m;ω)
and J j(m;ω) = (1−µ)S j(m;ω). Therefore, both the worker and firm always agree
that it is profitable to form a match if and only if S j(m;ω)> 0.
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2.2.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of value functions, W e(m;ω),
WUI(m;ω),WUU(m;ω), UUI(ω), UUU(ω), Je(m;ω), JUI(m;ω), JUU(m;ω), and
V (ω); market tightness θ(ω); search policy se(m;ω), sUI(ω) and sUU(ω); and
wage functions we(m;ω), wUI(m;ω), and wUU(m;ω), such that, given the initial
distribution of workers over the employment status and match productivity, the
government’s policy τ(ω) and φ(ω), and the law of motion for z:
1. The value functions and the market tightness satisfy the Bellman equations
for workers and firms, and the free entry condition, namely, equations (2.1),
(2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5)
2. The search decisions satisfy the FOCs for optimal search intensity, which are
equations (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16)
3. The wage functions satisfy the FOCs for the generalised Nash bargaining rule
(equation (2.7))
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied each period
5. The distribution of workers evolves according to the transition equations
(2.17), (2.18) and (2.19), which can be found in Appendix 2.6.3, consistent
with the maximising behaviour of agents
2.2.4 Solving the Model
In order to compute the market tightness (and, in effect, total match surpluses
and search effort) in the model, the agents in the economy need to keep track
of the distribution of workers over the employment status and match quality
{em ∀m,uUI,uUU} as they enter the vacancy creation condition (eq. 2.5). In or-
der to predict next-period unemployment rate they need to know the inflow to and
outflow from unemployment which are based on this distribution. I use the Krusell
& Smith (1998) algorithm to predict the laws of motion for both the insured and
total unemployment rates as a function of current unemployment rate (u) and TFP
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shock (z). As the distribution of employed workers by match quality does not vary
much over time, I use the stochastic steady state distributions and adjust for the em-
ployment rate that can be inferred from the state variables. I report the performance
of this approximation in Appendix 2.6.4.
2.3 Calibration
I estimate a subset of the parameters by matching key statistics of the U.S. economy,
particularly its labour market. To obtain these statistics from the model, I solve for
the policy functions, and simulate an economy for T periods where T is large and
repeat for 1,000 times. In each simulation, I split the pre- and post-1985 periods
at T1 where 1 < T1 < T and compute relevant statistics including the correlations
between output and labour productivity for these two periods.13
In the simulation, the only difference between pre- and post-1985 periods is the UI
duration policy φ(u). Specifically, I allow for an increase in its generosity during
recessions from pre- to post-1985 periods. As a result, there are two UI duration
regimes. When u < u¯, the maximum UI duration is six months (standard) in both
regimes; however, when u≥ u¯, the maximum UI duration is extended to be in total:
1. Twelve months from period 1 to T1 representing January 1948 to March 1985
2. Eighteen months from T1+1 to T representing April 1985 to June 2014
Table 2.2 summarises all the pre-specified parameters while Table 2.3 describes the
calibrated parameters in the model.
Discretisation I discretise the total factor productivity (z) using Rouwenhurst
(1995)’s method to approximate an AR(1) process with a finite-state Markov chain.
I use 51 nodes to solve the model and 5,100 nodes by linear interpolation in the
simulations.
Similarly, I use 51 equidistant nodes to approximate the Beta distribution of
the match-specific productivity F(m) when solving the model and 5,100 nodes by
13Specifically, T is 5,320 and T1 is 2,980 so that they are proportional to the data used in this
paper. Additionally, I include 200 burn-in periods.
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linear interpolation in the simulations. I define f (m) to be F ′(m)/∑mF ′(m) where
F ′(m) is the probability density function of F(m).
2.3.1 Pre-specified Parameters
The pre-specified parameters in the model are summarised in Table 2.2. For the
discount factor β , I use the value of 0.9967 implying an annual interest rate of 4%
which is the U.S. average. I follow Fujita and Ramey (2012) in pinning down the
vacancy creation cost κ to be 0.0392 using survey evidence on vacancy durations
and hours spent on vacancy posting.14 I assign µ , the worker’s bargaining power,
to be 0.5 following den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
φH and φL are respectively the UI exhaustion rates during normal periods and
recessions. I set φH to be 1/6 which implies the standard maximum UI duration of 6
months given the monthly frequency. The UI exhaustion rates when u≥ u¯ are set to
be φL,pre85 = 1/12 for the pre-1985 periods and φL,post85 = 1/18 for the post-1985
periods implying the maximum UI duration of 12 months (pre-1985 average) and 18
months (post-1985 average) respectively. I set u¯, the threshold unemployment rate
that triggers UI extensions, to be 6% which is on the lower bound of the observed
UI extension criteria.
To determine the flow values of unemployed workers, h and, if insured, b, I use
the results in Gruber (1997). In particular, the drop in consumption for the newly
unemployed workers is 10% when receiving UI and 24% when not receiving UI
given the replacement rate of 50%.15
The slope of the search cost function for the unemployed au is normalised such
that the search effort of the uninsured unemployed sUU is unity when the economy is
in the steady state, similar to Nagypa´l (2005). The power parameters in the search
cost functions for both employed and unemployed workers (de and du) are set to
14Fujita and Ramey (2012) find the vacancy cost to be 17% of a 40-hour-work week. Normalising
the mean productivity to unity, this gives the value of 0.17 per week or 0.0392 per month. The actual
mean productivity may be higher than (but not greatly different from) unity due to truncation from
below of the match-specific quality.
15To find the implied h and b given a set of parameters, I first guess the mean wage for the newly
unemployed and solve the model to obtain the policy functions. I then simulate the model to check
if the guess is close to its counterpart from the simulation. If it is not, I replace the guessed wage for
the newly fired with the one from the simulation and repeat until the two are close enough.
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unity in line with Christensen, Lentz and Mortensen (2005) and Yashiv (2000).
2.3.2 Calibrated Parameters
I use the simulated method of moment to assign values to the remaining eleven
parameters {l,δ ,λ ,ψ,ξ ,ae,m,β1,β2,ρz,σz} by matching twelve moments.16 The
values of these parameters are in Table 2.3. The targeted moments used in the cali-
bration are the first and second moments of the unemployment rate, job destruction
rate and job finding rate, the first moment of the job-to-job transtion rate, aver-
age unemployment duration, and insured unemployment rate, the second moment
and autocorrelation of labour productivity, and the correlation between output and
labour productivity. I describe the data source in this calibration exercise in Ap-
pendix 2.6.1. The model’s generated moments are reported in Table 2.1 along with
their empirical counterparts. Table 2.5 shows other related moments not targeted in
the calibration.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Performance
As shown in Table 2.4, the baseline model despite being over-identified matches
the twelve targeted moments quite well overall including the first moments of un-
employment rate, job finding rate, job destruction rate and job-to-job transition rate.
It can also match the characteristics of the labour productivity quite well. The aver-
age job finding rate is somewhat higher than the data whilst unemployment and job
findings exhibit slightly higher fluctuations than the data. The mean unemployment
duration is lower than the data but this is mainly due to the Great Recession peri-
ods where there is an unprecedented spike in average duration of unemployment.
With regards to related moments that are not targeted (shown in Table 2.5), it can
match the dynamics of the employment rate and insured unemployment rate as well
as the cyclicality of unemployment, job finding rate and job destruction rate quite
well. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies is however moderately
16The calibrated parameters are to minimise the sum of squared residuals of percentage changes
between the model-generated moments and their empirical counterparts.
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negative (-0.27) while it is strongly negative in the data (-0.88).17
Additionally, I also find the path of TFP shocks that yields the detrended output
series identical to the data (using the parameters in Table 2.2 and 2.3), and compare
the resulting model series to the data. Figure 2.5 shows that the model produces sim-
ilar dynamics of unemployment, job findings, and unemployment durations while
job destructions fluctuate too little comparing to the data. It is expected that the de-
trended series from the model may be different from the data (Figure 2.6) since no
low frequency changes is accounted for. However, the model’s insured unemploy-
ment series is close to the data from both the cyclical and raw-data aspects, as shown
in Figure 2.7 and 2.8, especially during recessions when the insured unemployment
rate spikes.
2.4.2 The Correlation Between Output and Labour Productivity
With respect to the labour productivity puzzle, the model can explain a significant
part of the drop in the procyclicality of the labour productivity. Particularly, it can
generate half of the observed fall in the correlation between output and labour pro-
ductivity from pre- to post-1985 periods (0.20 as compared to 0.40) as shown in
Table 2.6. Note that a standard search and matching model without any change in
UI duration does not have different policy functions over the business cycles and
will therefore not be able to produce any shift in this correlation. The correlation
produced by the model is also close to that in the data (0.67 as compared to 0.62).
For the pre-1985 periods, the model-generated correlation is higher than that in the
data (0.81 as compared to 0.70), and the difference is larger for the post-1985 peri-
ods (0.61 as compared to 0.30).
The success of the model in generating a sizeable fall in the correlation comes from
the fall in the UI exhaustion rate during high unemployment (φL) from the pre-
1985 to post-1985 periods which alters the policy functions in the model: (i) match
surpluses and (ii) job search effort. A lower φL in post-1985 periods lowers the
match surpluses and lifts up the average labour productivity during the recessions.
17Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011) show that a longer model period emphasises the time aggrega-
tion issues and lowers the correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
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At the same time, a lower φL lowers the job search effort and, in effect, employment,
thereby prolonging the UI extensions once triggered.
Match Surpluses The existence of the φ(u) creates a discontinuity in the match
surpluses as a function of unemployment rate as shown in Figure 2.3. When u ≥
u¯, φ(u) falls from φH to φL. The fall in φ(u) increases the outside options and
decreases the surpluses from working for most workers.18 Therefore, it is less likely
for matches to be formed, especially those with low match quality m. This puts an
upward pressure on the average labour productivity against negative shocks to z, and
results in a less-than-perfect correlation between output and labour productivity.
Since φL,post85 < φL,pre85, the post-1985 match surpluses fall even further when
u ≥ u¯ comparing to those in pre-1985 periods. This means, in post-1985 periods,
the positive response of labour productivity upon a negative shock is stronger, and
results in a lower correlation between output and labour productivity comparing to
the pre-1985 periods.
Job Search Effort Similar to the previous argument, the existence of φ(u) creates a
drop in the job search effort and job finding rate for the insured unemployed around
u¯ where φ(u) falls from φH to φL as seen in Figure 2.4. When u ≥ u¯, there are
fewer meetings and, as a result, higher unemployment which feeds back to the UI
policy φ(u) to remain at φL for longer.19 With φL,post85 < φL,pre85, the post-1985 job
search effort fall even further when u ≥ u¯ comparing to those in pre-1985 periods.
Unemployment is thus more likely to remain high and lengthen the effects the UI
extension has on the falling correlation between output and labour productivity in
post-1985 periods.
18Specifically, the surpluses of workers with history {e,UI} fall as shown in Figure 2.3. We
can see that the surplus for workers with history UU , however, increases slightly with lower φ(u)
because it is better for this type of workers to become re-employed and increase the likelihood of
receiving UI in the event that they return to unemployment.
19In this model, the persistence of UI extensions interacts with the persistence of unemployment,
which is in line with the hypothesis in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) where a longer UI duration
increases the persistence of unemployment.
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2.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions (IRFs) of key variables in the model are useful in
demonstrating how the UI duration policy affects the correlation between output and
labour productivity. Figure 2.9 and 2.10 show respectively the IRFs of output (y),
labour productivity (LP) and average match quality (E(m)) to 1% and 2% negative
TFP (z) shocks from its steady state for pre-1985 (solid lines) and post-1985 (dashed
lines) periods.
In the case of 1% negative deviation, there is not much difference between the re-
sponses of variables in pre- and post-1985 periods because unemployment does not
exceed u¯ and trigger the UI extension. We can see the labour productivity recovers
as soon as the shock subsides while output reaches its trough 6 months after the
shock occurs for both eras. Therefore, the correlation between output and labour
productivity is less than perfect during this time but there is hardly any difference
between pre- and post-1985 periods.
On the contrary, the IRFs between pre- and post-1985 periods are very different
when the size of the shock is instead 2% negative deviation from the steady state.
This is mainly because the UI extension is triggered for the post-1985 periods (from
the fifth month onwards) but not in the pre-1985 periods where the IRFs are almost
identical to the 1% deviation case. As discussed in the previous subsection, a ex-
tension of UI tends to raise the overall match quality as can be seen in Figure 2.10.
The average match quality in post 1985 stays positive throughout once the UI exten-
sion is triggered. Labour productivity also behaves similarly. Despite its negative
response, it recovers at a faster rate than in pre-1985 periods once UI extension is
in place. More starkly is the response of output that reaches its trough 15 months
after the initial shock, almost one year later than the cases without UI extension
(the pre-1985 period with 2% shock and both pre- and post-1985 periods with 1%
shock). The quicker recovery of labour productivity combined with the highly per-
sistent negative output response makes the correlation between output and labour
productivity in post-1985 periods much smaller than that in pre-1985 periods.
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2.4.4 Decomposition of Countercyclical UI Duration Effects
As a change in the UI duration policy affects the procyclicality of labour produc-
tivity through the change in match surpluses and job search effort, I decompose
the effect of this policy change to measure the contribution of each channel to the
business cycle properties of labour productivity.
In the first case, to see how much the change in job search effort after 1985 ex-
plains the fall in the labour productivity’s procyclicality, I assume both workers and
firms always use the pre-1985 match surpluses throughout the simulation to make
decisions on match formation and dissolution (i.e., the policy functions for match
surpluses are the same for pre- and post-1985 periods). In the second case, I fix
the job search effort at the pre-1985 periods to estimate the impact of the change in
match surpluses, that is due to the increase in the generosity of UI duration policy,
on the procyclicality of the labour productivity.
It turns out that both match surpluses and job search effort explain a substantial
part of the drop in the output-labour-productivity correlation and deliver a higher
overall correlation of 0.76-0.77 as shown in Table 2.7. It is rather surprising that the
search effort channel contributes as just much as the match surplus channel to the
drop since it only affects insured unemployed workers whilst the change in match
surpluses affects most workers. This finding shows that in order to obtain a sizeable
shift in the correlation between output and labour productivity, the variable search
intensity margin is just as important as the total match surpluses that workers and
firms use to determine match formations and dissolutions. Assuming search effort
to be constant can undermine the effect of UI duration policy on the behaviour of
the labour productivity over the business cycles.
2.4.5 Hazard Rate of Exiting Unemployment
Modelling heterogeneity in unemployed workers also has an implication for the
duration-dependent job finding probabilities. Contrary to a constant unemployment
exit rate in a standard search and matching model (with no participation margins),
the model in this paper can produce a realistic feature of the rate an unemployed
worker finds a job by durations of unemployment. Empirically, this rate is de-
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creasing and usually convex in the time spent in unemployment, the properties that
the model can replicate as depicted by Figure 2.11. I present the hazard functions
in two cases: (i) the insured unemployed workers remain insured throughout the
unemployment spell, and (ii) the insured unemployed become uninsured with prob-
ability φH each period (implying the standard UI duration during normal times), as
these are the lower and upper bounds for the realised maximum UI durations. The
reason the hazard rate is decreasing in unemployment duration is due to the change
in the composition of unemployed workers. Uninsured unemployed workers have
a higher job finding rate and therefore exit unemployment faster than the insured
type. With time, unemployed workers are more represented by the insured type, the
exit rate therefore falls with the unemployment duration and only becomes constant
when there is no uninsured type left in the unemployment pool.
When compared to the data, Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016) have
estimated this hazard rate parametrically controlling for observable characteristics
from the CPS data between 2002-2007. They find that the relative job finding rate
(normalised to unity at zero duration) drops sharply during the first 8-10 months,
after which the rate becomes stable around 0.4-0.5. This function drops slightly
faster than what my model can produce given that the insured unemployed remain
insured throughout the spell (case (i)). However, when the stochastic UI exhaustion
rate is taken into account (case (ii)), the model can explain only partially the drop
in the hazard function during the first months of unemployment. The model’s true
performance lies between these two functions as the maximum UI durations can
vary between 6 months to almost 2 years.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper is set out to quantify how much the increasingly generous UI duration
policy during recessionary periods in the U.S. contributes to the substantial fall in
the procyclicality of its labour productivity over the business cycle. The results
are obtained from a search and matching model with stochastic UI duration, het-
erogeneous match quality, variable search intensity and on-the-job search. This
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model can produce 50% of the empirical drop in the correlation between output and
labour productivity. The countercyclical UI duration policy lowers the total match
surpluses in bad times and therefore raises the average labour productivity while
output is more negatively affected. At the same time, this policy lowers job search
effort of the insured unemployed, contributing to a higher persistence in unemploy-
ment and thus the UI extension (since it is a function of the unemployment rate)
and its effect on the correlation between output and labour productivity. Since the
UI duration policy is more generous after 1985, its effect via these two channels is
stronger than that in pre-1985 periods, which gives rise to the falling procyclicality
of the labour productivity. Lastly, the model performs very well in producing key
statistics in the labour markets especially the ratio of insured to total unemployment
rates over the business cycles.
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2.6 Appendix for Chapter 2
2.6.1 Data
Both empirical and simulated (logged) data in this paper are detrended by using the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly data
and of 129600 for monthly data following Ravn & Uhlig (2002). When necessary,
monthly empirical series are converted to quarterly frequency by using a quarterly
average except for the job finding rate and the job destruction rate whose quarterly
series are obtained by iterating the law of motion for unemployment. The range
of data (unless stated otherwise) is from January 1948 to June 2014. All series are
seasonally adjusted.
2.6.1.1 Unemployment
Monthly data on unemployment level and labour force level are obtained from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
U.S. Department of Labor, from January 1948 to June 2014.20 They do not include
persons marginally attached to the labour force. The ratio of these two series forms
the official definition of unemployment rate (‘U3’ as labelled by BLS).
2.6.1.2 Output and Labour Productivity
For output, I use the quarterly real GDP series provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce, and I use the BLS quarterly series
for non-farm output per job to represent the labour productivity.21
2.6.1.3 Transition Rates
I obtain the monthly job finding rates and job destruction rates as is done in Shimer
(2005) without correcting for time aggregation bias.22 As converting the monthly
turnover rates to quarterly ones by simply computing a quarterly average would
20The series IDs are respectively LNS13000000 and LNS11000000.
21The series ID for labour productivity is PRS85006163.
22By correcting for the time aggregation bias, the destruction rates will be higher and closer to the
BLS data. However, since Shimer (2005)’s correction means a newly unemployed worker has on
average half a month to find a new job before being recorded as unemployed, one must also adjust
the Bellman equations in a discrete-time model accordingly, otherwise the implied unemployment
will be too high when the model period is longer than half a month.
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overestimate the job finding rates and underestimate the job destruction rates, one
should iterate the law of motion for monthly unemployment (umot ) instead.
umot+1 = (1−ρmof ,t )umot +ρmox,t (1−umot ) (2.8)
umot+2 = (1−ρmof ,t+1)umot+1+ρmox,t+1(1−umot+1) (2.9)
umot+3 = (1−ρmof ,t+2)umot+2+ρmox,t+2(1−umot+2) (2.10)
where ρmof ,t and ρ
mo
x,t are respectively the monthly job finding and destruction rates
at time t. Replacing umot+2 in (2.10) with u
mo
t using (2.8) and (2.9) and setting u
q
t+1 ≡
umot+3 and u
q
t ≡ umot , one can obtain23
uqt+1 = (1−ρqf ,t)uqt +ρqx,t(1−uqt ) (2.11)
where
ρqx,t = ρmox,t+2+ρ
mo
x,t+1(1−ρmox,t+2−ρmof ,t+2)
+ρmox,t (1−ρmox,t+1−ρmof ,t+1)(1−ρmox,t+2−ρmof ,t+2) (2.12)
ρqf ,t = 1−ρx,t−
2
∏
i=0
(1−ρmox,t+i−ρmof ,t+i) (2.13)
2.6.1.4 UI Duration Policy
Data on UI extensions in the U.S. is provided by Employment and Training Ad-
ministration (ETA), U.S. Department of Labor, which collects and summarises the
Federal Unemployment Compensation Laws dating back to August 1935. There are
3 main types of UI durations: (i) the standard UI duration of 26 weeks (ii) the auto-
matic extension programme that is triggered by the state unemployment rate (either
total, insured or both) called “Extended Benefits (EB)” programme which extends
UI further by 13-20 weeks, and (iii) the ad-hoc programmes that are often issued
in the recessions and also triggered by the state unemployment rate providing addi-
23We could also obtain the quarterly series of unemployment rates by collecting the first monthly
unemployment rate of every quarter as in Robin (2011) instead of averaging every 3 months. This
does not change significantly the statistics reported in this paper.
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tional UI ranging from 13 to 53 weeks.24 The maximum duration of unemployment
benefits in the U.S. are shown chronologically in Figure 2.2 where I sum together
all types of UI durations. Apart from the early 1980’s recessions, the extended
UI duration has been steadily increasing throughout the 1948-2014 period with its
highest level at 99 weeks during the Great Recession.
2.6.2 Expressions for Optimal Search Intensity and Match Sur-
plus
Given the Bellman equations for the three types of workers {e,UI,UU}, we can
take the first derivative to find the optimal search effort for these workers. The first
order conditions are as follows
ν ′e(s
e(m;ω)) = −β (1−δ )M(1,θ(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
... (2.14)
(1−λ )(1−F(m))
(
WSe+(m;ω ′)−Em′|m′>m[WSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+ λEm′
[
(1−F(m′))(WSe+(m′;ω ′)−Em′′|m′′>m′[WSe+(m′′;ω ′)])
]]
ν ′u(s
UI(ω)) = βM(1,θ(ω))×
Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI(m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ)US(ω ′)
]
(2.15)
ν ′u(s
UU(ω)) = βM(1,θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUU(m′;ω ′),0}
]
(2.16)
where ν ′i (s) = ai(1+di)sdi; i ∈ {e,u}.
The surplus from being insured (as opposed to uninsured) of unemployed workers
is defined as
US(ω) ≡ UUI(ω)−UUU(ω)
The expressions for the total surpluses of worker-firm matches given the workers’
previous employment statuses (e,UI,UU) and the surplus of being insured unem-
ployed are respectively:
24For a more detailed account, see the ETA website. Appendix B of Mitman and Rabinovich
(2014) also provides a good summary.
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Se(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (1−ψ)(b+h−νu(sUI(ω)))
−ψ(h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−ψ)pUI(ω)Em′[µSUI+(m′;ω ′)]
−ψ pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)
(
φ + pUI(ω)(1−φ)ξ
)
US(ω ′)
]
SUI(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (1−φ)(1−ξ )(b+hνu(sUI(ω)))
−(1− (1−φ)(1−ξ ))(h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )pUI(ω)Em′[µSUI+(m′;ω ′)]
−
(
1− (1−φ)(1−ξ )
)
pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+
(
1−ψ− (1−φ)2(1−ξ )(1−ξ pUI(ω))
)
US(ω ′)
]
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SUU(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)US(ω ′)
]
US(ω) = b−νu(sUI(ω))+νu(sUU(ω))
+βEω ′|ω
[
pUI(ω)µEm′[SUI+(m′;ω ′)]− pUU(ω)µEm′[SUU+(m′;ω ′)]
(1−φ)
(
1−ξ pUI(ω)
)
US(ω ′)
]
2.6.3 Transitions
Employment The mass of employed agents in t with match quality m, em,t , evolves
as follows
em,t+1 =
(
(1−δ )(1−λ )(1− pem,t+ pem,tF(m))em,t
+(1−δ )(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
+(1−δ )λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pem′,t+ pem′,tF(m))em′,tdm′
+(1−δ )λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
)
1{Sem,t+1 > 0}
+ f (m)(uUIt p
UI
t )1{SUIm,t+1 > 0}
+ f (m)(uUUt p
UU
t )1{SUUm,t+1 > 0} (2.17)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. The total employment is the sum of all em-
ployed workers over the match qualities et =
∫
em,t dm and the aggregate output can
be computed as yt = zt
∫
m · em,t dm.
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Job Destructions The job destruction rate of employed workers of type m and the
average job destruction rate are respectively
ρx,t(m) =
δ if S
e
m,t+1 > 0,
1 otherwise
ρx,t =
δ
∫
{m:Sem,t+1>0} e
post
m,t dm+
∫
{m:Sem,t+1≤0} e
post
m,t dm
et
where epostm,t = (1−λ )(1− pem,t+ pem,tF(m))em,t
+(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
+λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pem′,t+ pem′,tF(m))em′,tdm′
+λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
denotes employed workers with match productivity m at the end of the period t.
Job Findings The job finding rate for an unemployed worker of type i= {UI,UU}
and the average job finding rate are respectively
ρ if ,t =
∫
ρ if ,t(m) f (m)dm
ρ f ,t =
uUIt ρUIf ,t +u
UU
t ρUUf ,t
uUIt +uUUt
where ρ if ,t(m) =
p
i
t if S
i
m,t+1 > 0,
0 otherwise
Job-to-job Transitions The match-specific and the average job-to-job transition
rates are respectively
ρeem,t = (1−δ )
(
(1−λ )pem,t(1−F(m))Em′>m[1{Sem′,t+1 > 0}]
+λ
∫
m′
pem,t f (m
′)(1−F(m′))Em′′>m′[1{Sem′′,t+1 > 0}]dm′
)
ρeet =
∫
mρeem,tem,tdm
et
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Unemployment The mass of unemployed workers with and without UI benefits as
well as the total unemployment evolve respectively as follows
uUIt+1 = (1−φt)(1− pUIt )uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUIt (1−φt)(1−ξ )pUIt uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
+ (1−ψ)ρx,tet︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, not losing UI
(2.18)
uUUt+1 = φt(1− pUIt )uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUIt
(
φt+(1−φt)ξ
)
pUIt u
UI
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
+(1−ρUUf ,t )uUUt + ψρx,tet︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, losing UI
(2.19)
ut+1 = uUIt+1+u
UU
t+1 (2.20)
where χUIt ≡
∫
1{SUIm,t+1 ≤ 0} f (m)dm denotes the rate the newly formed matches
with uUI are not viable.
2.6.4 Performance of the Approximation Method
Below I report the average percentage deviations (in absolute value) of the 1st, 2nd,
3rd and 4th moments of the approximated distribution of employed workers over
match quality from the distributions obtained from the simulation. The method de-
scribed in the Model section delivers distributions that are less than 1% different
in terms of the 1st, 2nd and 4th moments from the actual distributions found in
the simulation. However it generates the 3rd moment that is more than 3% differ-
ent from its counterpart since the skewness is more sensitive to the cut-offs in the
distributions coming from endogenous destructions.
Table 2.1: Performance of the Approximation Method
Percentage deviation (%) Mean Std
1st moment 0.4260 0.3499
2nd moment 0.3790 0.4621
3rd moment 3.7461 3.4375
4th moment 0.1809 0.2995
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Table 2.2: Pre-specified Parameters For Baseline Model (Monthly)
Parameter Description Value Source/Remarks
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.0392 Fujita & Ramey (2012)
µ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Den Haan, Ramey & Watson (2000)
φH UI exhaustion rate 1/6 6 months max UI duration, ETA
φL,I UI exhaustion rate 1/12 12 months max UI duration, ETA
φL,II UI exhaustion rate 1/18 18 months max UI duration, ETA
b UI benefit 0.1221 Gruber (1997) given E(w) = 0.872
h Leisure flow 0.6627 Gruber (1997) given E(w) = 0.872
u¯ UI policy threshold 0.06 ETA
au Search cost function 0.1287 Normalisation
du,de Search cost function 1 Christensen et al (2004), Yashiv (2000)
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters For Baseline Model (Monthly)
Parameter Description Value
l Matching function 0.6010
δ Exogenous destruction 0.0234
λ Redrawing new m 0.5000
ψ Losing UI after becoming unemp. 0.4900
ξ Losing UI after meeting firm 0.4605
ae Search cost function 0.1100
m Lowest match-specific prod. 0.4689
β1 Match-specific prod. distribution 2.8024
β2 Match-specific prod. distribution 4.5101
ρz Persistence of TFP 0.9715
σz Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0056
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Table 2.4: Targeted Moments
Moment Data Model
E(u) 0.0583 0.0603
E(ρ f ) 0.4194 0.4387
E(ρx) 0.0248 0.0258
E(ρee) 0.0320 0.0321
E(udur) (weeks) 15.4287 12.7217
E(uUI/u) 0.0290 0.0384
std(u) 0.1454 0.1633
std(ρ f ) 0.0999 0.1203
std(ρx) 0.0890 0.0836
std(LP) 0.0131 0.0123
corr(LP,LP−1) 0.7612 0.7716
corr(y,LP) 0.6186 0.6663
Table 2.5: Moments Not Targeted
Moment Data Model
std(udur) (weeks) 6.9941 5.7471
std(uUI) 0.1657 0.2250
std(v) 0.1408 0.0611
std(u)/std(y) 8.8121 7.2951
std(e)/std(y) 0.9900 0.9795
std(w)/std(y) 0.3878 0.4959
corr(y,ρ f ) 0.8009 0.9118
corr(y,ρx) -0.8414 -0.7973
corr(y,u) -0.8825 -0.8971
corr(u,v) -0.8786 -0.2675
corr(y,v) 0.8850 0.5353
E(m)pre85 - 0.8814
E(m)post85 - 0.8824
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Table 2.6: Correlation Between Output (y) and Labour Productivity (LP)
Data Model
corr(y,LP) 0.6186 0.6663
corr(y,LP)pre85 0.7015 0.8150
corr(y,LP)post85 0.2954 0.6111
∆corr(y,LP) 0.4061 0.2039
Table 2.7: Decomposition of UI Effects on corr(y,LP)
Data Baseline S-fixed s-fixed
corr(y,LP) 0.6186 0.6663 0.7617 0.7727
corr(y,LP)pre85 0.7015 0.8150 0.8470 0.8490
corr(y,LP)post85 0.2954 0.6111 0.7239 0.7390
∆corr(y,LP) 0.4061 0.2039 0.1231 0.1100
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Figure 2.1: Correlations between output and output per worker for 1948Q1-1985Q1 and
1985Q2-2014Q2 (both variables are of quarterly frequency and detrended using
the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600) (the green lines are linear
fitted trends) (Source: BEA and BLS)             	
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Figure 2.2: Maximum UI duration (in weeks) as plotted as against time periods from
1948Q1 to 2014Q2 (shaded areas denote recessions) (Source: ETA)               	 
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Figure 2.3: Total match surpluses Si; i ∈ {e,UI,UU} plotted against unemployment rate
(u): For the match-specific and total factor productivities at the middle nodes                           	 	  
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Figure 2.4: Conditional job finding rates (worker’s meeting rates) by employment statuses
plotted against unemployment rate: For the match-specific and total factor pro-
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Figure 2.5: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) detrended series of main vari-
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Figure 2.6: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) raw series of main variables         	
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Figure 2.7: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) detrended series of insured un-
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Figure 2.8: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) raw series of insured unem-
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Figure 2.11: Duration-dependent Job Finding Probability (implied UI durations in brack-
ets)              	 
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Chapter 3
Long-term Unemployment Dynamics
and Unemployment Insurance
Extensions
3.1 Introduction/Motivation
From the onset of the Great Recession, the US labour market exhibits dynamics
never seen before in previous recessions. Underlying the persistently high unem-
ployment is an unprecedented rise in the long-term unemployment (as represented
by those whose unemployment duration is greater than 6 months) as seen in Figure
3.1. The long-term unemployment rate had never been above 2 percent apart from
the early 1980s recession where it reached 2.5 percent. During the Great Reces-
sion, it went up to 4.4 percent representing 46 percent of the total unemployment
population whilst its share was only 26 percent in the early 1980s recession.
This paper investigates the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) extensions on
the long-term unemployment and the distribution of unemployment duration over
the business cycles using a search and matching model in general equilibrium.
While the analysis applies to the cyclical fluctuations in general, the focus of the
paper is on the Great Recession, the period during which UI eligible unemployed
workers could receive benefits for the maximum of 99 weeks (whereas the standard
maximum UI duration is only 26 weeks) as depicted in Figure 3.2. From the same
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Figure, it can be seen that the UI duration has been extended during recessionary
periods since late 1950s and its generosity, as measured by weeks of maximum
UI duration, has been increasing over time (apart from one extension in the early
1980s). In the US, there are primarily two types of UI extensions: (1) automatic
UI extensions that are in the federal laws since 1970s and are triggered by the state
(insured) unemployment rate, and (2) discretionary UI extensions that are issued
specifically during the recessions.1 Figure 3.3 shows that both the automatic and
total UI extensions have been increasing in their generosity and that discretionary
extensions are a feature of every recession since late 1950s.
Based on this countercyclical UI system, I extend the standard search and match-
ing model to incorporate unemployment-dependent UI extensions, variable search
intensity, endogenous separations, on-the-job search, and worker’s heterogeneity in
terms of productivity and benefit level. The job search decision of a worker depends
not only on their UI status, benefit level, and individual productivity but also on the
aggregate productivity and the unemployment rate which determine when and for
how long UI extensions will occur.
Many empirical studies have documented how the labour market outcomes of un-
employed workers can differ with respect to their UI status. These differences
come in many forms including their unemployment duration and unemployment
exit rate (Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990),
Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000)), job search intensity (Krueger and Mueller
(2010, 2011)) and consumption (Gruber (1997)). Katz and Meyer (1990) find a
large fraction of UI recipients expect to be recalled and represent over half of the
unemployment duration in the sample. This is related to a recent work by Fujita and
Moscarini (2015) who show that the recall rate rises during the recession and that the
negative duration dependence in unemployment exit rate only occurs among those
who are eventually recalled. I provide further empirical evidence regarding the dif-
1The automatic extensions are called extended benefits (EB) whilst the ad-hoc extensions are
under different names. For example, in 1958, the programme was called Temporary Unemployment
Compensation Act (TUC) and in 1961, it was Temporary Unemployment Extended Compensation
Act (TEUC). From 1991 onwards, the discretionary extensions have been under the name Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC).
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ferences in labour market outcomes of unemployed workers with and without UI
by studying their transition rates from unemployment and the stocks of unemploy-
ment durations. I find that the differences in the unemployment exit rates between
insured and uninsured unemployed workers are more pronounced in 2010, when UI
was extended up to 99 weeks, than in 2008 when no extensions was in place. As
a result, in 2010, over half of the long-term unemployed workers were represented
by the insured unemployed whilst in 2008 they represented only 15 percent of the
long-term unemployed.
There is a large literature studying the effects of the recent UI extensions on the
unemployment exit rate and total unemployment during the Great Recession. Em-
pirical studies include (but not limited to) Farber and Valletta (2011), Fujita (2011),
Valletta and Kuang (2010), Mazumder (2011), Rothstein (2011), Hagedorn, Kara-
han, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015), Barnichon and Figura (2014), and Hagedorn,
Manovskii, and Mitman (2015). Most of these studies focus on the “micro” effect
of the UI extensions, namely, the direct impact of increasing maximum UI dura-
tion on the probability of exiting unemployment or on the job search decisions of
the unemployed. They have found a small but significant impact of UI extensions.
A notable exception is Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015). They
take into account the response of job creation to benefit extensions and find a larger
effect on unemployment.
A benefit of using a general equilibrium model is that I can distinguish between
the direct impact of UI extensions on the number of insured unemployed workers
and the responses of job search behaviour, match formation and match separation.
Based on the direct UI effect and the response from job search (which I classify
as the “micro” effect), I find that the peak of the unemployment rate would be 0.9-
1.7 percentage points smaller if there was no extensions during the Great Recession.
This is consistent with estimates from the existing empirical literature that are in the
range of 0.1-1.8 percentage points.2 With respect to the general equilibrium effect
2Fujita (2011) finds the UI extensions contribute to 0.8-1.8 percentage points increase in the
unemployment rate during the Great Recession. Aaronson et al (2010)’s estimates are between 0.5-
1.25 percentage points. Valetta and Kuang (2010)’s estimate is 0.4 percentage points. Rothstein
(2011)’s estimates are between 0.1-0.5 percentage points.
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where the response of match formation/separation decisions are also considered,
I find a larger impact of the UI extensions similar to results from Hagedorn et al
(2015). In this paper, however, the additional effect is from the match separation
margin.
Quantitative studies on the effects of UI extensions are conducted by Mitman and
Rabinovich (2014) on jobless recoveries, Faig, Zhang and Zhang (2012) on the
volatility of unemployment and vacancies, and Nakajima (2012) whose focus is
on the Great Recession. Nakajima (2012) studies an economy with transition dy-
namics and finds that the UI extensions can contribute to the rise of 1.4 percentage
points in the unemployment rate. The model in this paper is most similar to that
in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014). They use an equilibrium search and matching
model to study the impact of UI extensions on jobless recoveries. In their model,
the discretionary UI extensions are treated as unexpected and assumed to last for-
ever by the agents in the economy (i.e., agents have adaptive expectations) such
that the model’s simulated UI extensions are exactly the same as the data. In this
paper, I assume all the UI extensions are systematic and the agents have rational
expectations regarding the timing and the length of these UI extensions which are
driven solely by the aggregate productivity (via unemployment rate).3 As a result,
agents in my model would respond less strongly to UI extensions in comparison to
theirs, in terms of both the job search intensity and the decision to form or dissolve
a match. Additionally, workers in my model have control over their job search in-
tensity whilst in their model workers do not make decisions on how hard to look for
a job. Therefore, unemployed workers in my model have heterogeneous job finding
rates according to their UI status and benefit level whilst there is a single job finding
rate for all unemployed workers in their model. As previously mentioned, I show
in the empirical section of the paper that insured and uninsured unemployed work-
ers do have different labour market outcomes and that this gap widened during the
Great Recession.
Heterogeneity in the job finding rates is crucial in explaining the unemploy-
3I show in the results section how consistent the model’s generated UI extensions are with the
data.
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ment duration structure in the US labour market. As shown in Wiczer (2015), a
single job finding rate implies the average unemployment duration and long-term
unemployment that are just over half of what can be observed in the data.4 This
point regarding an inadequacy of a single job finding rate is key to the results in this
paper. Not only unemployed workers in my model exit unemployment at different
rates according to their UI status but even the insured workers themselves also have
different exit rates due to different benefit levels.5
This paper also complements the literature on the incidence of the long-term un-
employment and worker heterogeneity. Ahn and Hamilton (2016) use a state space
model to uncover the unobserved heterogeneity of workers in terms of unemploy-
ment exit rate. Worker heterogeneity is also the focus in Hornstein (2012) in ac-
counting for unemployment dynamics with different durations. Ravn and Sterk
(2013) consider this difference in unemployment exit rates together with incom-
plete markets and price rigidities to study the amplification mechanism on unem-
ployment. Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014) offer an alternative explanation on
the fluctuations of aggregate unemployment and its duration over business cycles by
studying the role of unemployed workers’ occupational mobility. Ahn (2016) ex-
tends Ahn and Hamilton (2016) to incorporate various observable characteristics of
the workers (but not their UI statuses). My paper considers a degree of observed and
unobserved worker heterogeneity where the former comes from the unemployment
insurance status and the latter is from the worker’s productivity which eventually
affects the job finding rate.
To show how consistent the unemployment series at different durations from
the model are with the empirical data, I estimate the same non-linear state space
model in Ahn and Hamilton (2016) using Maximum Likelihood. I find the model’s
estimates are similar to the empirical values. This has implications on the sources
of long-term unemployment. I show that their interpretation of unobserved het-
erogeneity is related to the UI statuses in my model since the insured unemployed
4Wiczer (2015) studies the rise of long-term unemployment using occupational mismatch.
5In Chapter 2, I show that a single job finding rate for insured unemployed workers hardly affects
the distribution of unemployment durations. In this paper, I allow for the job finding rates of insured
unemployed workers to vary with the benefit level and individual-specific productivity.
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workers have a lower unemployment exit rate. I find that the worker’s productivity
does not matter much once different UI statuses are taken into account.
The heterogeneity in unemployment exit rates results in the negative duration de-
pendence that is purely compositional. At longer durations, the pool of unemployed
workers is more represented by those with lower exit rates. The duration-dependent
unemployment exit rate is a featured result in several studies including Clark and
Summers (1979), Machin and Manning (1999) and Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2008).
Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016) analyse the impact of a genuine dura-
tion dependence in unemployment exit rate along with the labour force participation
margin on the rise of long-term unemployment. They also find little account for the
observable characteristics of the workers (but they do not include UI statuses in
their analysis). Elsby, Hobijn, S¸ahin and Valetta (2011) study the flows between
non-participation and unemployment at different unemployment durations. Aaron-
son, Mazumder, and Schechter (2010) analyse the impact of the transition rates
between employment, unemployment and non-participation as well as the labour
force demographics on the long-term unemployment. While the labour force par-
ticipation margin is undoubtedly important in accounting for unemployment, the
model in this paper abstracts from it. I show in the empirical section that the labour
force exit rate varied only little during the Great Recession even when conditioned
on the UI status and several observable characteristics of workers. Barnichon and
Figura (2014) also find similar results that UI extensions did not affect the labour
force participation rate in the past 35 years.
To preview the results, the model can account for a large fraction of the observed
rise in the long-term unemployment and realistic dynamics of the unemployment
duration distribution during the Great Recession. The main driver of the long-term
unemployment is the response of job search behaviour to UI extensions whilst the
job separation margin is more important in accounting for the observed rise in total
unemployment. In a counterfactual exercise, I show that eliminating all UI exten-
sions during the Great Recession could potentially lower the unemployment rate by
0.9-3.4 percentage points. At the same time, it could drastically reduce the long-
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term unemployment rate by roughly 4 percentage points and the average unemploy-
ment duration by up to 27 weeks. The micro effect of UI extensions is consistent
with the existing literature as its effect on the unemployment rate is minimal. I also
analyse the impact of Reachback provision, a programme that provides UI elig-
ility to unemployed workers who have already exhausted their benefits prior to the
extensions of UI and have found a small impact on unemployment.
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the impact of UI extensions on
the incidence of long-term unemployment and on the unemployment duration dis-
tribution in a general equilibrium model, taking into account the responses of job
search, match formation and job separation under rational expectation regarding the
maximum UI duration. The framework is useful for policy experiments to study the
mechanisms through which the UI extensions affect the aggregate labour market.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some motivating data on UI
extensions and long-term unemployment during the Great Recession. Section 3 de-
scribes the model. Section 4 discusses the calibration exercise. Section 5 analyses
the results under the baseline model and counterfactual experiments, and it also dis-
cusses welfare implications. Section 6 measures how consistent the model’s results
are with the empirical data. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
I first examine the empirical evidence that (1) workers currently receiving UI ben-
efits tend to find a job at a slower rate than those without UI and that (2) this gap
between insured and uninsured workers’ job finding rates was more pronounced
during the Great Recession. These findings are important for explaining the surge
in the long-term unemployment. I study the transition rates from unemployment to
employment, unemployment and out-of-labour-force (OLF) (namely UE, UU and
UOLF rates respectively) as well as the distributions of unemployment duration
between 2006 and 2014 according to the UI statuses and several other observable
characteristics of unemployed workers including age, education, gender, industry,
occupation, reasons for unemployment and recall expectation. They are constructed
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from the CPS Basic Monthly Data and CPS Displaced Worker, Employee Tenure,
and Occupational Mobility Supplement. I consider workers whose age is 16 years
or older. Since the workers’ UI history is only surveyed when the supplement takes
place (every two years), I obtain the transition rates by merging the January sup-
plement data with the basic monthly data for the following February. Transition
rates are calculated as a fraction of unemployed workers conditioned on their UI
status (i.e., whether they are currently receiving UI benefits or not) and possibly
other characteristics moving into either employment, unemployment or OLF in the
following month.
I focus on the changes in the transition rates in January 2008, when UI exten-
sions were not in place, relative to January 2010, conveniently when the UI duration
was just extended to 99 weeks in most states. Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 summarise re-
spectively the UE, UU and UOLF rates in 2008 and 2010. I subsequently show that
as a result of the increase in UE rate and the drop in UU rate, the share of long-term
unemployed workers who were receiving UI benefits became larger in 2010 and
2012. The shares during 2006-2014 are summarised in Table 3.5. I contrast them
with the shares of newly unemployed workers (with duration less than 5 weeks)
who were receiving UI benefits in Table 3.6.
Job findings Table 3.2 shows that the job finding rate of current UI recipients is
generally smaller than that of non-UI recipients and this gap became larger during
the Great Recession. In January 2008, when there was no UI extensions, unem-
ployed workers with and without UI found a job at rate 21 percent and 28 percent
respectively, whilst in January 2010, when the maximum UI duration was 99 weeks,
the job finding rate of insured unemployed workers fell dramatically to 7 percent,
11 percentage points smaller than that of the uninsured unemployed. The UE rate
by UI status for 2006-2014 periods is plotted in Figure 3.4.
These findings are still consistent when I control for other observable charac-
teristics of the workers. Insured workers had a lower job finding rate than uninsured
workers in most subgroups in 2008 and in all subgroups in 2010.6 The job finding
6Current UI recipients in the following subgroups find a job at a faster rate than non-UI recipients:
professional/business services, those on temporary layoff, those who are expecting a recall. How-
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rates from 2008 to 2010 for current UI recipients in most subgroups fell by a larger
maginitude than for non-UI recipients.
To stay unemployed or to exit the labour force? Accompanying the drop in job
findings during the Great Recession are an increase in the UU rate and a small
change in the UOLF rate. This is the case regardless of the workers’ UI statuses.
Table 3.3 shows that from 2008 to 2010 the UU rate increased by 16 percentage
points for workers with UI and by 12 percentage points for workers without UI.
At the same time, Table 3.4 shows that the fall in the UOLF rate was only 2(3)
percentage points for the (un)insured unemployed. This finding suggests that UI
extensions do not significantly affect the labour force exit rate.7 The same results
apply when I condition on other observable characteristics of workers. I plot the UU
and UOLF rates by UI status during 2006-2014 in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
Distribution of unemployment duration I now shift the focus to the stocks of
unemployment by durations. Figure 3.7 shows that the unemployment duration
distribution shifted towards longer duration bins in 2010 and 2012. This is expected
since the average job finding rate fell substantially during these periods, but what is
interesting is that the shares of insured unemployed workers in longer duration bins
also increased dramatically as depicted in Figure 3.8.
In fact, the share of long-term unemployed workers who were current UI re-
cipients rose substantially from 15 percent to 51 percent between 2008 and 2010 as
shown in Figure 3.9. This large increase in the share of current UI recipients during
the Great Recession is a prominent feature in all subgroups considered as shown in
Table 3.5.8 In Figure 3.9, I contrast this with the shares of insured workers amongst
the newly unemployed that did not increase as much.
ever, workers in professional/business services have a much lower job finding rate in 2010 (at 4.3
percent) than in 2008 (at 46 percent). It is not surprising that insured workers knowing or expecting
to be back at work have a job finding rate similar to uninsured workers in the same subgroups.
7For simplicity, the model I present in the following section will therefore not feature the labour
force participation margin.
8In most subgroups, there is at least a 30 percentage point increase in the share of current UI
recipients from 2008 to 2010. This finding does not apply to two subgroups: workers with less than
high school degree and workers with low-skilled occupations.
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In summary, insured unemployed workers tend to find a job at a slower rate than
those without UI and this gap was more pronounced when the maximum UI dura-
tion was extended during the Great Recession. These results largely apply when I
condition on several other observable characteristics of the workers. Accompanying
the drop in the job finding rate was a substantial rise in the UU rate whilst the UOLF
rate remained rather stable. Following the change in these transition rates, the long-
term unemployment rose dramatically during the Great Recession and were mainly
represented by insured unemployed workers.
3.3 Model
I present in this section a random search and matching model a` la Pissarides (2000)
with endogenous separations, variable job search intensity and on-the-job search.
On top of this, I allow for the maximum UI duration to depend on the unemployment
rate. Workers may differ in terms of UI status, benefit level and labour productivity.
Only the last attribute is permanent. These differences not only affect how hard
workers search for jobs but also how likely worker-firm matches are formed and
dissolved. Workers with higher outside options, e.g. those with higher (potential)
UI benefits, tend to exit unemployment more slowly and are more likely to quit.
I begin this section by specifying technology and preferences of workers and
firms as well as the UI duration policy and UI eligibility. I then discuss wage deter-
mination, and finally present the equilibrium conditions.
3.3.1 Technology and Preferences
Time is discrete and runs forever. There are two types of agents in the economy: a
continuum of workers of measure one and a large measure of firms. Workers have
either high or low productivity (type H or L). A match consists of one worker and
one firm whose output depends on the aggregate productivity (z), its match-specific
productivity (m), and type-i worker’s productivity (ηi). Specifically,
yit(m) = zt×m×ηi ; i ∈ {H,L}
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The price of output yit(m) is normalised to one. The aggregate productivity z has
the following AR(1) representation
lnzt = ρz lnzt−1+ εt
where the only exogenous shock in the model εt is normally and independently dis-
tributed with mean zero and standard deviation σz. The match-specific productivity
m is drawn at the start of every new worker-firm match from a distribution F(m). At
the rate 1−λ , a given match keeps its match quality m to the next period, otherwise
it has to redraw a new m from the same distribution F(m) for its production next
period. ηi is type-i worker’s productivity where ηL < ηH and ηH is normalised to
1. A worker’s productivity is permanent.
With respect to preferences, both workers and firms are infinitely-lived and risk-
neutral. They discount future flows by the same factor β ∈ (0,1). Workers are ei-
ther employed (e), insured unemployed (UI) or uninsured unemployed (UU). They
exert job search effort s at the cost of νe(s) when employed, and at the cost νu(s)
when unemployed regardless of their UI status. These search cost functions νe(.)
and νu(.) are strictly increasing and convex. During unemployment, workers’ job
search intensity may vary depending on their UI status, benefit level and productiv-
ity, whilst during employment, it depends on their match quality and productivity.
For employment status j ∈ {e,u}, a worker’s period utility flow is ci−ν j(s) where
ci is type-i worker’s consumption:
cit =

wit(m, m˜) if employed at match quality m
h+bi(m˜) if insured unemployed
h if uninsured unemployed
where wi(m, m˜) is the wage of type-i worker that depends on m, the current match
quality, and m˜, the match quality in her most recent employment. h can be inter-
preted as home production or leisure flow during unemployment. bi(m˜) is the UI
benefit of type-i worker with match quality m˜ in her most recent employment. I
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describe the UI system in the next subsection.
On the firm side, they are either matched with a worker or unmatched. Matched
firms sell output, pay negotiated wage to their workers and pay lump-sum tax τ to
finance the UI payment. A match is exogenously separated at rate δ and an endoge-
nous separation can occur when either the value of a worker or firm is negative.
When firms are unmatched with a worker, they post a vacancy at cost κ and cannot
direct their posting to a specific type of workers.
3.3.1.1 UI Duration Policy and UI Eligibility
UI Duration The maximum UI duration is captured by the variable φ(ut). Namely,
insured unemployed workers exhaust their UI benefits at the rate
φ(ut) ≡ φL1{ut ≥ u¯}+φH1{ut < u¯}
where φL < φH implying the rate is a decreasing function of the unemployment rate
ut in the economy.9 Since the inverse of φ(ut) is the expected duration of receiving
UI benefits, a fall in the rate implies an unemployment insurance extension. This
UI duration policy is set to mimic the rules for the UI extensions in the US where
these extensions are dependent on the state unemployment rate (above which the
extensions are triggered). During normal times when ut < u¯, the UI exhaustion
rate is φH which is set to imply a standard UI duration of 26 weeks. When the
unemployment rate is high and above u¯ (often in recessions), insured unemployed
workers exhaust the benefits at a slower rate φL. I can capture the observed increase
in the duration of UI extensions in the US by lowering in the value that φL takes.
UI Eligibility Upon losing a job, employed workers become uninsured at the rate
1−ψ . This is to reflect how some unemployed workers do not take up their UI
benefits. On top of this, insured unemployed workers lose UI eligibility after an
unproductive meeting with a firm at rate ξ to reflect how UI recipients’ job search
are being monitored.
9This stochastic UI exhaustion is first used in Fredericksson and Holmlund (2001). Mitman and
Rabinovich (2014), Faig, Zhang and Zhang (2012), and also the model in Chapter 2 of this thesis
treat this rate to be state-dependent.
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UI payment is financed each period by lump-sum tax payment (τ) from matched
firms:
τ(1−u) = ∑
i∈{H,L}
∑˜
m
uUIi (m˜)bi(m˜)
where uUIi (m˜) is the number of type-i insured unemployed workers whose UI benefit
is bi(m˜).
3.3.1.2 Search and Matching
Workers and unmatched firms meet via a meeting function M(s,v) where s is the
aggregate search intensity and v is the number of job vacancies. The meeting func-
tion M(., .) has constant returns to scale, and is strictly increasing and concave in its
arguments. Market tightness can be defined as θ ≡ v/s. The conditional job finding
probability per unit of search is Ms = M(1,θ); therefore, the conditional job find-
ing probability of type-i worker with employment status j is s jiM(1,θ) ≡ p ji (θ).10
Analogously, the probability that a firm meets a worker is Mv ≡ q(θ).
3.3.1.3 Timing
1. Given (ut ,zt), production takes place and UI duration policy φ(ut) is set
2. Workers choose job search effort
3. Current matches draw a new m at rate λ
4. Workers and unmatched firms meet
5. Aggregate productivity zt+1 next period is realised
6. Matches/meetings dissolve
7. uUI lose UI eligibility at rate φ(ut) if not meeting a firm, or at rate φ(ut)+(
1−φ(ut)
)
ξ if a meeting has occurred
8. Unemployment ut+1 for next period is realised
10The conditional job finding probability is essentially the probability that a worker meets a firm.
The true job finding rate dependes on whether such a meeting leads to a successful match formation.
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3.3.1.4 Workers’ Value Functions
I first define the set of state variables as ω ≡ {z,u,ui,uUIi (m˜),uUUi ,ei(m);
∀m, m˜ and i ∈ {H,L}} where ui is the number of type-i unemployed workers,
uUIi (m˜) is the number of type-i insured unemployed workers whose match quality
in their most recent employment was m˜, uUUi is the number of type-i uninsured
unemployed workers and ei(m) is the number of type-i employed workers with
current match quality m.
Employed workers The value of a type-i employed worker with last period’s em-
ployment status and associated benefit level j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU} is
W ji (m;ω) = maxsei (m;ω)
w ji (m;ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))+βEω ′|ω
[
(1−δ )(1−λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, keep m)
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m;ω
′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′|m′>m[W
e(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
]
+(1−δ )λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, new m)
Em′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′′|m′′>m′ [W
e(m)+
i (m
′′;ω ′)]
]
+ δ︸︷︷︸
Pr(match exogenously separated)
(
(1−ψ)UUIi (m,ω ′)+ψUUUi (ω ′)
)]
(3.1)
where W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′) ≡ max{W e(m)i (m′;ω ′),(1 − ψ)UUIi (m,ω ′) + ψUUUi (ω ′)}
showing that employed workers can always become unemployed (and get unem-
ployment insurance at rate 1−ψ).11 UUIi (m) and UUUi are respectively the value
of the insured unemployed with benefit bi(m) and the value of the uninsured unem-
ployed. The expressions for optimal search intensity of employed workers can be
found in Appendix 3.8.1.
11Similar to the argument made in Krause and Lubik (2010), the current wage affects neither the
decision of the employed worker to quit nor their job search effort due to the timing of the model
and the bargaining structure. As a result, the bargaining set is still convex and Nash bargaining is
still applicable for the determination of wage. Shimer (2006) discusses the implications of having a
non-convex payoff set.
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Unemployed worker The difference between insured and uninsured workers stems
from the period utility flow during unemployment. Amongst insured unemployed
workers, their period utility flow can differ according to m˜, their match quality in the
most recent employment, since the UI benefits are attached to this variable. There-
fore, the values of type-i uninsured unemployed workers and insured unemployed
workers with benefit bi(m˜) are respectively
UUUi (ω) = max
sUUi (ω)
h−νu(sUUi (ω))+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
...
pUUi (ω)max{WUUi (m′;ω ′),UUUi (ω ′)}+(1− pUUi (ω))UUUi (ω ′)
]
(3.2)
and
UUIi (m˜,ω) = max
sUIi (m˜,ω)
bi(m˜)+h−νu(sUIi (m˜,ω))
+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
pUIi (m˜,ω)max
{
WUI(m˜)i (m
′;ω ′), ...
(1−φu)(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(keep UI | meeting a firm)
UUIi (m˜,ω
′)+
(
φu+(1−φu)ξ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(lose UI | meeting a firm)
UUUi (ω
′)
}
+(1− pUIi (m˜,ω))
(
(1−φu)UUIi (m˜,ω ′)+φuUUUi (ω ′)
)]
(3.3)
The expressions for optimal search intensity of insured and uninsured unemployed
workers are shown in Appendix 3.8.1.
3.3.1.5 Firms
Matched firms Similar to the setup of employed workers, the value of a matched
firm with type-i worker whose work history is j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU} is
J ji (m;ω) = yi(m;ω)−w ji (m;ω)− τ(ω)+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Je(m)+i (m;ω ′)
]
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)
]]
(3.4)
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where Je(m)+i (m
′;ω ′) ≡ max{Je(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}. Note that I have already imposed
the free entry condition which implies the value of an unmatched firm is zero, i.e.
V (ω) = 0,∀ω .
Unmatched firms Since unmatched firms cannot direct their search to a particular
type of worker, the distribution of workers’ search intensity over employment status,
UI status, benefit level, productivity type and match quality of on-the-job searchers
(as denoted by ζ ’s in the following equation) enters the unmatched firm’s problem
and, therefore, becomes a part of the state variables. The value of an unmatched
firm is
V (ω) = −κ+βq(ω)Eω ′|ω
[
∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
ζ ei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
+∑
m
ζUIi (m,ω)Em′[J
UI(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]+ζUUi (ω)Em′[J
UU+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
)]
(3.5)
where ζ ei (m) =
(1−λ )sei (m)ei(m)+λ f (m)∑m sei (m)ei(m)
s
ζUIi (m) =
sUIi (m)u
UI
i (m)
s
; ζUUi =
sUUi u
UU
i
s
s = ∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
(
sei (m)ei(m)+ s
UI
i (m)u
UI
i (m)
)
+ sUUi u
UU
i
)
3.3.2 Wage and Surplus
Wages are negotiated bilaterally using a generalised Nash bargaining rule. For
i∈ {H,L}, type-i workers with previous employment status j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU}
and match quality m receive
w ji (m;ω) = argmax
(
WS ji (m;ω)
)µ(
J ji (m;ω)
)(1−µ)
(3.6)
where µ is the worker’s bargaining power. WS ji is the surplus of type-i employed
workers with history j and it is the difference between the value of working and the
corresponding outside option. We can define the total match surplus S ji ≡WS ji +J ji .
As a result,WS ji = µS
j
i and J
j
i = (1−µ)S ji . The surpluses of employed workers are
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as follows
WSe(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ W e(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−ψ)UUIi (m˜,ω)−ψUUUi (ω)
WSUI(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ WUI(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )UUIi (m˜,ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )UUUi (ω)
WSUUi (m;ω) ≡ WUUi (m;ω)−UUUi (ω)
The expressions for total match surpluses can be found in Appendix 3.8.1.
3.3.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterised by value functions,
W e(m˜)i (m;ω), W
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω), W
UU
i (m;ω), U
UI
i (m˜,ω), U
UU
i (ω), J
e(m˜)
i (m;ω),
JUI(m˜)i (m;ω), J
UU
i (m;ω), and V (ω); market tightness θ(ω); search policy
sei (m;ω), s
UI
i (m,ω) and s
UU
i (ω); and wage functions w
e(m˜)
i (m;ω), w
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω),
and wUUi (m;ω), such that, given the initial distribution of workers over productiv-
ity level, employment status, UI status, benefit level and match productivity, the
government’s policy τ(ω) and φ(ω), and the law of motion for z:
1. The value functions and the market tightness satisfy the Bellman equations
for workers and firms, and the free entry condition, namely, equations (3.1),
(3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5)
2. The search decisions satisfy the FOCs for optimal search intensity, which are
equations (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9)
3. The wage functions satisfy the FOCs for the generalised Nash bargaining rule
(equation (3.6))
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied each period
5. The distribution of workers evolves according to the transition equations
(3.10), (3.12) and (3.13), which can be found in Appendix 3.8.2, consistent
with the maximising behaviour of agents
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3.3.4 Solving the Model
In order to compute the market tightness (and, in effect, total match surpluses and
search effort) in the model, the agents in the economy need to keep track of the dis-
tribution of workers over the productivity level, employment status, UI status, bene-
fit level and match quality {ei(m),uUIi (m˜),uUUi ; i ∈ {H,L},∀m, m˜} as they enter the
vacancy creation condition (equation 3.5). In order to predict next period’s unem-
ployment rate they need to know the inflow into and outflow from unemployment
which are based on this distribution. I use the Krusell & Smith (1998) algorithm
to predict the laws of motion for both the insured and total unemployment rates
as a function of current unemployment rate (u) and aggregate productivity (z). As
the distributions of employed workers by match quality and insured unemployed
workers by benefit level do not vary much over time, I use the stochastic steady
state distributions (also separating between high and low unemployment states for
the distribution of the insured unemployed), and adjust for the employment rate that
can be inferred from the state variables. I report the performance of this approxi-
mation in Appendix 3.8.3.
3.4 Calibration
Before I calibrate the model to match the US economy, I specify the functional
forms for the search cost functions, the distribution function of the match-specific
productivity and the meeting function between workers and firms. I obtain a subset
of the parameters using the simulated method of moments. The rest of the parame-
ters are taken from the empirical data and the literature. Table 3.8 summarises the
pre-specified parameters while table 3.10 describes the calibrated ones.
Functional forms I assume the search cost function takes the following power func-
tion
ν j(s) = a js1+d j ; j ∈ {e,u}
where a j and d j are strictly positive scalars. I distinguish the search cost only
between employment (e) and unemployment (u) to control for the relation between
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job-to-job transition rate and the job finding rate. Workers of type-H and type-L
face the same cost of search and so do unemployed workers with and without UI.
With respect to the distribution of match quality, a worker-firm match draws a new
m from the following Beta distribution
F(m) = m+betacdf(m−m,β1,β2)
where β1 and β2 are strictly positive scalars, and m > 0 is the lowest productivity
level.
The meeting function between unmatched firms and workers is similar to that in
den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) with the introduction of search intensity
M(s,v) =
sv(
sl+ vl
) 1
l
; l > 0
Discretisation I discretise the aggregate productivity (z) using Rouwenhurst
(1995)’s method to approximate an AR(1) process with a finite-state Markov chain.
I use 51 nodes to solve the model and 5,100 nodes by linear interpolation in the sim-
ulations. Similarly, I use 51 equidistant nodes to approximate the Beta distribution
of the match-specific productivity F(m)when solving the model and 5,100 nodes by
linear interpolation in the simulations. I define f (m) to be F ′(m)/∑mF ′(m) where
F ′(m) is the probability density function of F(m). Finally, I use 101 equidistant
nodes to approximate the unemployment rate between 0.02 to 0.2.
Simulation I apply the calibrated model to the U.S. economy by feeding in the
productivity shocks that match the deviations of output (GDP per capita) from HP
trend as well as the observed maximum UI durations during each recession. It is
useful to note that the timing of each UI extension and how long it lasts are not
predetermined. They are purely the result of the model’s simulated unemployment
rate which can be used to measure how well the model can replicate the US labour
market.
Additionally, from May 2007, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
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law has included the “Reachback Provision” providing UI eligility to unemployed
workers who have already exhausted their benefits prior to the extensions of UI. I
also simulate the model accordingly and study the impact of this programme in the
results section.
3.4.1 Pre-specified Parameters
The pre-specified parameters in the model are summarised in Tables 3.8 and 3.9.
The model is monthly and I use the value 0.9967 for the discount factor β , imply-
ing an annual interest rate of 4% which is the U.S. average. I follow Fujita and
Ramey (2012) in pinning down the vacancy creation cost κ to be 0.0392 using sur-
vey evidence on vacancy durations and hours spent on vacancy posting.12 I assign
µ , the worker’s bargaining power, to be 0.5 following den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000).
φH and φL are respectively the UI exhaustion rates during normal periods and
recessions. I set φH to be 1/6 which implies the standard maximum UI duration of
26 weeks given the monthly frequency. With regards to the UI extensions during
recessions, I can sort them into four main UI duration groups:
1. 39 weeks (9 months) for January 1948 - December 1971
2. 52 weeks (1 year) for January 1972 - December 1974 and July 1982 - Septem-
ber 1991
3. 68 weeks (16 months) for January 1975 - June 1982 and October 1991 - July
2008
4. 90 weeks (21 months) for August 2008 - June 2014
The above durations are obtained by averaging the observed maximum UI durations
over the respective periods when UI were extended. The value φL changes and
implies the maximum UI duraitons according to the above UI duration regimes.
12Fujita and Ramey (2012) find the vacancy cost to be 17% of a 40-hour-work week. Normalising
the mean productivity to unity, this gives the value of 0.17 per week or 0.0392 per month. The actual
mean productivity may be higher than (but not greatly different from) unity due to truncation from
below of the match-specific quality.
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Note that these are the maximum UI durations used only when the unemployment
rate is above the threshold u¯. For example, in the simulation, the UI extension in
the Great Recession is not triggered until April 2009. I set u¯ to be 6.5 percent which
has been historically used as a criterion in most of the UI extensions.
To determine the utility flow of type-i unemployed workers, h and, if insured,
bi(m), I use the results in Gruber (1997). In particular, the drop in consumption
for the newly unemployed workers is 10 percent when receiving UI and 24 per-
cent when not receiving UI given the replacement rate of 50 percent.13 To find the
implied h and bi(m) given a set of parameters, I first guess the mean wages for
the (type-i) unemployed with different match qualities {w0(m),w0i (m);∀m} and set
h such that the average ratio of h to w0(m) is 0.76 (where I use the steady state
distribution of unemployed workers by match qualities to compute the weighted av-
erage). For bi(m), it is set such that the ratio of h+bi(m) over w0i (m) is 0.9 for each
match quality m. I then solve and simulate the model to check if the guess is close
to its counterpart from the simulation. If it is not, I replace the guessed wages with
the simulated ones and repeat until they are close enough.
The slope of the search cost function for the unemployed au is normalised such
that the search effort of the uninsured unemployed sUU is unity when the economy is
in the steady state, similar to Nagypa´l (2005). The power parameters in the search
cost functions for both employed and unemployed workers (de and du) are set to
unity in line with Christensen, Lentz and Mortensen (2005) and Yashiv (2000) im-
plying a quadratic search cost function.
3.4.2 Calibrated Parameters
I use the simulated method of moments to assign values to the remaining twelve
parameters {l,δ ,λ ,ψ,ξ ,ae,m,β1,β2,ρz,σz,ηL} by matching main statistics in the
U.S. labour market as well as the labour productivity process during 1948-2007.14
13Aguiar and Hurst (2005) report the drop in food consumption of workers upon becoming unem-
ployed to be 5 percent and the drop in food expenditure to be 19 percent. However, in their study,
unemployed workers are not distinguished by their UI status which makes it impossible separately
identify h and bi(m)’s under the present calibration strategy.
14The calibrated parameters are to minimise the sum of squared residuals of percentage changes
between the model-generated moments and their empirical counterparts.
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The twelve moments I try to match are the following:
• First and second moments of unemployment rate, job finding rate, job sepa-
ration rate, and average unemployment duration
• First moment of job-to-job transition rate and insured unemployment rate
• Second moment and autocorrelation of labour productivity15
The model’s generated moments are reported in Table 3.7 along with their empirical
counterparts. Table 3.11 shows other related moments not targeted in the calibra-
tion. The values of calibrated parameters are in Table 3.10.
In terms of the targeted moments, the baseline model matches the twelve tar-
geted moments quite well overall. However, the insured unemployment rate is
slightly higher and the job finding rate is more volatile than in the data. With re-
gards to related moments that are not targeted, it can match the dynamics of unem-
ployment grouped in four duration bins quite well in terms of the first and second
moments. However, the model could further improve on the volatility of vacancies
and the correlation between unemployment and vacancies.16
3.5 Results
In this section, I first discuss the model’s performance in generating realistic dy-
namics of the US labour market with the focus on the long-term unemployment and
the unemployment duration structure. The results are based on the aggregate pro-
ductivity series that matches the deviations of output from its HP trend as depicted
in Figure 3.10.17 Next, I study the mechanisms of the model in generating such
dynamics, particularly how the three following channels respond to UI extensions:
15The transition rates are author’s own calculations based on the CPS data. For output, I use the
quarterly real GDP series provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and I use the BLS
quarterly series for non-farm output per job to represent the labour productivity.
16The main reason why vacancies are not as volatile as they are in the data is due to the endogenous
separation margin. In recessions, unemployment increases at a faster rate from endogenous match
separations which makes vacancy posting less costly, and this counteracts with the effect of negative
aggregate shocks.
17We can see that the drop in aggregate productivity during the Great Recession is neither of larger
magnitude nor does it exhibit more persistence than in previous recessions.
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job search behaviour, match formation and match separation. Then I conduct pol-
icy experiments to measure the impact of UI extensions (via these channels) and the
Reachback Provision programme on the labour market during the Great Recession.
Lastly, I study the duration dependence in the unemployment exit rate.
3.5.1 Performance
UI Extensions I show in Figure 3.11 that the model is successful in generating
realistic UI extensions both in terms of when they are triggered and how long each
extension lasts. This is due to how well the model can replicate the unemployment
rate in the US (of which UI extensions are a function) as shown in Figure 3.12. The
model produces 95 percent of the observed unemployment rate between October
2009 and June 2014 as shown in Table 3.12.18
Long-term Unemployment The model can account for a large fraction of the ob-
served rise in long-term unemployment in the Great Recession as depicted in Figure
3.13. Specifically, between October 2009 and June 2014, it generates 87 percent of
the observed long-term unemployment rate (reported in Table 3.12). Despite this
success, the model tends to overshoot the long-term unemployment and does not
produce enough persistence in some of the previous recessions. The main reason
for this comes from the sudden change in optimal job search behaviour of insured
unemployed workers when the maximum UI duration returns to the standard dura-
tion, the mechanism that I will discuss in the next subsection.
Distribution of Unemployment Duration Figure 3.14 shows that the model can
produce a substantial rise in the average unemployment duration in the Great Reces-
sion.19 However, the model’s series drops quickly as the economy recovers whilst it
is more persistent in the data. The model also does very well in producing a realistic
shift in the distribution of unemployment duration towards longer duration bins as
previously discussed in the empirical section. In Figure 3.15 I plot the distributions
18This number is calculated by averaging the absolute percentage deviations of the model’s un-
employment series from the empirical counterpart. I choose October 2009 as the starting period as
it was when the US unemployment rate reached its peak at 9.98 percent during the Great Recession.
19To be specific, the model can generate 77 percent of the empirical average unemployment dura-
tion series as reported in Table 3.12.
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in December 2007 and June 2010, where UI was only extended in the latter case.20
With respect to the entire 1948-2014 period, I show in Figure 3.16 the shares of un-
employment by four duration bins (less than 1 month, 2-3 months, 4-6 months and
longer than 6 months). These figures provide an evidence that the model is suitable
for studying the dynamics of the entire distribution of unemployment durations and
not just for the long-term unemployment dynamics.
Job Findings In the left panel of Figure 3.17, I compare the model’s job finding
rate with the empirical series. Despite a clear negative trend that the model does not
take into account, it produces a fall in the job finding rate during the Great Recession
similar in magnitude to that in the data. When I further condition on the UI status
of workers as displayed in the left panel of Figure 3.18, we can see that (1) the job
finding rate of the insured unemployed workers are on average lower than that of the
uninsured, and (2) the job finding rate of the insured falls more dramatically than
that of the uninsured. Both features are consistent with findings from the empirical
section.
3.5.2 Mechanisms
Job Search Behaviour The endogenous UI extensions affect the optimal search
behaviour of workers in the following ways: (1) only the search intensity of insured
unemployed workers varies with the maximum UI duration and (2) the higher the
UI benefits the lower the search effort is being exerted, and such behaviour is more
noticeable when the extended UI duration is longer.
I show in Figure 3.19 that the conditional job finding rate of the insured unem-
ployed workers drops whenever UI is extended (implied by u ≥ u¯) whilst the rates
for the employed and uninsured unemployed are largely constant. Further, amongst
the insured unemployed, their job search effort decreases in the amount of benefit
they receive as shown in the left panel of Figure 3.20. With regards to the worker
heterogeneity, higher productivity workers exert more search effort as their value
during employment is relatively higher than the lower productivity type (right panel
20I choose June 2010 because it is when the model’s long-term unemployment rate reaches its
peak. Additionally, the model generates a hump in the distribution in 2010 similar to the empirical
distribution owing to the endogenous separation margin.
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of Figure 3.20). Mapping this to the simulation of the US economy in Figure 3.18,
the job finding rates between the two productivity types during 1948-2014 are quite
similar. However, when I separate the job finding rates by UI statuses instead, they
are very different. Specifically, the unemployment exit rate of the insured unem-
ployed is smaller and exhibits higher volatility which is consistent with the empir-
ical evidence. This suggests that once we condition on the UI status, the workers’
productivity types contribute little to the rise of the long-term unemployment.
It is useful to note that the job finding rates in Figure 3.18 are driven not only
by the job search behaviour but also by the decision between a worker and a firm to
form a match once they meet. Such decisions as well as match separation decisions
are also affected by the endogenous UI extensions as I discuss next.
Match Formation/Dissolution From the model section, we learn that the worker’s
surplus from being employed and the value of producing firms (WS ji (m;ω) and
J ji (m;ω); j ∈ {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UU}) are simply a constant fraction of the total match
surplus (µS ji (m;ω) and (1− µ)S ji (m;ω) respectively). This means both workers
and firms always agree when a match should be formed (when the total surplus
is positive) and when it should be dissolved (when the total surplus is negative).
The match surplus when the worker is currently employed (Se(m˜)i (m;ω)) determines
the endogenous match separations whereas the match surplus when the worker is
currently unemployed (SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) or S
UU
i (m;ω)) determines how many matches
will be formed, given that unemployed workers and firm have met.
Figure 3.21 shows that total match surpluses for employed and insured unem-
ployed workers (Se(m˜)i (m;ω) and S
UI(m˜)
i (m;ω)) decrease in unemployment and that
they decrease at a faster rate when UI is extended (u≥ u¯).21 Similar to the optimal
job search policy, The longer the extended duration, the more drastic is the drop in
the surplus. Further, I show that SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) increases in m and decreases in m˜ in
Figures 3.22. m increases the surplus because a higher match quality in the produc-
tion raises the firm’s profit, the worker’s wage and also the worker’s potential UI
21It can be seen that the match surplus for the uninsured unemployed workers is higher when the
UI extension is longer. This is because it is actually better for the uninsured unemployed to regain
employment and potentially qualify for UI benefits.
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benefit after being employed at m; on the other hand, a higher m˜ implies a higher
outside option of the insured unemployed (h+bi(m˜)) which means it is less likely
for a match to be formed. A similar argument applies to Se(m˜)i (m;ω) but instead on
the job separation margin where (h+ bi(m˜)) is the outside option of the employed
worker if she quits and is eligible for UI.
From the model’s simulation, Figure 3.23 shows that the success rate of
worker-firm meetings is procyclical and always close to one. The reasons are (1)
for insured workers, those likely to have an unproductive meeting are those with
currently high UI benefits and it is unlikely for them to meet a firm in the first place,
and (2) for uninsured workers, the surplus from working is very high due to their
lower outside option which means the meetings are likely to lead to viable matches.
With respect to job separation, we can see from the right panel of Figure 3.17 that
the separation rate is countercyclical which is a result of Se(m˜)i (m;ω) becoming neg-
ative during recessions.
What Drives the Long-term Unemployment? In this exercise, I study the con-
tribution of the three UI channels (job search behaviour, match formation and job
separation) on the long-term unemployment during the Great Recession. By fixing
one channel at a time I study the evolution of the long-term unemployment given
the same path of aggregate shock (z) as in the baseline model (Figure 3.10).22
I find that the long-term unemployment is largely unaffected by the response
of match formation and dissolution but it would fall drastically (over 3 percentage
points) when the job search behaviour is fixed as shown in Figure 3.24. Despite
a small impact on the long-term unemployment, the job separation margin has a
sizeable contribution to the average unemployment duration and is more important
than the job search response in accounting for the total unemployment as displayed
in 3.25.
22Specifically, I set the unemployment rate used in the respective policy functions to be at the
pre-Great Recession level which is less than u¯ implying that UI is not extended.
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3.5.3 Policy Experiment
To quantify the effects of UI extensions on the aggregate labour market during
the Great Recession, I conduct a counterfactual experiment by eliminating all UI
extensions, i.e. the maximum UI duration is 26 weeks instead of 90 weeks. I then
study how unemployment, long-term unemployment and average unemployment
duration respond under this scenario. Just like the previous decomposition exercise,
I use the same path of aggregate productivity (z) as in the baseline model (Figure
3.10). The benefit of using a general equilibrium model is that I can isolate the
effects of UI extensions according to the factors that respond to the maximum UI
duration. I will study three scenarios:
1. The direct impact of changing the maximum UI duration from 90 weeks to
26 weeks
• Only the number of insured unemployed workers is affected by this
change
2. The direct impact of UI extensions + the response of job search intensity
• I allow the optimal search intensity to adjust to when there is no UI
extensions. Specifically, workers exert job search effort as if the unem-
ployment rate was at its historical mean at 5.83 percent (below u¯)
3. The direct impact of UI extensions + the responses of job search intensity
and match surpluses:
• I allow both the optimal search intensity and the decisions on match
formation and match dissolution to correspond to when there is no UI
extensions (setting the unemployment rate at 5.83 percent in the policy
functions)
As most of the literature studying the effects of UI extensions mainly focus on the
“micro” effect, the first two scenarios are most comparable whilst the last scenario
can be considered as the “general equilibrium” effect where firms and workers take
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into account the effect of UI extensions on match separations.23 Table 3.13 sum-
marises the results from this experiment.
Long-term unemployment Figure 3.26 shows the evolution of the maximum UI
durations under the counterfactual experiment where in the Great Recession it is 26
instead of 90 weeks. The response of long-term unemployment to the change in
maximum UI duratiom is shown in Figure 3.27. It can be seen that UI extension
has a huge impact on long-term unemployment even when the behaviour of workers
and firms do not react to this change. This is however not surprising since with the
standard UI duration (of 26 weeks) all long-term unemployed workers are uninsured
by definition, and we also know that uninsured unemployed workers have a much
higher unemployment exit rate than do insured unemployed workers. As a result,
by removing all UI extensions during the Great Recession, the peak of the long-
term unemployment rate falls drastically from 4.9 percent in the baseline model to
1.2 percent in the first scenario where workers and firms do not react to the cut in
maximum UI duration (as shown in Table 3.13). It falls to 0.6 percent when job
search behaviour responds to the change in UI duration and just slightly further to
0.5 percent when both job search and job separations respond to this change.
Unemployment Figure 3.28 shows the responses of unemployment rate (top panel).
Comparing to the long-term unemployment, the unemployment rate is much less af-
fected by the cut in UI duration. The direct impact of removing UI extensions is
a slight fall of less than one percentage point in the unemployment rate (measured
at its peak) as can be seen in Table 3.13. When job search behaviour responds to
the extension removal, the peak of the unemployment rate falls by 1.7 percentage
points. It is only within the general equilibrium context, where the decisions on
match separations also react to the UI duration cut, that the peak of the unemploy-
ment rate substantially falls by 3.4 percentage points to 6.8 percent.
The reason that under the first two scenarios the impact on the unemployment
rate is more subdued is because they are relevant for only a subgroup of unem-
ployment population whilst in the last scenario the job separation margin applies to
23It is clear from the previous decomposition exercise that the response of match formation to UI
extensions is negligible.
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all employed workers and determines the inflow of (insured) unemployed workers.
Using the same argument, we can explain why under the first two scenarios the UI
extensions have a large impact on the long-term unemployment.
This result is consistent with the existing literature that studies the impact of
UI extensions on the unemployment rate in the Great Recession. Most of the stud-
ies focus on the micro effect where the worker-firm relationships are not taken into
account, and find that the unemployment rate would have been 0.1 to 1.8 percentage
points lower had there been no UI extensions. My “micro effect” of around 0.9-1.7
percentage points is within the range of the empirical estimates (0.1-1.8 percentage
points) albeit on the higher side. Moreover, the larger “general equilibrium” effect
of UI extensions in this model is similar to findings in Hagedorn et al (2015) but
they focus the impact on vacancy creation whilst mine comes from match separa-
tions. Lastly, the unemployment rate is much less persistent when there is no UI
extensions, i.e. there would be no jobless recoveries. This result is consistent with
the findings in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014).
Average unemployment duration In contrast to the response of the unemployment
rate, eliminating UI extensions significantly affects the average unemployment du-
ration during the Great Recession as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 3.28.
The direct effect of eliminating (64 weeks of) UI extensions alone accounts for a
24-week drop in the average duration of unemployment (measured at the peak of
the series) as shown in Table 3.13. When job search behaviour adjusts to the UI
duration cut, the duration drops by 2 weeks further. The additional impact from the
general equilibrium effect is minimal.
To summarise, I find a large impact of UI extensions on the long-term unemploy-
ment and the average unemployment duration which mainly comes from the direct
effect of changing maximum UI duration and to a smaller extent from the response
of job search behaviour (where I label these two channels the micro effect) with a
small role from the job separation margins. However, the story is the opposite for
the unemployment rate. The micro effect of UI extensions is small relative to the
general equilibrium effect when match formation/dissolution decisions respond to
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the change in the maximum UI duration. Overall, the impact of UI extensions on
the unemployment rate is consistent with results from the existing literature.
3.5.4 Reachback Provision Programme
From May 2007, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation law has included
the “Reachback Provision” providing UI eligility to unemployed workers who have
already exhausted their benefits prior to the extensions of UI. This programme can
potentially affect the long-term unemployment since the programme is targeted di-
rectly at this group of workers. As the programme is already incorporated when I
simulate the model and present the results, I will in this exercise remove the pro-
gramme and leave everything else the same including the paths of aggregate pro-
ductivity and UI extensions in the baseline model. The results from this exercise
are summaried in Table 3.14. Figure 3.29 shows how the long-term unemployment,
unemployment and average unemployment duration are impacted by the removal of
the programme.
I find that the programme does not have a significant impact on the aggregate
labour market. The (long-term) unemployment rate is only (0.2) 0.3 percentage
points smaller than in the baseline model when measured at its peak. The small
impact of the programme is due to the fact that the subgroup of workers who are
affected by the programme represents just 3.5 percent of the unemployment pop-
ulation. However, from the CPS data, the true effect of this programme could be
non-trivial since unemployed workers who already exhausted UI represented a sub-
stantial 44 percent of the long-term unemployment population in January 2008. The
model produces a much smaller number for this group of workers because once the
insured unemployed exhaust their benefits, they adopt the job search behaviour of
the uninsured which implies a much higher unemployment exit rate than the insured.
3.5.5 On-the-job Search
In this exercise I show how on-the-job search contributes to unemployment and
its duration distribution during the Great Recession. Its effect could go in either
direction. On one hand, on-the-job search allows employed workers to improve
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their match qualities by searching for other vacant firms and drawing new match
qualities. Having higher match qualities implies higher associated UI benefit levels
if they become insured unemployed. Since the job search intensities and job finding
rates are decreasing in the benefit level, this would increase unemployment duration
and total unemployment. On the other hand, on-the-job search also increases the
value of being employed. Therefore, more unemployed workers would be induced
to take up job offers even when the first match quality draws are not great (since
they can conduct on-the-job search and leave the first matches with not so great
match qualities), and spend less time in unemployment. I plot the evolution of long-
term unemployment, unemployment and average unemployment duration during
the Great Recession in Figure 3.30
On-the-job search has little impact on all three labour market variables outside
recessionary periods, but it becomes clear that there is a positive impact when the
maximum UI duration is extended during the Great Recession. I find that on-the-job
search contributes to a small but significant increase in (long-term) unemployment
of up to (0.4) 0.5 percentage points from the baseline model as well as a 1.1-week
increase in the average unemployment duration.
3.5.6 Hazard Rate of Exiting Unemployment
Due to the heterogeneity in job finding rates amongst unemployed workers, the
model generates the negative duration dependence in unemployment exit rate that
comes purely from the changing composition in the stocks of unemployment. At
longer unemployment durations, the stocks of unemployment are more represented
by those with lower exit rates, and they are the insured unemployed workers with
higher UI benefits in this case. Moreover, the strength of the duration dependence is
positively correlated with the state of the economy as pointed out in Wiczer (2015).
In Figure 3.31, I plot the hazard rates of exiting unemployment by duration for
December 2007 (maximum 26 weeks of UI) and June 2010 (maximum 90 weeks
of UI) to show how the recession and UI extensions affect this hazard rate. The
negative duration dependence is more severe with UI extensions and persists as
long as the maximum UI duration itself. In the same figure, I also plot the empirical
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estimate by Kroft et al (2016) over 2002-2007 period and the model’s counterpart.
Empirical results based on Kroft et al (2016) and Wiczer (2015) suggest that the
hazard rate is rather stable after 6 months of being unemployed. In the model,
however, since the uninsured unemployed workers exit unemployment at a faster
rate than do the insured, the hazard rate rises upon the exhaustion of UI benefits.
The heterogeneous worker productivity could potentially help explain the neg-
ative duration dependence after the UI exhaustion since type-H workers exit unem-
ployment at a faster rate. However, despite this heterogeneity, the exit rates of both
types (H and L) when uninsured are quite similar and much higher than when they
are insured leaving the average exit rate after UI exhaustion rather stable. In order to
fit the empirical results better, other heterogeneity amongst uninsured unemployed
workers could be introduced such as different values of home production, or even a
larger degree of heterogeneity in productivity.
3.6 On the Sources of Long-term Unemployment
In this section I first show how consistent the model’s unemployment series are
with the empirical data by estimating a non-linear state space model in Ahn &
Hamilton (2016) using the model’s generated data. Then I study the implications
on the sources of long-term unemployment. They explore the roles of worker’s
unobserved heterogeneity on unemployment dynamics. Their interpretation is that
there are two types of workers: type-H workers have an ex-ante higher rate of ex-
iting unemployment than do type-L workers. They also allow for genuine duration
dependence that could be positive (motivational effect) and negative (scarring ef-
fect). The measurements or observables in their model are unemployment series
by 5 duration bins {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t ,u7.12t ,u13+t } which are, respectively, unemployed
workers with duration less than 1 month, 2-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months,
and more than 12 months. The latent or hidden states are also time varying. They
are the number of newly unemployed workers for each type and a factor governing
the unemployment continuation probability for each type. I summarise their state
space model in Appendix 3.8.4.
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I obtain 50 different series of {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t , u7.12t ,u13+t } using the Monte Carlo
simulations from the baseline model. For each set of the simulated unemployment
series, I use Maximum Likelihood to obtain a set of (twelve) estimates from the state
space model as described in Appendix 3.8.4. The extended Kalman fiter is used to
construct the likelihood function since some latent variables enter the equations
for unemployment series non-linearly. Table 3.15 reports these estimates and their
standard errors.
Overall, the model’s estimates are consistent with the empirical ones in Ahn and
Hamilton (2016). Based on these estimated parameters, I construct the series for (1)
the probability that newly unemployed workers of each type stay unemployed the
following month, (2) the number of newly unemployed workers of each type, and
(3) the share of unemployment by each type. Comparisons between these series and
their empirical counterparts from Ahn and Hamilton (2016) are shown in Figures
3.32, 3.33 and 3.34 respectively.
The probabilities that the newly unemployed workers stay unemployed in the fol-
lowing month from the model’s estimates (Figure 3.32) exhibit more volatility over
the business cycles especially for type-L workers. Nonetheless, during the Great
Recession, the model’s data implies the rise of this probability for type-L workers
and a small drop for type-H workers similar to its empirical counterpart. Going back
to the model’s results, we can see from the left panel of Figure 3.18 that they com-
plement well with the results from this estimation where the insured unemployed
workers (the type with “lower” exit rate) has a much more volatile unemployment
exit rate than the uninsured (the type with “higher” exit rate).
With respect to the number of newly unemployed during the Great Recession (Fig-
ure 3.33), the model’s estimates also imply a spike of the inflow of type-L workers
(and a much smaller rise for type-H) with similar magnitude to the empirical coun-
terpart. However, since the UI status of newly unemployed workers in the model is
governed solely by the poisson rate ψ , the series for the newly unemployed workers
who are insured and uninsured are perfectly correlated and therefore do not com-
plement the results in Figure 3.33. The series only differ as the workers remain
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unemployed which is related to Figure 3.34, showing the shares of total unemploy-
ment by unobserved types. The model’s implied share has very similar dynamics
to the data throughout the observed periods. However, the share of type-L work-
ers does not show a clear negative trend like in Ahn and Hamilton (2016), but this
is expected since the model does not account for any low frequency changes or a
trend e.g. in the unemployment rate or the job finding rate. Figure 3.35 shows the
model’s shares of total unemployment by UI status and worker’s productivity. It
can be seen that the rise in the share of type-L workers from the estimation (Figure
3.34) has more similar dynamics to the share of the insured unemployed workers
in the model (rather than the share of the low productivity workers which exhibits
smaller fluctuations).
Figure 3.36 shows the implied unemployment continuation probabilities from the
true duration dependence component which are similar to the empirical estimates.
This probability is rather constant in the first 6 months of duration, and then in-
creases during 6-12 months of unemployment implying a scarring effect. After 12
months of unemployment, it is more likely that a worker exits unemployment the
longer she stays unemployed . These estimates are somewhat consistent with the
model’s hazard rate of exiting unemployment (Figure 3.31) discussed in the previ-
ous subsection. As the UI benefits run out, workers search harder for jobs and exit
unemployment more quickly. The change in the job search behaviour (and therefore
the hazard rate) depends on the maximum UI duration but we can observe that in
the 1976-2014 periods (upon which the observations are based) the maximum UI
duration during recessions is at least 12 months which is consistent with a fall in the
probability of remaining unemployed after 12 months.
In summary, the model’s unemployment series are consistent with the empirical
data as estimated using a state space model. I can relate Ahn and Hamilton (2016)’s
interpretation of worker unobserved heterogeneity to the UI statuses of unemployed
workers in my model since the insured unemployed have lower unemployment exit
rate than do the uninsured. They have similar dynamics in terms of the unemploy-
ment exit rate as well as the shares of total unemployment. Moreover, some feature
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of the genuine duration dependence in the job finding rate can also be related to the
UI exhaustion in the model.
3.7 Conclusion
The long-term unemployment dynamics has an important implication on the re-
covery of the aggregate labour market. This paper quantifies the impact of coun-
tercyclical UI extensions on the long-term unemployment and the unemployment
duration distribution.
I develop a general equilibrium search and matching model where the maxi-
mum UI duration depends on the unemployment rate and the UI benefits depend on
the match quality during employment. Unemployed workers’ job search behaviour
differs according to their UI status, benefit level and productivity, and is affected by
the maximum UI duration.
The main result is that UI extensions have a significant impact on the long-
term unemployment and the average unemployment duration but the impact on the
unemployment rate is more limited. By studying the mechanisms through which the
UI extensions affect the labour market, the response of job search behaviour plays a
crucial role on the long-term unemployment dynamics whereas the response of job
separation decisions is more important in accounting for the total unemployment.
The model is also used to assess the impact of UI extensions during the Great
Recession distinguishing between the micro effect (the direct impact on the number
of insured workers and the response of job search) and the general equilibrium
effect (micro effect plus the response of job separation decisions). The micro effect
on unemployment is small and consistent with existing studies whilst the general
equilibrium effect is somewhat larger. This is because the micro effect is relevant
for a subgroup of unemployment population but the job separation margin applies
to all employed workers determining the inflow of (insured) unemployed workers.
The result that the model produces little persistence in the long-term unem-
ployment outside the extended UI periods could be altered by using an empirical
fact that the majority of long-term unemployed workers outside recessionary pe-
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riods are those who have already exhausted UI. A distinction between uninsured
workers who never receive UI and those who have exhausted UI could help cre-
ate the persistence needed to match the data. Specifically, the unemployment exit
rate of the formerly-insured unemployed workers can be smaller than the rest of
the uninsured unemployment population. This could come from selection whereby
workers with high non-UI outside options are more likely to stay unemployed (e.g.
heterogeneous values of home production, leisure, or a larger degree of individual
productivity). Persistence or habits in job search behaviour during unemployment
could potentially help explain not only the persistence of long-term unemployment
but also its trend. The introduction of savings in the model could be useful in study-
ing the interaction between private and public insurance as well as in the welfare
analyses. These extensions would provide a more complete framework to study the
impact of UI extensions.
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3.8 Appendix for Chapter 3
3.8.1 Expressions for Optimal Search Intensity and Match Sur-
plus
Given the worker’s value functions when employed, insured unemployed and unin-
sured unemployed, we can take the first derivative to find the optimal search effort.
The first order conditions for type-i workers are as follows
ν ′e(s
e
i (m;ω)) = −β (1−δ )M(θ(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
...
(1−λ )(1−F(m))
(
WSe(m)+i (m;ω
′)−Em′|m′>m[WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+ λEm′
[
(1−F(m′))(WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)−Em′′|m′′>m′[WSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)])
]]
(3.7)
ν ′u(s
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i (m,ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ(u))USi(m,ω ′)
]
(3.8)
ν ′u(s
UU
i (ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
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]
(3.9)
Total match surpluses and unemployed worker’s surplus are as follows
Se(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ(ω)− (1−ψ)(bi(m˜)+h−νu(sUI(m˜)i (ω)))
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SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ
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3.8.2 Transitions
Employment The mass of type-i employed agents in t with match quality m, ei,t(m),
evolves as follows
ei,t+1(m) = (1−δ )(1−λ )(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m))ei,t(m)1{Se(m)i,t+1(m)> 0}
+(1−δ )(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m))ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+ f (m)
∫
m˜
uUIi,t (m˜)p
UI
i,t (m˜)1{SUI(m˜)i,t+1 (m)> 0}dm˜
+ f (m)uUUi,t p
UU
i,t 1{SUUi,t+1(m)> 0} (3.10)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. The total employment is the sum of all em-
ployed workers over productviity types and match qualities et =∑i=H,L
∫
ei,t(m) dm
and the aggregate output can be computed as yt = zt∑i=H,L
∫
m · ei,t(m) dm.
Job Destructions The job destruction rate of type-i employed workers with match
quality m at the beginning of period t and m′ at the end of period t, and the average
job destruction rate are respectively
ρx,it(m,m′) =
δ if S
e(m)
i,t+1(m
′)> 0,
1 otherwise
ρx,it =
(
δ
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)>0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
+
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)≤0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
)
/et (3.11)
where eposti,t (m,m
′) = (1−λ )(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m′))ei,t(m′)
+(1−λ ) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)1{m< m′}
+λ f (m′)(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m′))ei,t(m)
+λF(m′) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)
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denotes employed workers with match productivity m at the beginning of period t
and m′ at the end of the period t.
Job Findings The job finding rate for a type-i unemployed worker of status j =
{UI(m˜),UU} and the average job finding rate are respectively
ρ jf ,it =
∫
ρ jf ,it(m) f (m)dm
ρ f ,t =
∫
m˜ u
UI
i,t (m˜)ρ
UI(m˜)
f ,it dm˜+u
UU
i,t ρ
UU
f ,it∫
m˜ u
UI
t (m˜)dm˜+uUUt
where ρ jf ,it(m) =
p
j
i,t if S
j
i,t+1(m)> 0,
0 otherwise
Job-to-job Transitions The match-specific and the average job-to-job transition
rates are respectively
ρeei,t (m) = (1−δ )
(
(1−λ )pei,t(m)(1−F(m))Em′>m[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′)> 0}]
+λ
∫
m′
pei,t(m) f (m
′)(1−F(m′))Em′′>m′[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′′)> 0}]dm′
)
ρeei,t =
∫
mρeei,t (m)ei,t(m)dm
et
Unemployment The mass of type-i unemployed workers with and without UI ben-
efits as well as the total unemployment evolve respectively as follows
uUIi,t+1(m˜) = (1−φt)(1− pUIi,t (m˜))uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUIi,t (m˜)(1−φt)(1−ξ )pUIi,t (m˜)uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
+(1−ψ)
∫
m′
ρx,it(m˜,m′)ei,t(m˜,m′)dm′︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, not losing UI
(3.12)
uUUi,t+1 =
∫
m˜
(
φt(1− pUIi,t (m˜))uUIi,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUIi,t (m˜)
(
φt+(1−φt)ξ
)
pUIi,t (m˜)u
UI
i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
)
dm˜
+(1−ρUUf ,it )uUUi,t + ψρx,itei,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, losing UI
(3.13)
ut+1 = ∑
i=H,L
(∫
m˜
uUIi,t+1(m˜)dm˜+u
UU
i,t+1
)
(3.14)
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where χUIi,t (m˜)≡
∫
1{SUIi,t+1(m˜,m)≤ 0} f (m)dm denotes the rate the newly formed
matches with uUIi (m˜) are not viable.
3.8.3 Performance of the Approximation Method
Below I report the average percentage deviations (in absolute value) of the 1st, 2nd,
3rd and 4th moments of the approximated distribution of employed workers over
match quality from the distributions obtained from the simulation. The method de-
scribed in the Model section delivers distributions that are less than 1% different
in terms of the 1st, 2nd and 4th moments from the actual distributions found in
the simulation. However it generates the 3rd moment that is more than 3% differ-
ent from its counterpart since the skewness is more sensitive to the cut-offs in the
distributions coming from endogenous destructions.
Table 3.1: Performance of the Approximation Method
Percentage deviations (%)
Mean SE
1st moment 0.5650 0.3953
2nd moment 0.4670 0.4499
3rd moment 3.6819 3.4767
4th moment 0.2009 0.2936
3.8.4 Ahn and Hamilton (2016)’s State Space Model
To summarise briefly, Ahn and Hamilton (2016)’s state space model contains the
latent variables which are the number of each type entering unemployment in each
time period (wH,t ,wL,t) and the time-varying factors governing their outflow rates
(xH,t ,xL,t). These four variables follow a random walk process. For example,
wH,t = wH,t−1+ εwH,t
The errors are independently and normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation {σwH ,σwL ,σ xH ,σ xL} respectively. They assume the true duration dependence
102 Chapter 3. Long-term Unemployment and UI Extensions
of unemployment exit rate is time invariant and summarised by {δ1,δ2,δ3}. The
measurements or observables in their model are unemployment series by 5 dura-
tion bins {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t ,u7.12t ,u13+t }. They are, respectively, unemployed workers
with duration less than 1 month, 2-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months, and more
than 12 months. All five unemployment series can contain measurement errors
{r1t ,r2.3t ,r4.6t ,r7.12t ,r13+t } which are independently and normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation {R1,R2.3,R4.6,R7.12,R13+}. The evolution
of these series are as follows
u1t = ∑
i=H,L
wit+ r1t
u2.3t = ∑
i=H,L
[wi,t−1Pit(1)+wi,t−2Pit(2)]+ r2.3t
u4.6t = ∑
i=H,L
5
∑
k=3
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r4.6t
u7.12t = ∑
i=H,L
11
∑
k=6
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r7.12t
u13+t = ∑
i=H,L
47
∑
k=12
[wi,t−kPit(k)]+ r13+t
where Pit( j) = pi,t− j+1(1)× pi,t− j+2(2)× ...× pi,t( j)
pit(τ) = exp[−exp(xit+dτ)]
dτ =

δ1(τ−1) for τ < 6
δ1[(6−1)−1]+δ2[τ− (6−1)] for 6≤ τ < 12
δ1[(6−1)−1]+δ2[(12−1)− (6−1)]+δ3[τ− (12−1)] for 12≤ τ
The parameters to be estimated are the standard deviations of the errors
{σwH ,σwL ,σ xH ,σ xL, R1,R2.3,R4.6,R7.12,R13+} and the parameters for true duration
dependence {δ1,δ2,δ3}. I obtain 50 different series of {u1t ,u2.3t ,u4.6t , u7.12t ,u13+t }
by using the Monte Carlo simulations. For each set of the simulated unemployment
series, I obtain a set of twelve estimates from the same non-linear state space model
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using Maximum Likelihood. The extended Kalman fiter is used to construct the
likelihood function since {xH,t ,xL,t} enter the equations for unemployment series
non-linearly. Table 3.15 reports these estimates and their standard errors.
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment and Long-term Unemployment (those unemployed > 6
months) in the U.S. (Source: CPS)
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Figure 3.2: Maximum Unemployment Insurance Duration (weeks) in the U.S. (Source:
ETA. Shaded areas denote the recessions)               	 
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Figure 3.3: Maximum Unemployment Insurance Duration (weeks) in the U.S. with Auto-
matic Extensions (Source: ETA. Shaded areas denote the recessions. Dashed
green line denotes the automatic extensions)               	 
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Figure 3.4: Unemployment-to-Employment Transition Rate (%) by UI status (Source:
CPS)
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment-to-Unemployment Transition Rate (%) by UI status (Source:
CPS)
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Figure 3.6: Unemployment-to-Out-of-Labour-Force Transition Rate (%) by UI status
(Source: CPS)
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Figure 3.7: Distributions of unemployment durations and fractions represented by current
UI recipients (Source: CPS)
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Figure 3.8: Shares (%) of current UI recipients over total unemployment in each monthly
duration bins (Source: CPS)
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Figure 3.9: Shares (%) of Current UI Recepients in 2 Subgroups: Long-term Unemploy-
ment and Newly Unemployed Workers (Source: CPS)
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Figure 3.10: Aggregate Productivity Series (z) as Constructed to Match Output Deviations
from HP Trend
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Figure 3.11: UI Extensions from the Model and the Data (Data source: ETA)
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Figure 3.12: Unemployment Rate (%) from the Model and the Data (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 3.13: Long-term Unemployment Rate (%) from the Model and the Data (Data
source: CPS)
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Figure 3.14: Average Unemployment Duration from the Model and the Data (Data source:
CPS)
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Figure 3.15: Distribution of Unemployment Durations during the Great Recession (Data
source: CPS)
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Figure 3.16: Unemployment Shares (%) by Durations (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 3.17: Job Finding (left panel) and Job Separation Rates (right panel) (%) as Ob-
served in the Data and as Generated by the Model (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 3.18: Unemployment Exit Rate (%) by UI Status (left panel) and Worker’s Produc-
tivity (right panel)
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Figure 3.19: Conditional Job finding rate (%) as a function of unemployment by UI status
(peH(m˜), p
UI
H (m˜), p
UU
H ): For solid (dashed) lines, maximum UI duration is 39
(90) weeks
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Figure 3.20: Conditional Job finding rate (%) as a function of unemployment by UI
benefit levels (pUIH (m˜) by m˜) (left panel) and by Worker’s Productivity
(pUIH (m˜), p
UI
L (m˜)) (right panel): For solid (dashed) lines, maximum UI du-
ration is 39 (90) weeks
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Unemployment rate (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Co
nd
itio
na
l jo
b f
ind
ing
 ra
te 
(%
)
Conditional Job Finding Rate for Insured type-H with UI @ mid (Z)
pUIH : P5 of F(m)
pUIH : P25 of F(m)
pUIH : P50 of F(m)
pUIH : P75 of F(m)
pUIH : P95 of F(m)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Unemployment rate (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Co
nd
itio
na
l jo
b f
ind
ing
 ra
te 
(%
)
Conditional Job Finding Rate for u UI @ mid (m,Z)
pUIH : max UI 39 wks
pUIL : max UI 39 wks
pUIH : max UI 90 wks
pUIL : max UI 90 wks
114 Chapter 3. Long-term Unemployment and UI Extensions
Figure 3.21: Total Match Surplus as a function of unemployment by UI status
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UI(m˜)
H (m),S
UU
H (m)) (left panel) and by worker’s productivity
(SUI(m˜)H (m),S
UI(m˜)
L (m)) (right panel): For solid (dashed) lines, maximum UI
duration is 39 (90) weeks
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Figure 3.22: Total Match Surplus as a function of unemployment for the insured unem-
ployed by future match quality (SUI(m˜)H (m) by m) (left panel) and by benefit
level (SUI(m˜)H (m) by m˜) (right panel): For solid (dashed) lines, maximum UI
duration is 39 (90) weeks
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Figure 3.23: Success rate of meetings between unemployed workers and firms (fractions of
meetings that lead to viable matches)
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Figure 3.24: Decomposition of the Effect of UI Extensions on Long-term Unemployment
(%): Data, Baseline Model and Counterfactual (each of the following chan-
nels is fixed: job search behavior, match formation and job destruction) (Data
source: CPS)
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Figure 3.25: Decomposition of the Effect of UI Extensions on Unemployment (%) (top
panel) and Average Unemployment Duration (weeks) (bottom panel): Data,
Baseline Model and Counterfactual (each of the following channels is fixed:
job search behavior, match formation and job destruction) (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 3.26: UI Extensions: Data, Baseline Model and Counterfactual (with no UI exten-
sions) (Data source: ETA)
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Figure 3.27: The Effect of Removing UI Extension on the Long-term Unemployment
(%): Data, Baseline Model and Counterfactual (with no UI extensions) (Data
source: CPS)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
%
Long-term Unemployment Rate (%): Model vs Data
data
model
"?
"(?,s)
"(?,s,S)
∆φ : only maximum UI duration changes
∆(φ ,s): maximum UI duration and job search effort change
∆(φ ,s,S): maximum UI duration, job search effort and match surplus change
118 Chapter 3. Long-term Unemployment and UI Extensions
Figure 3.28: The Effect of Removing UI Extension on Unemployment (%) (top panel) and
Average Unemployment Durations (bottom panel): Data, Baseline Model and
Counterfactual (with no UI extensions) (Data source: CPS)
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∆φ : only maximum UI duration changes
∆(φ ,s): maximum UI duration and job search effort change
∆(φ ,s,S): maximum UI duration, job search effort and match surplus change
3.8. Appendix for Chapter 3 119
Figure 3.29: The Effect of Removing Reachback Provision Programme on Long-term Un-
employment (%) (top panel), Unemployment (%) (middle panel) and Average
Unemployment Durations (bottom panel): Data, Baseline Model and Model
without Reachback Provision (Data source: CPS)
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From May 2007, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation law has included
the “Reachback Provision” providing UI eligility to unemployed workers who have
already exhausted their benefits prior to the extensions of UI. This programme is
featured in the baseline model whilst it is not in the counterfactual experiment.
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Figure 3.30: The Effect of Removing On-the-job Search (OJS) on Long-term Unemploy-
ment (%) (top panel), Unemployment (%) (middle panel) and Average Unem-
ployment Durations (bottom panel): Data, Baseline Model and Model without
OJS (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 3.31: Hazard Rate (%) of Exiting Unemployment
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Figure 3.32: Probability that the newly unemployed workers of each type remain unem-
ployed the following month: model’s prediction (left panel) and empirical
prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2016) (right panel, source: Ahn & Hamil-
ton, 2016)
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Figure 3.33: Number of newly unemployed workers of each type: model’s prediction (left
panel) and empirical prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2016) (right panel,
source: Ahn & Hamilton, 2016)
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Figure 3.34: Share of unemployment by worker’s type: model’s prediction (left panel) and
empirical prediction from Ahn & Hamilton (2016) (right panel, source: Ahn
& Hamilton, 2016)
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Figure 3.35: Shares (%) of unemployment by UI Status and Worker’s Productivity
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Figure 3.36: Implied Unemployment Continuation Probability from Genuine Duration De-
pendence: model’s prediction (solid) and empirical prediction from Ahn &
Hamilton (2016) (dashed)
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• Note: The time varying factors governing the outflow rates for type-i workers
(xit) are normalised to zero when calculating these probabilities.
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Table 3.2: Unemployment-to-Employment (UE) Monthly Transition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 21.4 7.2 −14.2 27.5 17.8 −9.7
25−54 years 24.3 7.1 −17.1 30.7 19.7 −11.0
Gender
Male 24.9 7.2 −17.6 28.4 18.3 −10.1
Female 16.3 7.2 −9.1 26.3 17.1 −9.2
Education
Less than High School 25.0 4.7 −20.3 25.4 16.2 −9.2
High School 9.0 7.5 −1.5 28.9 16.0 −12.9
Some College 27.4 7.4 −20.0 28.0 20.5 −7.5
College or higher 26.8 7.4 −19.3 28.4 24.5 −3.9
Industry
Manufacturing 22.5 6.5 −16.0 25.6 14.9 −10.7
Construction 18.3 9.6 −8.7 36.3 21.6 −14.7
Wholesale & Retail n/a 6.4 n/a 26.0 16.3 −9.7
Prof./Business Services 45.9 4.3 −41.6 22.5 19.9 −2.6
Occupation
High-skilled 27.4 7.8 −19.5 27.4 24.6 −2.9
Middle-skilled 18.6 6.6 −12.0 30.1 17.9 −12.2
Low-skilled 20.6 10.4 −10.2 26.6 17.6 −9.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 50.7 12.2 −38.5 46.2 40.4 −5.8
Permanent Separation 13.6 6.7 −6.9 25.6 15.6 −10.0
Recall
Date Given 56.4 9.9 −46.5 53.9 47.00 −6.9
No Date Given 22.4 7.7 −14.7 29.4 22.9 −6.5
Some indication 48.3 13.3 −35.0 36.6 33.8 −2.8
No indication 16.5 7.0 −9.5 22.2 17.5 −4.7
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UE rate (in percentage points) =UEJan10−UEJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-
, middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and
manual jobs)
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Table 3.3: Unemployment-to-Unemployment (UU) Monthly Transition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 68.4 84.4 +16.0 48.0 60.2 +12.2
25−54 years 65.4 84.9 +19.6 50.8 62.6 +11.8
Gender
Male 62.5 85.5 +23.0 50.9 63.0 +12.1
Female 77.0 81.9 +4.9 43.9 56.0 +12.1
Education
Less than High School 60.7 82.4 +21.7 43.8 58.1 +14.3
High School 77.6 87.8 +10.2 49.8 63.2 +13.4
Some College 65.1 81.7 +16.6 49.3 58.8 +9.5
College or higher 61.1 81.2 +20.1 51.7 60.4 +8.8
Industry
Manufacturing 68.2 82.0 +13.8 51.9 62.6 +10.7
Construction 65.6 84.4 +18.8 50.5 66.5 +16.0
Wholesale & Retail 80.9 86.1 +5.2 49.5 60.1 +10.6
Prof./Business Services 52.5 88.9 +36.3 55.5 60.2 +4.7
Occupation
High-skilled 68.5 86.1 +17.6 49.8 60.7 +10.9
Middle-skilled 69.1 83.9 +14.8 48.3 62.3 +14.0
Low-skilled 62.9 81.0 +18.1 47.8 55.8 +8.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 36.2 81.1 +44.9 42.2 49.5 +7.2
Permanent Separation 78.5 84.5 +6.0 57.2 69.1 +11.9
Recall
Date Given 28.5 81.4 +52.9 35.9 47.0 +11.1
No Date Given 68.7 84.0 +15.3 52.6 63.5 +11.0
Some indication 39.5 80.9 +41.4 50.2 52.4 +2.2
No indication 77.6 84.3 +6.8 55.2 69.1 +13.9
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UU rate (in percentage points) =UUJan10−UUJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-
, middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and
manual jobs)
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Table 3.4: Unemployment-to-Out-of-Labour-Force (UOLF) Monthly Transition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 10.3 8.5 −1.8 24.5 22.0 −2.5
25−54 years 10.4 8.0 −2.4 18.5 17.7 −0.8
Gender
Male 12.6 7.3 −5.4 20.7 18.7 −2.0
Female 6.8 10.9 +4.1 29.8 26.8 −3.0
Education
Less than High School 14.3 12.9 −1.4 30.8 25.7 −5.1
High School 13.4 4.6 −8.7 21.3 20.8 −0.5
Some College 7.5 11.0 +3.5 22.7 20.7 −2.0
College or higher 12.1 11.3 −0.8 19.9 15.1 −4.8
Industry
Manufacturing 9.3 11.6 +2.3 22.5 22.5 0.0
Construction 16.1 5.9 −10.2 13.2 11.9 −1.3
Wholesale & Retail 19.1 7.5 −11.6 24.4 23.6 −0.8
Prof./Business Services 1.5 6.8 +5.3 22.0 19.9 −2.1
Occupation
High-skilled 4.1 6.0 +1.9 22.8 14.8 −8.0
Middle-skilled 12.3 9.5 −2.8 21.7 19.9 −1.8
Low-skilled 16.5 8.6 −7.9 25.6 26.6 +1.0
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 13.2 6.7 −6.4 11.6 10.2 −1.4
Permanent Separation 7.9 8.8 +0.9 17.2 15.3 −1.9
Recall
Date Given 15.1 8.6 −6.5 10.2 6.1 −4.1
No Date Given 8.9 8.3 −0.6 18.0 13.6 −4.4
Some indication 12.3 5.8 −6.5 13.2 13.8 +0.56
No indication 6.0 8.7 +2.7 22.6 13.4 −9.2
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UOLF rate (in percentage points) = UOLFJan10 −
UOLFJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-
, middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and
manual jobs)
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Table 3.5: Fraction (%) of Long-term Unemployment Represented by Current UI Recipi-
ents in each Subgroup
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 ∆pp. from
2008 to 2010
Age
16 years or older 18 15 51 39 16 +36
25-54 years 18 14 50 41 18 +36
Gender
Male 15 13 50 38 14 +38
Female 22 18 54 40 19 +36
Education
Less than High School 13 23 34 32 12 +11
High School 21 2 53 34 14 +51
Some College 17 21 56 44 17 +35
College or higher 22 22 56 40 22 +34
Industry
Manufacturing 27 25 62 38 17 +37
Construction 8 16 47 40 21 +31
Wholesale & Retail 6 n/a 53 34 18 n/a
Prof./Business Services 13 11 43 35 6 +32
Occupation
High-skilled 29 22 61 46 27 +39
Middle-skilled 14 15 53 39 12 +38
Low-skilled 11 6 29 30 14 +23
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff n/a 30 61 49 12 +31
Permanent Separation 22 18 56 41 17 +38
Recall
Date Given n/a n/a 42 63 10 n/a
No Date Given 15 26 60 46 26 +34
Some indication n/a 5 68 43 12 +63
No indication 16 29 60 46 27 +31
• Data source: CPS
Long-term unemployment is defined as unemployed workers whose duration
is longer than six months.
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-
, middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and
manual jobs)
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Table 3.6: Fraction (%) of Newly Unemployed Workers Represented by Current UI Recip-
ients in each Subgroup
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 ∆pp. from
2008 to 2010
Age
16 years or older 23 21 41 30 25 +20
25-54 years 24 21 42 33 31 +21
Gender
Male 26 20 40 33 27 +20
Female 18 23 42 26 21 +19
Education
Less than High School 23 18 25 28 8 +7
High School 29 17 48 27 33 +30
Some College 16 26 41 33 26 +14
College or higher 18 24 46 33 30 +22
Industry
Manufacturing 45 30 44 36 31 +15
Construction 33 17 44 45 32 +27
Wholesale & Retail 25 21 51 20 24 +30
Prof./Business Services 13 19 26 33 22 +7
Occupation
High-skilled 22 24 55 34 30 +31
Middle-skilled 26 18 41 36 25 +23
Low-skilled 6 30 22 12 18 −8
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 34 25 44 27 31 +19
Permanent Separation 25 21 47 33 28 +26
Recall
Date Given 25 25 49 23 24 +24
No Date Given 32 30 49 34 36 +20
Some indication 39 26 42 31 40 +16
No indication 28 31 51 34 35 +19
• Data source: CPS
Newly unemployed workers are defined as unemployed workers whose dura-
tion is less five weeks.
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-
, middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and
manual jobs)
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Table 3.7: Targeted Moments
Moment Data Model
E(u) 0.0583 0.0577
E(ρUE) 0.4194 0.4286
E(ρEU ) 0.0248 0.0251
E(ρEE) 0.0320 0.0320
E(udur) 15.416 13.063
E(uUI) 0.0290 0.0327
std(u) 0.1454 0.1453
std(ρUE) 0.0999 0.1402
std(ρEU ) 0.0890 0.0641
std(udur) 6.9327 6.1954
std(LP) 0.0131 0.0104
corr(LP,LP−1) 0.7612 0.7593
• ρUE : job finding rate // ρEU : job separation rate // ρEE : job-to-job transition
rate
udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks) // LP = y/(1− u): labour pro-
ductivity
Data source: CPS
Table 3.8: Fixed Parameters For Baseline Model
Parameter Description Value Sources/Remarks
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.0392 Fujita & Ramey (2012)
µ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Den Haan, Ramey & Watson (2000)
φH UI exhaustion rate 1/6 6 months max UI duration, ETA
φL1 UI exhaustion rate 1/9 9 months max UI duration, ETA
φL2 UI exhaustion rate 1/12 12 months max UI duration, ETA
φL3 UI exhaustion rate 1/16 16 months max UI duration, ETA
φL4 UI exhaustion rate 1/21 21 months max UI duration, ETA
u¯ UI policy threshold 0.065 ETA
au Search cost function 0.1116 Normalisation
du,de Search cost function 1 Christensen et al (2004), Yashiv (2000)
h Leisure flow 0.5835 Gruber (1997)
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Table 3.9: Values of UI benefits by match quality in most recent employment and worker’s
productivity
m10 m20 m30 m40 m50 m60 m70 m80 m90 m100
bH(m) 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.028 0.043 0.064 0.077 0.104 0.130 0.296
bL(m) 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.027 0.042 0.062 0.076 0.103 0.129 0.295
m 0.526 0.563 0.618 0.655 0.692 0.748 0.785 0.859 0.933 1.396
• mx is the x-th percentile of the match quality distribution F(m)
Table 3.10: Calibrated Parameters For Baseline Model
Parameter Description Value
l Meeting function 0.51
δ Exogenous separation rate 0.023
λ Pr(redrawing new m) 0.50
ψ Pr(losing UI after becoming unemployed) 0.49
ξ Pr(losing UI after meeting firm) 0.50
ae Search cost function 0.15
m Lowest match-specific productivity 0.396
β1 Match-specific prod. distribution 2.55
β2 Match-specific prod. distribution 5.26
ρz Persistence of TFP 0.9562
σz Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0075
ηL Productivity of type-L 0.985
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Table 3.11: Moments Not Targeted
Moment Data Model
E(U1) 0.0233 0.0237
E(U2) 0.0172 0.0180
E(U4) 0.0080 0.0085
E(LTU) 0.0098 0.0076
std(U1) 0.0048 0.0017
std(U2) 0.0046 0.0030
std(U4) 0.0035 0.0035
std(LTU) 0.0085 0.0107
std(uUI) 0.1780 0.2523
std(v) 0.1226 0.0327
corr(u,v) -0.6682 -0.1906
• U1: Unemployed less than 1 month // U2: Unemployed with 2-3 month du-
ration
U4: Unemployed with 4-6 month duration // LTU : Unemployed longer 6
months
udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks)
Data source: CPS
Table 3.12: Performance of the Model during the Great Recession
Data Model Data Model mean % deviation
x max(x) max(x) mean(x) mean(x) (in modulus) from data
u(%) 10.0% 10.1% 8.3% 8.3% 4.6%
udur (weeks) 40.6 38.8 36.3 28.5 23.0%
LTU(%) 4.4% 4.9% 3.4% 3.1% 12.9%
• LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months // udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks)
- These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US
unemployment rate) and June 2014
- The last column shows the time-average percentage deviation in modulus of
each variable from its empirical counterpart
- Data source: CPS
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Table 3.13: Counterfactual Experiments: Effects of Decreasing Maximum UI Duration
from 90 Weeks to 26 Weeks during the Great Recession
Data Baseline ∆φ ∆(φ ,s) ∆(φ ,s,S)
max(u) (%) 10.0% 10.1% 9.2% 8.4% 6.8%
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 38.8 14.8 12.9 12.2
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.9% 1.2% 0.6% 0.5%
∆ max(u) −0.9pp −1.7pp −3.4pp
∆ max(udur) −24.0 −25.9 −26.6
∆ max(LTU) −3.7pp −4.3pp −4.4pp
• ∆φ : only maximum UI duration changes
∆(φ ,s): maximum UI duration and job search effort change
∆(φ ,s,S): maximum UI duration, job search effort and match surplus change
LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months // udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks)
∆ max(·): difference between the model’s and counterfactual experiments’
maxima
- These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US
unemployment rate) and June 2014
- Data source: CPS
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Table 3.14: Counterfactual Experiments: Effects of Removing the Reachback Provision
Programme during the Great Recession
Data Baseline No Reachback
max(u) (%) 10.0% 10.1% 9.8%
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 38.7 38.4
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.9% 4.7%
∆ max(u) −0.3pp
∆ max(udur) −0.3
∆ max(LTU) −0.2pp
• LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months // udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks)
∆ max(·): difference between the model’s and counterfactual experiment’s
maxima
- These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US
unemployment rate) and June 2014
- Data source: CPS
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Table 3.15: Parameter Estimates from State Space Model in Ahn and Hamilton (2016)
Parameter A&H (2016) Model
σwL 0.0434 0.0439
(0.0041) (0.0086)
σwH 0.0456 0.0487
(0.0059) (0.0060)
σ xL 0.0446 0.0469
(0.0049) (0.0096)
σ xH 0.0209 0.0211
(0.0028) (0.0030)
δ1 0.0053 0.0055
(0.0138) (0.0010)
δ2 -0.0647 -0.0283
(0.0242) (0.0383)
δ3 0.0724 0.0981
(0.0250) (0.0231)
R1 0.0981 0.0966
(0.0058) (0.0156)
R2.3 0.0759 0.0755
(0.0043) (0.0111)
R4.6 0.0775 0.0765
(0.0068) (0.0123)
R7.12 0.0597 0.0626
(0.0051) (0.0080)
R13+ 0.0366 0.0390
(0.0026) (0.0057)
• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix E for
variables’ definitions
Chapter 4
The Persistence of Unemployment
and the Role of Unemployment
Insurance History
4.1 Introduction/Motivation
The effects of unemployment insurance (UI) extensions on unemployment and its
duration structure have long been studied from both theoretical and empirical per-
spectives.1 The generous UI extensions and the unprecedented rise in unemploy-
ment duration during the Great Recession in the US have sparked a greater interest
in quantifying the effect of UI extensions. This question becomes more compli-
cated since the extensions themselves were triggered by the state unemployment
rate. Some studies find a limited role of UI extensions on unemployment and its du-
ration structure. For example, Rothstein (2011) finds that UI extensions contributes
to 0.1-0.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate while Fujita (2011)
estimates the UI effect to be around 0.5-1.25 percentage point increase.2 At the
same time, other studies find a more substantial effect of the UI extensions. For
1For example, see Shavell and Weiss (1979), Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985), and
Katz and Meyer (1990), Wang and Williamson (1996), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Chetty
(2008), Shimer and Werning (2008), and Krueger and Mueller (2010, 2011).
2Other studies that find a small but significant impact of UI extensions within the range of 0.1-1.8
percentage point increase in unemployment include Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schechter (2010),
Valletta and Kuang (2010), Farber and Valletta (2011), Mazumder (2011), Nakajima (2012), and
Barnichon and Figura (2014).
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example, Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015) find that without UI
extensions the unemployment rate would have been 2.5 percentage points lower.
Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) link the emergence of jobless recoveries in the past
three recessions to UI extensions.
Chapter 3 develops a framework which helps reconcile these mixed results by
studying a general equilibrium search and matching model that distinguishes be-
tween the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of UI extensions. I find that
the extensions can account for a large part of the increase in the average unem-
ployment duration and long-term unemployment (those unemployed longer than
six months) during the Great Recession. However, the model overstate the size of
the changes of these labour market variables, and also understate their persistence.
The purpose of this paper is to address these issues by exploiting the fact that there
are further heterogeneities the job finding rates of unemployed workers. By distin-
guishing unemployed workers into three categories: currently receiving UI benefits
(henceforth insured unemployed), having exhausted UI benefits in the current un-
employment spell (formerly insured unemployed), and having never collected ben-
efits in the current spell (uninsured unemployed), I show that in the US data the job
finding rate of the formerly insured is significantly lower than that of the uninsured.
This finding is at odds with models that incorporate job search intensity including
the one in Chapter 3 since they predict that both the formerly insured and the unin-
sured exert the same search effort (due to having the same outside option), and,
therefore, have the same job finding rate. Following Shimer (2004), I measure the
search effort based on the number of job search methods, and find that both types of
unemployed workers (formerly insured and uninsured) do exert similar job search
intensities.
Motivated by these empirical findings, I extend an equilibrium search and matching
model with variable job search intensity by introducing a drop in job search effi-
ciency during an unemployment spell of insured unemployed workers. I argue that
this drop in search efficiency can be interpreted as a loss of career network or a loss
of skills/tools to conduct job search efficiently after a period of less activity (whilst
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being insured). This feature allows the formerly insured, whose search efficiency
has fallen, to exert similar search efforts to the uninsured, and at the same time find
a job at a slower rate than do the uninsured. Because of the fall in the formerly
insured workers’ job finding rate, the model can potentially increase the persistence
of unemployment duration and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, the drop
in job search efficiency lowers the value of being insured unemployed which has
two implications. First, it lowers the job separations of employed workers who are
on the margin of returning to unemployment. Second, it increases the job search
intensity of the insured (to avoid losing the search efficiency), and thereby shortens
the unemployment spells. This means that the response of insured unemployment
to UI extensions is expected to be more moderated.
This paper is also related to the literature studying the dynamics of unemployment
and its duration structure by exploring worker heterogeneities. Ahn and Hamil-
ton (2016), Ahn (2016), Hornstein (2012), and Ravn and Sterk (2013) study the
role of unobserved heterogeneity of workers that affects the unemployment exit
probabilities. Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016) study the roles of the
genuine duration dependence in the job finding rate together with the non participa-
tion margin. Elsby, Hobijn, S¸ahin and Valetta (2011) also study the contribution of
flows between non-participation and unemployment. Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers
(2014) study the role of occupational choices of unemployed workers on aggregate
unemployment and its duration distribution. This paper contributes to this literature
by focussing on the roles of worker’s UI history and how this affects the effects of
UI extensions on the unemployment duration distribution over the business cycles.
The main contributions of this paper is two folds. Empirically, I show that the
worker’s UI history is an important determinant for the labour market outcomes. I
then present an equilibrium model that is made consistent with the empirical find-
ings by introducing a drop in job search efficiency for unemployed workers who
have received UI benefits, and study the impact of UI extensions on unemployment
and its duration structure from both positive and normative aspects.
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I find that the introduction of a search efficiency drop for the formerly insured un-
employed improves the persistence of unemployment, average unemployment du-
ration and long-term unemployment by at least 14, 5 and 7 percent respectively (as
measured by the autocorrelation coefficients up to 2-year lags) when compared to
a model without a search efficiency drop. At the same time, the effect of UI ex-
tensions is also revised downwards where the elasticity of unemployment duration
is 5 percentage points lower, and a 1-week increase in maximum UI duration im-
plies a [0.33, 0.38] week increase in average unemployment duration. However, the
effect on total unemployment is hardly affected by this drop in search efficiency.
Additionally, I find that on average there is a welfare gain from eliminating all UI
extensions during the Great Recession of 0.14 percent, which is a combination of
0.27 percent welfare increase for the employed and 1.27 percent welfare drop for
the unemployed. Consistent with the results From Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)
who study the optimal UI policy over the business cycles, I find that the welfare
gain subsides as the economy recovers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents empirical findings related
to worker’s UI history. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the
calibration exercise. Section 5 discusses the results including the welfare analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Evidence
To motivate the main assumption of this paper that there is a drop in search effi-
ciency for unemployed workers who have received UI benefits, I present two empir-
ical findings in this section. First, unemployed workers who have exhausted their UI
benefits (the formerly insured) have a significantly lower job finding rate than that
of unemployed workers who never received the benefits (the uninsured). Second,
despite the smaller job finding rate, the formerly insured exert a similar job search
effort to the uninsured. This second finding rules out the possibility that the lower
job finding rate of the formerly insured is simply due to a lower job search effort.3
3Another possible explanation would be unobserved heterogeneity where workers with inher-
ently lower job finding rates are more likely to take up and exhaust UI benefits. Those with lower
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Job Findings I use the CPS Basic Monthly Data and CPS Displaced Worker, Em-
ployee Tenure, and Occupational Mobility Supplement from 2006 to 2014 to con-
struct monthly transition rates from unemployment to employment, unemployment
and out of labour force similar to Chapter 3. Additionally, I consider 3 UI statuses
amongst unemployed workers: current UI recipients (insured), non-UI recipients
(uninsured), and exhausted-UI recipients (formerly insured). Figure 4.1 plots the
unemployment-to-employment transition (job finding) rates. It shows that the for-
merly insured find a job at a slower rate than the uninsured, especially during the
Great Recession when the rate becomes lower and much closer to that of the in-
sured. Table 4.1 shows that this finding still holds when I control for several ob-
servable characteristics that may influence the UI take-up decision, and that adverse
selection could be ruled out.4 Lastly, Figure 4.3 shows that the formerly insured
represent a large fraction of the long-term unemployed (those unemployed longer
than 6 months) and therefore acknowledging the difference in the job finding rates
between the formerly insured and the uninsured can be important in explaining the
unemployment duration structure and its persistence that this paper aims to address.
Job Search Intensity Following Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama, Patterson and
S¸ahin (2017), I use the number of active job search methods as a proxy for job
search intensity.5 Figure 4.2 plots the average number of active job search methods
for unemployed workers with different UI histories over the 2006-2014 period.6 On
finding rates should also exert less search efforts; however, the data does not suggest the search
efforts are significantly different between the formerly insured (with lower finding rates) and the
uninsured (with higher finding rates).
4The only exception is for unemployed workers who are expecting to be recalled and/or are on
temporary layoff whose job finding rates remain quite high which is consistent with findings in
Fujita and Moscarini (2015). However, the share of these workers did not go up during the Great
Recession.
5Mukoyama et al (2017) also use another measure of search intensity based on information from
the American Time Use Survey. However, this survey does not report the UI status of the respon-
dents. Existing literature using this survey such as Krueger and Mueller (2010), Rothstein (2011)
and Mukoyama et al (2017) use the UI eligibility criteria (unemployed workers who are job losers
or temporary job enders) as a proxy for UI recipients but this paper is the first to report the search
intensity based on the reported receipt of UI which is a more accurate measurement.
6Active methods are the following: (1) contacted employer directly/interview, (2) contacted pub-
lic employment agency, (3) contacted private employment agency, (4) contacted friends or relatives,
(5) contacted school/university employment center, (6) sent out resumes/filled out application, (7)
checked union/professional registers, (8) placed or answered ads, and (9) other active. The survey
also lets the respondents answer the following passive methods: (1) looked at ads, (2) attended job
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average, the formerly insured use 2.48 methods in job searching which is very close
to the uninsured who use 2.44 methods whilst the insured use less at 2.25 methods.
This finding is not surprising given that both the formerly insured and the unin-
sured are supposed to have similar outside options (without UI benefits) they should
exert similar job search intensities. What is interesting, however, is when we con-
sider this with the fact that the job finding rate for the formerly insured is signifi-
cantly lower than that of the uninsured. To reconcile these two findings, I impose an
assumption that insured unemployed workers experience a drop in job search effi-
ciency during their unemployment spells. As an intuition, this can be the case when
they lose the career/professional network, and/or skills and tools to conduct job
search efficiently after having not been searching as actively for some time whilst
on the benefits. Therefore, even if the formerly insured exert the same search effort
as the uninsured, they will have a lower probability of meeting a potential employer
due to having a lower search efficiency.
4.3 Model
In this section, I describe a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model with endogenous job separation, variable job search intensity with on-the-
job search, endogenous UI extensions and a degree of worker heterogeneity. The
model is built upon Chapter 3 with an additional unemployment state, namely, for-
merly insured unemployment. Based on empirical findings in the previous section,
I introduce a drop in job search efficiency for unemployed workers who have col-
lected UI benefits. I purposefully retain all features in Chapter 3 so that the results
can be compared straightforwardly.
4.3.1 Technology and Preferences
Time is discrete and goes on forever. The economy is populated by workers and
firms. Workers are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their productivity which
is either high (H) or low (L) whilst firms are ex-ante identical. A match consists of
one worker and one firm. It produces output whose price is normalised to one. The
training programs/courses, (3) nothing, and (4) other passive.
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output of a match is a function of the aggregate productivity (z), the match-specific
productivity (m), and the worker-specific productivity (ηi; i ∈ {H,L}). Namely,
yit(m) = zt×m×ηi
The aggregate productivity (z) evolves according to an AR(1) process: lnzt =
ρz lnzt−1 + εt where εt ∼ N(0,σz). The match-specific productivity (m) is drawn
at the start of a worker-firm match from a distribution F(m), and may be redrawn in
each subsequent period at the rate λ from the same distribution F(m). Worker’s pro-
ductivity (ηi) is permanent and therefore remains the same throughout the duration
of a match. I normalise the productivity of type-H workers such that (ηL <)ηH ≡ 1.
A given match is exogenously separated at rate δ and may be endogenously sep-
arated whenever the value of workers and/or firms becoming unmatched is higher
than the value of being in production.
4.3.1.1 Workers
Workers are risk neutral and infinitely-lived. They discount future payoffs by the
factor β . As previously mentioned, there are two types of workers distinguished
by their productivity which can either be high or low. A worker can either be em-
ployed (e), insured unemployed with higher search efficiency (uUI1), insured un-
employed with lower search efficiency (uUI0), formerly insured unemployed with
higher search efficiency (uUIx1), formerly insured unemployed with lower search ef-
ficiency (uUIx0), or uninsured unemployed (uUU ). I assume that unemployed work-
ers who have collected UI benefits experience a drop in job search efficiency at rate
γ in each period during their unemployment spells. Workers are formerly insured
unemployed if and only if they were insured unemployed and have exhausted their
UI benefits. The worker’s UI history is important because the formerly insured and
the uninsured are made different due to different search efficiencies.
Both employed and unemployed workers decide each period how much effort they
exert in searching for a job (particularly, a new one in case of employed workers).
The search effort increases a worker’s probability of meeting a firm, and gives a
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disutility to the worker. The search cost function is strictly concave so a unique
search effort is determined for all states. Specifically, the disutility from exerting
search effort s of workers with status k ∈ {e,u1,u0}
νk(s) = aksdk ; ak,dk > 0,
I distinguish between the search cost of employed workers −νe(·), insured and
formerly insured with higher search efficiency as well as uninsured unemployed
workers −νu1(·), and, lastly, insured and formerly insured workers with low search
efficiency, νu0(·) where au0 > au1 and/or du0 > du1. Therefore, one unit of search
effort yields the insured and formerly insured with higher search efficiency as well
as uninsured unemployed workers the same probability of meeting a firm, whilst
the insured and formerly insured with lower search efficiency have a lower proba-
bility. The search cost for the employed is separated from the unemployed only to
discipline the job-to-job transition rate. It is useful to note that workers of different
productivity types (H or L) face the same search cost function.
All unemployed workers receive a utility flow h in each period which can be inter-
preted as home production or leisure flow from not working. Insured unemployed
workers further receive unemployment benefits bi(m˜); i ∈ {H,L} that depend on
the worker’s type (i) and the match-specific productivity in the most recent em-
ployment (m˜).7 Employed workers receive a wage w ji (m) where i ∈ {H,L} and
j ∈ {e(m˜),UI1(m˜),UI0(m˜),UIx1,UIx0,UU}. The wage depends on the worker’s
type (i), previous employment status and associated unemployment benefits ( j), and
the current match-specific productivity (m).
UI Duration Policy and UI Eligibility I assume that any employed worker re-
turning to unemployment becomes insured unemployed at rate 1−ψ , and become
uninsured unemployed at rate ψ , so that I can target the UI take-up rate and the size
of insured unemployment.
I follow Chapter 3 in modelling the UI duration policy to be a function of the
7As unemployment benefits are calculated as a fraction of a worker’s past wage, I use the worker’s
type along with the match-specific productivity as a proxy for their wages.
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unemployment rate as observed in the US economy. In particular, the maximum UI
duration is extended when the unemployment rate in the economy reaches a thresh-
old u¯. Similar to Frediksson and Holmlund (2001), I do not explicitly model the
length of an unemployment spell of a worker and instead use a UI exhaustion rate
to govern the number of insured unemployed workers losing UI eligibility each pe-
riod. Additionally, I allow this UI exhaustion rate to vary with total unemployment
(u). Namely, the rate an insured unemployed worker loses their UI benefit given the
unemployment rate is ut is
φ(ut) ≡ φL1{ut ≥ u¯}+φH1{ut < u¯}
where φL < φH . Whenever the unemployment rate goes above the threshold u¯ the
exhaustion rate becomes smaller and therefore the expected maximum UI duration,
which equals the inverse of the exhaustion rate, becomes longer/extended.
I assume that, on top of the UI exhaustion rate, insured unemployed workers face
an additional probability of losing UI eligibility at rate ξ when they meet a firm but
do not proceed to employment.
Workers’ Value Functions I define the set of state variables as ω ≡ {z,u,ui,
uUI1i (m˜), u
UI0
i (m˜), u
UIx1
i ,u
UIx0
i ,u
UU
i ,ei(m); ∀m, m˜ and i ∈ {H,L}
}
where ui is the
measure of type-i unemployed workers, uUI1i (m˜) is the measure of type-i insured
unemployed workers with higher search efficiency whose match quality in the most
recent employment was m˜, uUIx1i is the measure of type-i formerly insured unem-
ployed workers with higher search efficiency, uUUi is the measure of type-i unin-
sured unemployed workers, and ei(m) is the measure of type-i employed workers
with current match quality m. uUI0i (m˜) and u
UIx0
i are defined analogously but for
workers with lower search efficiency.
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Given this setup, I can write the Bellman equation for type-i insured unemployed
workers with unemployment benefits bi(m˜) and higher search efficiency as
UUI1i (m˜;ω) = max
sUI1i (m˜;ω)
bi(m˜)+h−νu1(sUI1i (m˜;ω)) (4.1)
+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
pUI1i (m˜;ω)max
{
WUI1(m˜)i (m
′;ω ′), ...
(1−φ(u))(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(keep UI | meeting a firm)
U¯UIi (m˜;ω
′)+
(
φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(lose UI | meeting a firm)
U¯UIxi (ω
′)
}
+(1− pUI1i (m˜;ω))
(
(1−φ(u))U¯UIi (m˜;ω ′)+φ(u)U¯UIxi (ω ′)
)]
where U¯UIi (·; ·) ≡ (1− γ)UUI1i (·; ·)+ γUUI0i (·; ·) and U¯UIxi (·) ≡ (1− γ)UUIx1i (·)+
γUUIx0i (·). pUI1i (m˜; ·) is the probability that type-i insured unemployed workers with
benefit bi(m˜) and higher search efficiency meets a firm which is increasing in their
job search intensity sUI1i (m˜; ·). This job finding probability is explained in detail in
the next subsection. Once these workers meet a firm, they draw a match-specific
productivity m, and decide whether to stay unemployed (with some probability of
losing UI eligibility) or start working for that firm. If they lose UI eligibility, they
become formerly insured unemployed whose value isUUIx1i (·) (UUIx0i (·)) for higher
(lower) efficiency searchers. The Bellman equation for type-i insured unemployed
workers with unemployment benefits bi(m˜) and lower search efficiency can be writ-
ten as
UUI0i (m˜;ω) = max
sUI0i (m˜;ω)
bi(m˜)+h−νu0(sUI0i (m˜;ω)) (4.2)
+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
pUI0i (m˜;ω)max
{
WUI0(m˜)i (m
′;ω ′), ...
(1−φ(u))(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(keep UI | meeting a firm)
UUI0i (m˜;ω
′)+
(
φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(lose UI | meeting a firm)
UUIx0i (ω
′)
}
+(1− pUI0i (m˜;ω))
(
(1−φ(u))UUI0i (m˜;ω ′)+φ(u)UUIx0i (ω ′)
)]
It is useful to note that the search cost function of these workers, νu0(·), is the only
reason why UUI1i (·; ·) is different from UUI0i (·; ·).
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As for type-i formerly insured unemployed workers with higher and lower search
efficiency, I can write their Bellman equations respectively as
UUIx1i (ω) = max
sUIx1i (ω)
h−νu1(sUIx1i (ω))+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
... (4.3)
pUIx1i (ω)max{WUIx1i (m′;ω ′),U¯UIxi (ω ′)}+(1− pUIx1i (ω))U¯UIxi (ω ′)
]
UUIx0i (ω) = max
sUIx0i (ω)
h−νu0(sUIx0i (ω))+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
... (4.4)
pUIx0i (ω)max{WUIx0i (m′;ω ′),UUIx0i (ω ′)}+(1− pUIx0i (ω))UUIx0i (ω ′)
]
Analogous to the insured unemployed, pUIx1i (·) is the probability that type-i for-
merly insured unemployed workers with higher search efficiency meets a firm, and
it is increasing in sUIx1i (·). After the meeting takes place, a match-specific pro-
ductivity m is drawn and these workers decide whether to stay formerly insured
unemployed or start working for that firm. The notations for the formerly insured
with lower search efficiency can be similarly defined.
I can write the Bellman equation for type-i uninsured unemployed workers as
UUUi (ω) = max
sUUi (ω)
h−νu1(sUUi (ω))+βEm′ω ′|ω
[
... (4.5)
pUUi (ω)max{WUUi (m′;ω ′),UUUi (ω ′)}+(1− pUUi (ω))UUUi (ω ′)
]
It is useful to note that the values of uninsured unemployed workers are different
from formerly insured unemployed workers only because of the possibility that the
latter type face a drop in search efficiency.
Lastly, I can write the Bellman equation for type-i employed workers with current
match quality m, and previous employment status and associated unemployment
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benefits j ∈ {e(m˜),UI1(m˜),UI0(m˜),UIx1,UIx0,UU} as
W ji (m;ω) = maxsei (m;ω)
w ji (m;ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))+βEω ′|ω
[
(1−δ )(1−λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, keep m)
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m;ω
′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′|m′>m[W
e(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
]
+(1−δ )λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay matched, new m)
Em′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(stay with current firm)
W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′)
+ pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(move to new firm)
Em′′|m′′>m′ [W
e(m)+
i (m
′′;ω ′)]
]
+ δ︸︷︷︸
Pr(match exogenously separated)
(
(1−ψ)UUI1i (m,ω ′)+ψUUUi (ω ′)
)]
(4.6)
where W e(m)+i (m
′;ω ′) ≡ max{W e(m)i (m′;ω ′),(1− ψ)UUI1i (m,ω ′) + ψUUUi (ω ′)}
showing that employed workers are free to return to unemployment in which case
they become insured at rate 1−ψ and uninsured at rate ψ . The expressions for
optimal job search intensities for all types of workers can be found in Appendix
4.7.1.
4.3.1.2 Firms
Similar to workers, firms are risk neutral and infinitely-lived. They also discount
future payoffs by the factor β . Firms are ex-ante identical, and either matched with
one worker or unmatched. Matched firms are only made different by the type of
workers they are matched with and the match-specific productivity they have drawn
together. Matched firms produce and sell output, pay wage to their workers, and
lump-sum tax to finance UI payments. Unmatched firms pay a fixed cost κ to post
a job vacancy, and have no ability to direct their search to a certain type of workers.
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The Bellman equation for unmatched firms is
V (ω) = −κ+βq(ω)Eω ′|ω
[
∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
ζ ei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
+∑
m
ζUI1i (m,ω)Em′[J
UI1(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]+∑
m
ζUI0i (m,ω)Em′ [J
UI0(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
+ζUIx1i (ω)Em′[J
UIx1+
i (m
′;ω ′)]+ζUIx0i (ω)Em′[J
UIx0+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
+ζUUi (ω)Em′[J
UU+
i (m
′;ω ′)]
)]
(4.7)
where ζ ei (m) =
(1−λ )sei (m)ei(m)+λ f (m)∑m sei (m)ei(m)
s
ζUI1i (m) =
sUI1i (m)u
UI1
i (m)
s
; ζUI0i (m) =
sUI0i (m)u
UI0
i (m)
s
;
ζUIx1i =
sUIx1i u
UIx1
i
s
; ζUIx0i =
sUIx0i u
UIx0
i
s
; ζUUi =
sUUi u
UU
i
s
;
s = ∑
i∈{H,L}
(
∑
m
(
sei (m)ei(m)+ s
UI1
i (m)u
UI1
i (m)+ s
UI0
i (m)u
UI0
i (m)
)
+sUIx1i u
UIx1
i + s
UIx0
i u
UIx0
i + s
UU
i u
UU
i
)
J ji (·) denotes the value of a firm being matched to a worker of type-i and previous
employment status j ∈ {e(m˜),UI1(m˜),UI0(m˜),UIx1,UIx0,UU} and J j+i (m;ω)≡
max{J ji (m;ω),V (ω)}. Since the meeting process between workers and firms is
random, unmatched firms must take into account the entire distribution of workers
over productivity types, employment statuses and associated (potential) UI bene-
fits to compute the probability they meet a certain type of workers. I also assume
that firms can enter and leave the market freely; therefore, the value of being an
unmatched firm is always zero, i.e. V (ω) = 0,∀ω .
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Given the free entry condition, I can write the Bellman equation for matched firms
as
J ji (m;ω) = yi(m;ω)−w ji (m;ω)− τ(ω)+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Je(m)+i (m;ω ′)
]
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Je(m)+i (m′;ω ′)
]]
(4.8)
where Je(m)+i (m;ω)≡max{Je(m)i (m;ω),0} implying that matched firms are free to
endogenously separate from their current matched workers.
4.3.1.3 Search and Matching
A meeting function M(s,v) determines the number of meetings between workers
and firms. It is concave in its arguments which are the total job search intensity
(s) and the total number of job vacancies (v), and has constant returns to scale.
Conventionally, I define the rate a worker meets a firm per unit of job search to be
M(s,v)
s =M(1,θ)≡ p(θ); therefore, the rate a worker of type i with history j meets
a firm is s ji p(θ) ≡ p ji (θ). The rate a firm meets a worker is M(s,v)v =M(1/θ ,1) ≡
q(θ), where θ ≡ vs is the market tightness.
4.3.2 Wage and Surplus
A wage in the model is determined by the generalised Nash bargaining rule. That
is, the Nash bargained wage solves
w ji (m;ω) = argmax
(
WS ji (m;ω)
)µ(
J ji (m;ω)
)(1−µ)
(4.9)
where µ is the worker’s bargaining power. The worker’s previous employment
status j ∈ {e(m˜),UI1(m˜),UI0(m˜),UIx1,UIx0,UU} is important for the determi-
nation of wage because workers use their outside options in the bargaining process.
Specifically, WS ji denotes the surplus of type-i employed workers with history j.
It is defined as the difference between the value of being employed and the corre-
sponding outside option. Define the total match surplus as S ji ≡WS ji + J ji . Nash
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bargaining results in WS ji = µS
j
i and J
j
i = (1− µ)S ji . I can write the surpluses of
employed workers as follows
WSe(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ W e(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−ψ)UUI1i (m˜,ω)−ψUUUi (ω)
WSUI1(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ WUI1(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )U¯UIi (m˜,ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )U¯UIxi (ω)
WSUI0(m˜)i (m;ω) ≡ WUI0(m˜)i (m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )UUI0i (m˜,ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )UUIx0i (ω)
WSUIx1i (m;ω) ≡ WUIx1i (m;ω)−U¯UIxi (ω)
WSUIx0i (m;ω) ≡ WUIx0i (m;ω)−UUIx0i (ω)
WSUUi (m;ω) ≡ WUUi (m;ω)−UUUi (ω)
where U¯UIi (m˜,ω) = (1− γ)UUI1i (m˜,ω) + γUUI0i (m˜,ω). U¯UIxi (ω) is analogously
defined. The expressions for total match surpluses can be found in Appendix 4.7.1.
4.3.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is characterised by
• Value functions: W e(m˜)i (m;ω),W
UI1(m˜)
i (m;ω),W
UI0(m˜)
i (m;ω),W
UIx1
i (m;ω),
WUIx0i (m;ω), W
UU
i (m;ω), U
UI1
i (m˜;ω), U
UI0
i (m˜;ω), U
UIx1
i (ω), U
UIx0
i (ω),
UUUi (ω), J
e(m˜)
i (m;ω), J
UI1(m˜)
i (m;ω), J
UI0(m˜)
i (m;ω), J
UIx1
i (m;ω), J
UIx0
i (m;ω),
JUUi (m;ω), and V (ω);
• Market tightness θ(ω);
• Search policy: sei (m;ω), s
UI1
i (m,ω), s
UI0
i (m,ω), s
UIx1
i (ω), s
UIx0
i (ω) and
sUUi (ω); and
• Wage functions: we(m˜)i (m;ω), w
UI1(m˜)
i (m;ω), w
UI0(m˜)
i (m;ω), w
UIx1
i (m;ω),
wUIx0i (m;ω) and w
UU
i (m;ω),
such that, given the initial distribution of workers over productivity level, employ-
ment status, UI status, benefit level and match productivity, the government’s policy
τ(ω) and φ(ω), and the law of motion for z:
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1. The value functions and the market tightness satisfy the Bellman equations
for workers and firms, and the free entry condition, namely, equations (4.1),
(4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8)
2. The search decisions satisfy the FOCs for optimal search intensity, which are
equations (4.10), (4.11), (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15)
3. The wage functions satisfy the FOCs for the generalised Nash bargaining rule
(equation (4.9))
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied each period
5. The distribution of workers evolves according to the transition equations
(4.16), (4.18), (4.19), (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22), which can be found in Ap-
pendix 4.7.2, consistent with the maximising behaviour of agents
4.4 Calibration
For simplicity, I assume that the rate the insured unemployed workers experience a
drop in their search efficiency is the same as the rate they exhaust their UI benefits,
i.e. γ coincides with φ(u); ∀u. This implies that the employment statuses reduce to
a set of {e(m˜),UI(m˜),UIx,UU}. Therefore, only the formerly insured unemployed
(those with status UIx) have a lower search efficiency.
The calibration strategy follows Chapter 3 with the exception of an additional
parameter to be calibrated and an additional target. Namely, the relative search
efficiency of the formerly insured unemployed, au0au1 , is calibrated to match the aver-
age ratio of the job finding rates between the insured unemployed and the formerly
insured unemployed.8 Therefore, there are in total 13 targeted moments and 13
parameters to be calibrated using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). Ta-
ble 4.2 summarises the targeted moments used in the calibration exercise, and also
compares the baseline model’s performance to that of the model without a drop in
search efficiency of the formerly insured unemployed. Non-targeted moments are
8Despite this additional parameter directly affects the relative job finding rates between unem-
ployed workers with and without UI benefits, it inevitably affects other moments in the calibration
exercise.
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reported in Table 4.3. Table 4.4 reports the calibrated parameters whilst Table 4.5
summarises the pre-specified parameters.
I continue to assume that the match-specific productivity m follows a Beta dis-
tribution with three parameters {m,β1,β2}. Specifically, F(m) = m+betacdf(m−
m,β1,β2). The meeting function between workers and firms is similar to den Haan,
Ramey and Watson (2000) but the number of job searchers is augmented by their
search intensities, namely, M(s,v)= (sv)/(sl+vl)
1
l . I choose the same pre-specified
parameters as in Chapter 3 including UI exhaustion rates during recessionary peri-
ods (φL) that vary to match the observed extended UI durations over the 1948-2007
period. It is useful to note that the UI extensions in the simulations are still endoge-
nous and triggered when the unemployment rate is above the threshold.
Overall, the model performs well in matching the targets. It matches the aver-
age ratio of the job finding rates between insured and formerly insured unemployed
workers unlike the model without a drop in search efficiency in Chapter 3 where this
statistic is not targeted. It also improves on the average share of insured unemploy-
ment, and performs much better in producing the volatility of the job finding rates.
With respect to the non-targeted moments, since the model delivers a more moder-
ated insured unemployment series, it produces a much more realistic volatility of
the series. In effect, this makes total unemployment more moderated and improves
on the Beveridge curve as measured by the correlation between unemployment and
vacancies. The volatilty of the vacancies also improves despite being somewhat far
from the data.
4.5 Results
I obtain the results in this section by feeding in (1) the observed extended maximum
UI durations between 1948 and 2014, and (2) the path of aggregate productivity z
such that the model delivers the same series of deviations of output (GDP per capita)
from its HP trend exactly as in the data. I then evaluate the performance of the
baseline model with respect to the model without formerly insured unemployment
in terms of how well it can account for the labour market activities over the business
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cycles as well as the increase in the persistence of unemployment. I show how the
increased persistence affects the previously reported results regarding the effects of
UI extensions during the Great Recession. Lastly, I report the welfare gains and
losses from eliminating UI extensions during the recent recession.
4.5.1 Performance
Unemployment Firstly, Figure 4.4 shows how well the model can account for the
total unemployment series in the data. Since UI extensions are a function of un-
employment, it is expected that the model generated UI extensions are similar to
the ones observed in the data. However, the model’s unemployment series does not
reach the threshold to trigger UI extension during the 90s recession. Overall, the
model’s series is more moderated than in the model without formerly insured un-
employment. The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows that the series exhibits a slightly
more persistent and subdued response during the Great Recession than does the se-
ries from the previous model without uUIx. From Table 4.6, we can see that the
baseline model does a better job in accounting for total unemployment during the
Great Recession (96 percent of the observed series - as measured by percentage
deviation) than the previous model (95.4 percent) as the series from the baseline
model overshoots by less when UI is extended during a recession.
Unemployment Duration Structure The same observation can be made with re-
gards to the average unemployment duration and long-term unemployment series
shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The persistence of these series are slightly higher
than those in the previous model. Both series do improve in terms of their responses
to negative aggregate shocks and UI extensions as observed by the significantly
smaller spikes during recessionary episodes (i.e., less overshooting). However,
both average unemployment duration and long-term unemployment in the base-
line model are on average lower than those in the previous model. As a result, the
model performs slightly worse in accounting for these two series (despite delivering
the observed peak of long-term unemployment that the other model overshoots) as
shown in Table 4.6.
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Persistence To quantify the increase in the persistence of unemployment and its
duration structure from the introduction of worker’s UI history, I show in Figure
4.7 the autocorrelation coefficients of total unemployment, average unemployment
duration and long-term unemployment from the models with and without a search
efficiency drop and the empirical counterparts. The baseline model is successful in
generating greater persistence for all three variables especially at longer lags (6 to 24
months). It yields higher autocorrelation coefficients on average by 0.03 (14 percent
increase) for unemployment, 0.02 (5 percent increase) for average unemployment
duration, and 0.03 (7 percent increase) for long-term unemployment in comparison
to the previous model. I find similar improvement in the autocorrelation coefficients
when I remove the quadratic time trend from the series as shown in Figure 4.8, but
since the coefficients are smaller, the baseline model improves from the previous
model by 41 percent for total unemployment, 10 percent for average unemployment
duration, and 33 percent for long-term unemployment. Nonetheless, the observed
persistence for all series in the data is significantly higher which may suggest that
further worker heterogeneities can improve the persistence and match the structure
of unemployment duration further.
4.5.2 Effects of UI Extensions on the Aggregate Labour Market
Now that I have established that the introduction of a drop in search efficiency for
insured unemployed workers helps increase the persistence of unemployment that
was lacking in the model in Chapter 3, I discuss in this section its implication on
the revised effects of UI extensions on the aggregate labour market.
Table 4.7 shows the responses of main labour market variables to a reduction of
maximum UI duration from 90 weeks to 26 weeks during the Great Recession, i.e.,
eliminating all UI extensions. To compare the effectiveness of UI duration policy, I
report the responses from the previous model without a drop in search efficiency in
the same table.
It can be seen from this table that introducing a drop in job search efficiency
for formerly insured workers reduces the effects of UI extensions on the unemploy-
ment duration structure (as represented by the average unemployment duration and
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long-term unemployment) but it hardly affects the effects of UI extensions on total
unemployment. This is expected since the formerly insured unemployed represent
a small fraction of total unemployment but its (negative) effect on the job find-
ing rates becomes more important for the unemployment duration due to Jensen’s
inequality, and they represent a larger fraction of long-term unemployment. The
reason that the UI effects are smaller in the baseline model is because a drop in job
search efficiency lowers the value of being insured unemployed in the first place.
Insured unemployed workers then search for jobs more intensively than in the pre-
vious model regardless of the level of the benefit. As a result, these workers respond
less strongly to UI extensions. The elasticity of unemployment duration on changes
in the maximum UI duration is also revised downwards from [0.38, 0.41] weeks to
[0.33, 0.38] weeks for a one-week increase in maximum UI duration.
4.5.3 Welfare Implication
Following the revised effects of UI extensions after the introduction of a search
efficiency drop amongst insured unemployed workers, I show in this section how
it is translated into welfare gains and/or losses for agents in the economy had UI
extensions not been implemented during the Great Recession. I also compare this
to the case where there is no drop in search efficiency. I summarise the welfare
results in Table 4.8 and plot them in Figure 4.9 and 4.10. As in Lucas (1987), I
define the welfare gain/loss to be the percentage change in consumption necessary
in each period to make agents in the economy to be as satisfied as they would be in
a counterfactual economy, which is the economy without UI extensions in this case.
I find that eliminating all UI extensions increases the total welfare of the economy
by around 0.14 percent. This is expected since given the agents are risk neutral there
is no role of UI provision as precautionary savings which may alter the results to be
more in favour of UI extensions. However, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) study
the optimal UI policy over the business cycles using a search and matching model
similar to this paper except that workers are risk averse. They find that the optimal
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UI policy should be procyclical in terms of both level and duration.9 Figure 4.9
shows that the welfare gain from eliminating UI extensions subsides as the economy
recovers (the welfare loss is present from the second half of 2013), which also
suggests that UI extensions should be procyclical.
Welfare gains and losses do vary with the types of workers. Only employed work-
ers benefit from the removal of UI extensions (a welfare improvement of 0.27 per-
cent). This is due to the fact that they have to indirectly pay taxes to finance the
UI payments for the unemployed each period. The low-productivity employed ben-
efit slightly more than the high-productivity type since they inherently earn lower
wages and have to pay the same amount of lump-sum taxes.
Unemployed workers suffer a large welfare loss of 1.27 percent when UI ex-
tensions are removed, especially the insured unemployed whose welfare goes down
by 1.64 percent. As expected, the insured unemployed with shorter unemployment
durations (0-2 months) benefit more from UI extensions than those with longer du-
rations since they are more likely to be insured (with a higher search efficiency)
in subsequent periods and enjoy the extended benefits. The uninsured unemployed
also suffer slightly from the UI extension removal mainly because the insured un-
employed would search harder for jobs making the market less tight. As a result, the
uninsured would have lower chances to meet a vacant firm unless they also search
harder. However, the formerly insured unemployed are barely affected. The larger
search cost they face implies that their search intensity varies only slightly in either
case. Unemployed workers with a higher productivity suffer a larger welfare loss
than those with a lower productivity as higher wages imply higher UI payments.
The welfare gain from eliminating UI extensions is revised downwards when the
baseline model is compared to an economy without a drop in job search efficiency
(which has a welfare gain of 0.23 percent). In this alternative scenario, insured un-
employment respond more strongly to UI extensions than in the baseline model as
discussed in previous subsections. Therefore, the tax burden for employed workers
9Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013) also study the optimal UI policy over the business cycles
and find that the policy should be countercyclical; however, they assume a complete wage rigid-
ity whilst wages in this model and in Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) are determined using Nash
bargaining.
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is higher and they benefit more from the UI extension removal than in the base-
line case. The insured unemployed, on the contrary, suffer less than in the baseline
model since their search efficiency now remain the same throughout the unemploy-
ment spell making being unemployed less unpleasant.
4.6 Conclusion
Building on Chapter 3 which studies the general equilibrium impact of UI exten-
sions on unemployment and its duration structure in the US, this paper distinguishes
between unemployed workers who never collected UI benefits and those who have
exhausted the benefits as they face different labour market outcomes. To make the
model consistent with the data, I assume that the job search efficiency falls during
an unemployment spell of workers who have collected UI benefits. Given further
heterogeneities in the job finding rates, the model improves from Chapter 3 in ac-
counting for unemployment and its duration structure. In particular, it generates
higher persistence (closer to the data) as well as a smaller degree of overshooting in
recessionary periods. As a result, the effects of UI extensions on the unemployment
duration structure have been revised slightly downwards. I also find that removing
all UI extensions during the Great Recession improves the welfare of the economy
given that agents are risk neutral.
Despite the model’s success in creating more persistence in unemployment and
its duration, a considerable improvement can be made in this aspect. Nonetheless,
the findings from this paper suggest that further heterogeneities from either workers
or firms that affect the unemployment exit probabilities could create more realistic
dynamics of the aggregate labour market, and provide more accurate results from
policy experiments.
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4.7 Appendix for Chapter 4
4.7.1 Expressions for Optimal Search Intensity and Match Sur-
plus
Given the worker’s value functions when employed, insured unemployed and unin-
sured unemployed, we can take the first derivative to find the optimal search effort.
The first order conditions for type-i workers are as follows
ν ′e(s
e
i (m;ω)) = −β (1−δ )M(θ(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
...
(1−λ )(1−F(m))
(
WSe(m)+i (m;ω
′)−Em′|m′>m[WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+ λEm′
[
(1−F(m′))(WSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)−Em′′|m′′>m′ [WSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)])
]]
(4.10)
ν ′u(s
UI1
i (m,ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI1(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ(u))U¯Sxi (m,ω ′)
]
(4.11)
ν ′u(s
UI0
i (m,ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI0(m)i (m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ(u))USx0i (m,ω ′)
]
(4.12)
ν ′u(s
UIx1
i (ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUIx1i (m′;ω ′),0}
]
(4.13)
ν ′u(s
UIx0
i (ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUIx0i (m′;ω ′),0}
]
(4.14)
ν ′u(s
UU
i (ω)) = βM(θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUUi (m′;ω ′),0}
]
(4.15)
where
U¯Sxi (m,ω
′) ≡ (1− γ)USx1i (m,ω ′)+ γUSx0i (m,ω ′)
USx1i (m,ω
′) ≡ UUI1i (m,ω ′)−UUIx1i (ω ′)
USx0i (m,ω
′) ≡ UUI0i (m,ω ′)−UUIx0i (ω ′)
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Total match surpluses and unemployed worker’s surplus are as follows (note that
the expressions below are under the assumption that the rate an insured unemployed
worker loses UI eligibility is the same as the rate she experiences a drop in her job
search efficiency):
Se(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ(ω)− (1−ψ)(bi(m˜)+h−νu(sUI(m˜)i (ω)))
−ψ(h−νu(sUUi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−ψ)pUI(m˜)i (ω)Em′[µSUI(m˜)+i (m′;ω ′)]
−ψ pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)
(
USxi (m,ω
′)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ pUI(m˜)i (ω))USxi (m˜;ω ′))]
SUI(m˜)i (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )(b(m˜)+h−νu(sUI(m˜)i (ω)))
−(φ +(1−φ)ξ )(h−νux(sUIx(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )pUI(m˜)i (ω)Em′[µSUI(m˜)+i (m′;ω ′)]
−(φ +(1−φ)ξ )pUIxi (ω)Em′[µSUIx+i (m′;ω ′)]
+USxi (m,ω
′)−ψUSi(m,ω ′)
−(1−φ)2(1−ξ )
(
1−ξ pUI(m˜)i (ω)
)
USxi (m˜;ω
′)
]
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SUUi (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ− (h−νu(sUUi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]+(1−ψ)USi(m,ω ′)
]
SUIxi (m;ω) = yi(m,ω)−νe(sei (m;ω))− τ− (h−νux(sUIxi (ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se(m)+i (m;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe(m)+i (m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se(m)+i (m′;ω ′)...
+pei (m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe(m)+i (m′′;ω ′)]
]
−pUIxi (ω)Em′[µSUIx+i (m′;ω ′)]+USxi (m,ω ′)−ψUSi(m,ω ′)
]
USi(m,ω) = b(m)−νu(sUI(m)i (ω))+νu(sUUi (ω))
+βEω ′|ω
[
pUI(m)i (ω)Em′ [µS
UI(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]...
−pUUi (ω)Em′[µSUU+i (m′;ω ′)]
+USi(m,ω ′)−
(
φ +(1−φ)ξ pUI(m)i (ω)
)
USxi (m,ω
′)
]
USxi (m,ω) = b(m)−νu(sUI(m)i (ω))+νux(sUIxi (ω))
+βEω ′|ω
[
pUI(m)i (ω)Em′[µS
UI(m)+
i (m
′;ω ′)]...
−pUIxi (ω)Em′[µSUIx+i (m′;ω ′)]
+(1−φ)
(
1−ξ pUI(m)i (ω)
)
USxi (m,ω
′)
]
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4.7.2 Transitions
Employment The mass of type-i employed agents in t with match quality m, ei,t(m),
evolves as follows
ei,t+1(m) = (1−δ )(1−λ )(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m))ei,t(m)1{Se(m)i,t+1(m)> 0}
+(1−δ )(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m))ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+(1−δ )λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pei,t(m
′)ei,t(m′)1{Se(m
′)
i,t+1(m)> 0}dm′
+ f (m)
∫
m˜
uUI1i,t (m˜)p
UI1
i,t (m˜)1{SUI1(m˜)i,t+1 (m)> 0}dm˜
+ f (m)
∫
m˜
uUI0i,t (m˜)p
UI0
i,t (m˜)1{SUI0(m˜)i,t+1 (m)> 0}dm˜
+ f (m)uUIx1i,t p
Uix1
i,t 1{SUIx1i,t+1(m)> 0}
+ f (m)uUIx0i,t p
Uix0
i,t 1{SUIx0i,t+1(m)> 0}
+ f (m)uUUi,t p
UU
i,t 1{SUUi,t+1(m)> 0} (4.16)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. The total employment is the sum of all em-
ployed workers over productviity types and match qualities et =∑i=H,L
∫
ei,t(m) dm
and the aggregate output can be computed as yt = zt∑i=H,L
∫
m · ei,t(m) dm.
Job Destructions The job destruction rate of type-i employed workers with match
quality m at the beginning of period t and m′ at the end of period t, and the average
job destruction rate are respectively
ρx,it(m,m′) =
δ if S
e(m)
i,t+1(m
′)> 0,
1 otherwise
ρx,it =
(
δ
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)>0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
+
∫ ∫
{(m,m′):Se(m)i,t+1(m′)≤0}
eposti,t (m,m
′)dm dm′
)
/et (4.17)
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where eposti,t (m,m
′) = (1−λ )(1− pei,t(m′)+ pei,t(m′)F(m′))ei,t(m′)
+(1−λ ) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)1{m< m′}
+λ f (m′)(1− pei,t(m)+ pei,t(m)F(m′))ei,t(m)
+λF(m′) f (m′)pei,t(m)ei,t(m)
denotes employed workers with match productivity m at the beginning of period t
and m′ at the end of the period t.
Job Findings The job finding rate for a type-i unemployed worker of status j =
{UI1(m˜), UI0(m˜), UIx1,UIx0,UU} and the average job finding rate are respec-
tively
ρ jf ,it =
∫
ρ jf ,it(m) f (m)dm
ρ f ,t =
∫
m˜ u
UI1
i,t (m˜)ρ
UI1(m˜)
f ,it dm˜+
∫
m˜ u
UI0
i,t (m˜)ρ
UI0(m˜)
f ,it dm˜+u
UIx1
i,t ρUIx1f ,it +u
UIx0
i,t ρUIx0f ,it +u
UU
i,t ρUUf ,it∫
m˜ u
UI1
t (m˜)dm˜+
∫
m˜ u
UI0
t (m˜)dm˜+uUIx1t +uUIx0t +uUUt
where ρ jf ,it(m) =

p ji,t if S
j
i,t+1(m)> 0,
0 otherwise
Job-to-job Transitions The match-specific and the average job-to-job transition
rates are respectively
ρeei,t (m) = (1−δ )
(
(1−λ )pei,t(m)(1−F(m))Em′>m[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′)> 0}]
+λ
∫
m′
pei,t(m) f (m
′)(1−F(m′))Em′′>m′[1{Sei,t+1(m,m′′)> 0}]dm′
)
ρeei,t =
∫
mρeei,t (m)ei,t(m)dm
et
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Unemployment The mass of type-i unemployed workers with and without UI ben-
efits as well as the total unemployment evolve respectively as follows
uUI1i,t+1(m˜) = (1− γ)
(
(1−φt)(1− pUI1i,t (m˜))uUI1i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUI1i,t (m˜)(1−φt)(1−ξ )pUI1i,t (m˜)uUI1i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
)
+(1−ψ)
∫
m′
ρx,it(m˜,m′)ei,t(m˜,m′)dm′︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, not losing UI
(4.18)
uUI0i,t+1(m˜) = (1−φt)(1− pUI0i,t (m˜))uUI0i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUI0i,t (m˜)(1−φt)(1−ξ )pUI0i,t (m˜)uUI0i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
+γ
(
(1−φt)(1− pUI1i,t (m˜))uUI1i,t (m˜)+χUI1i,t (m˜)(1−φt)(1−ξ )pUI1i,t (m˜)uUI1i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
losing search efficiency
)
(4.19)
uUIx1i,t+1 = (1− γ)
∫
m˜
(
φt(1− pUI1i,t (m˜))uUI1i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUI1i,t (m˜)
(
φt +(1−φt)ξ
)
pUI1i,t (m˜)u
UI1
i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
)
dm˜
+(1− γ)(1−ρUIx1f ,it )uUIx1i,t (4.20)
uUIx0i,t+1 = γ
∫
m˜
(
φt(1− pUI1i,t (m˜))uUI1i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUI1i,t (m˜)
(
φt +(1−φt)ξ
)
pUI1i,t (m˜)u
UI1
i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
)
dm˜
+
∫
m˜
(
φt(1− pUI0i,t (m˜))uUI0i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUI0i,t (m˜)
(
φt +(1−φt)ξ
)
pUI0i,t (m˜)u
UI0
i,t (m˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
)
dm˜
+(1−ρUIx0f ,it )uUIx0i,t + γ(1−ρUIx1f ,it )uUIx1i,t (4.21)
uUUi,t+1 = (1−ρUUf ,it )uUUi,t + ψρx,itei,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, losing UI
(4.22)
ut+1 = ∑
i=H,L
(∫
m˜
uUI1i,t+1(m˜)dm˜+
∫
m˜
uUI0i,t+1(m˜)dm˜+u
UIx1
i,t+1+u
UIx0
i,t+1+u
UU
i,t+1
)
(4.23)
where χUI1i,t (m˜)≡
∫
1{SUI1i,t+1(m˜,m)≤ 0} f (m)dm denotes the rate the newly formed
matches consisting of uUI1i (m˜) are not viable. χ
UI0
i,t (m˜) is analogously defined.
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Figure 4.1: Unemployment-to-Employment Monthly Transition Rate (%) by UI History
(Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.2: Average Number of Active Job Search Methods (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.3: Shares of Formerly Insured Unemployed Workers amongst Total Unemployed
Workers and Long-term Unemployed Workers (> 6 months duration) (Data
source: CPS)
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Figure 4.4: Unemployment Rate (%): Data and Models (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.5: Average Unemployment Duration (%): Data and Models (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.6: Long-term Unemployment Rate (%): Data and Models (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.7: Autocorrelation Functions: Data and Models (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.8: Autocorrelation Functions: Data and Models After Removing the Quadratic
Time Trend (Data source: CPS)
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Figure 4.9: Welfare Gains and Losses from Eliminating All UI Extensions during the Great
Recession
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Figure 4.10: Welfare Gains and Losses from Eliminating All UI Extensions during the
Great Recession: Unemployed Workers by UI History
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Table 4.1: Unemployment-to-Employment (UE) Monthly Transition Rate (%)
Current UI Recipients Non-UI Recipients Former UI Recipients
Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp. Jan-08 Jan-10 ∆pp.
Age
16 years or older 21.4 7.2 −14.2 27.5 17.8 −9.7 24.5 10.5 −14.0
25−54 years 24.3 7.1 −17.1 30.7 19.7 −11.0 27.8 11.8 −16.0
Gender
Male 24.9 7.2 −17.6 28.4 18.3 −10.1 22.2 12.6 −9.6
Female 16.3 7.2 −9.1 26.3 17.1 −9.2 26.9 6.3 −20.6
Education
< High School 25.0 4.7 −20.3 25.4 16.2 −9.2 43.4 10.3 −33.1
High School 9.0 7.5 −1.5 28.9 16.0 −12.9 16.1 8.8 −7.3
Some College 27.4 7.4 −20.0 28.0 20.5 −7.5 26.2 12.0 −14.2
College or higher 26.8 7.4 −19.3 28.4 24.5 −3.9 30.3 8.3 −22.0
Industry
Manufacturing 22.5 6.5 −16.0 25.6 14.9 −10.7 22.5 6.5 −16.0
Construction 18.3 9.6 −8.7 36.3 21.6 −14.7 n/a 12.1 −n/a
Wholesale & Retail n/a 6.4 n/a 26.0 16.3 −9.7 34.6 10.2 −24.4
Prof./Business Services 45.9 4.3 −41.6 22.5 19.9 −2.6 39.3 23.6 −15.3
Occupation
High-skilled 27.4 7.8 −19.5 27.4 24.6 −2.9 13.7 10.6 −3.1
Middle-skilled 18.6 6.6 −12.0 30.1 17.9 −12.2 22.0 10.7 −11.3
Low-skilled 20.6 10.4 −10.2 26.6 17.6 −9.0 43.9 9.1 −36.8
Reasons for Unemployment
Temporary Layoff 50.7 12.2 −38.5 46.2 40.4 −5.8 27.1 34.5 7.4
Permanent Separation 13.6 6.7 −6.9 25.6 15.6 −10.0 28.0 8.0 −20.0
Recall
Date Given 56.4 9.9 −46.5 53.9 47.00 −6.9 100.0 64.3 −35.7
No Date Given 22.4 7.7 −14.7 29.4 22.9 −6.5 32.2 10.0 −22.2
Some indication 48.3 13.3 −35.0 36.6 33.8 −2.8 18.0 18.8 0.8
No indication 16.5 7.0 −9.5 22.2 17.5 −4.7 38.4 8.9 −29.5
• Data source: CPS
∆pp. ≡ change in UE rate (in percentage points) =UEJan10−UEJan08
Occupation skills are defined as in the job polarisation literature (where high-,
middle- and low-skilled occupations respectively are abstract, routine and manual
jobs)
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Table 4.2: Targeted Moments
Moment Data Baseline Without UIx
E(u) 0.0583 0.0569 0.0577
E(ρUE) 0.4194 0.4414 0.4286
E(ρEU ) 0.0248 0.0259 0.0251
E(ρEE) 0.0320 0.0316 0.0320
E(udur) 15.416 12.251 13.063
E(uUI) 0.0290 0.0314 0.0327
std(u) 0.1454 0.1449 0.1453
std(ρUE) 0.0999 0.1221 0.1402
std(ρEU ) 0.0890 0.0617 0.0641
std(udur) 6.9327 5.6412 6.1954
std(LP) 0.0131 0.0106 0.0104
corr(LP,LP−1) 0.7612 0.7609 0.7593
E(ρUIUE/ρ
UIx
UE ) 0.8009 0.8018 0.5508
• ρUE : job finding rate // ρEU : job separation rate // ρEE : job-to-job transition
rate
udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks) // LP = y/(1− u): labour pro-
ductivity
Data source: CPS
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Table 4.3: Moments Not Targeted
Moment Data Model Wihtout UIx
E(U1) 0.0233 0.0243 0.0237
E(U2) 0.0172 0.0183 0.0180
E(U4) 0.0080 0.0075 0.0085
E(LTU) 0.0098 0.0066 0.0076
std(U1) 0.0048 0.0015 0.0017
std(U2) 0.0046 0.0027 0.0030
std(U4) 0.0035 0.0033 0.0035
std(LTU) 0.0085 0.0090 0.0107
std(uUI) 0.1780 0.2059 0.2523
std(v) 0.1226 0.0436 0.0327
corr(u,v) -0.6682 -0.2077 -0.1906
• U1: Unemployed less than 1 month // U2: Unemployed with 2-3 month du-
ration
U4: Unemployed with 4-6 month duration // LTU : Unemployed longer 6
months
udur: mean unemployment duration (weeks)
Data source: CPS
Table 4.4: Calibrated Parameters For Baseline Model
Parameter Description Baseline No UIx
l Meeting function 0.50 0.51
δ Exogenous separation rate 0.025 0.023
λ Pr(redrawing new m) 0.50 0.50
ψ Pr(losing UI after becoming unemployed) 0.49 0.49
ξ Pr(losing UI after meeting firm) 0.50 0.50
ae Search cost function 0.20 0.15
m Lowest match-specific productivity 0.384 0.396
β1 Match-specific prod. distribution 2.57 2.55
β2 Match-specific prod. distribution 5.39 5.26
ρz Persistence of TFP 0.9581 0.9562
σz Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0086 0.0075
ηL Productivity of type-L 0.985 0.985
aux/au Search cost for uUIx compared to uUI 1.351 1
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Table 4.5: Fixed Parameters For Baseline Model (From Rujiwattanapong (2016))
Parameter Description Value Sources/Remarks
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.0392 Fujita & Ramey (2012)
µ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Den Haan, Ramey & Watson (2000)
φH UI exhaustion rate 1/6 6 months max UI duration, ETA
φL1 UI exhaustion rate 1/9 9 months max UI duration, ETA
φL2 UI exhaustion rate 1/12 12 months max UI duration, ETA
φL3 UI exhaustion rate 1/16 16 months max UI duration, ETA
φL4 UI exhaustion rate 1/21 21 months max UI duration, ETA
u¯ UI policy threshold 0.065 ETA
au Search cost function 0.1180 Normalisation
du,de,dux Search cost function 1 Christensen et al (2004), Yashiv (2000)
h Leisure flow 0.5695 Gruber (1997)
Table 4.6: Performance of the Model During the Great Recession
Data Model No UIx Data Model No UIx mean % dev. from data
x max(x) max(x) max(x) mean(x) mean(x) mean(x) Model No UIx
u(%) 10.0% 10.0% 10.1% 8.3% 8.2% 8.3% 4.0% 4.6%
udur (weeks) 40.6 35.9 38.8 36.3 26.7 28.5 26.5% 23.0%
LTU(%) 4.4% 4.4% 4.9% 3.4% 2.8% 3.1% 17.4% 12.9%
• LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months // udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks)
- These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US
unemployment rate) and June 2014
- The last 2 columns show the time-average percentage deviation in modulus
of each variable from its empirical counterpart
- Data source: CPS
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Table 4.7: Counterfactual Experiments: Effects of Decreasing Maximum UI Duration from
90 Weeks to 26 Weeks During the Great Recession: Baseline Model (with
Worker’s UI History) and Model without Worker’s UI History
With UIx Data Model ∆φ ∆(φ ,s) ∆(φ ,s,S)
max(u) (%) 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 8.1% 6.6%
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 35.9 14.57 12.25 11.59
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.4% 1.2% 0.6% 0.5%
∆ max(u) −1.0pp −1.9pp −3.4pp
∆ max(udur) −21.3 −23.6 −24.3
∆ max(LTU) −3.2pp −3.8pp −4.0pp
Without UIx Data Model ∆φ ∆(φ ,s) ∆(φ ,s,S)
max(u) (%) 10.0% 10.1% 9.2% 8.4% 6.8%
max(udur) (weeks) 40.6 38.8 14.8 12.9 12.2
max(LTU) (%) 4.4% 4.9% 1.2% 0.6% 0.5%
∆ max(u) −0.9pp −1.7pp −3.4pp
∆ max(udur) −24.0 −25.9 −26.6
∆ max(LTU) −3.7pp −4.3pp −4.4pp
• ∆φ : only maximum UI duration changes
∆(φ ,s): maximum UI duration and job search effort change
∆(φ ,s,S): maximum UI duration, job search effort and match surplus change
LTU : Unemployed longer 6 months // udur: mean unemployment duration
(weeks)
∆ max(·): difference between the model’s and counterfactual experiments’
maxima
- These statistics are computed between October 2009 (the peak of the US
unemployment rate) and June 2014
- Data source: CPS
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Table 4.8: Welfare Gains/Losses From Eliminating All UI Extensions During the Great
Recession
Average Welfare Gains/Losses (%) Baseline No UIx
Total 0.14 0.23
Employed 0.27 0.33
Employed: High Productivity 0.25 0.32
Employed: Low Productivity 0.28 0.34
Unemployed −1.27 −0.93
Unemployed: Insured −1.64 −1.20
Unemployed: Insured (0−2 months) −1.67 −1.30
Unemployed: Insured (3 months or longer) −1.61 −1.16
Unemployed: Formerly Insured 0.00 n/a
Unemployed: Uninsured −0.31 −0.15
Unemployed: High Productivity −1.35 −1.00
Unemployed: Low Productivity −1.21 −0.90
• These statistics are computed between June 2009 (the peak of the Great Re-
cession and when UI extension is triggered in the model) and June 2014
• Welfare gains/losses are defined as in Lucas (1987). It is the percentage
change in consumption necessary in each period to make agents in the econ-
omy with endogenous UI extensions be as satisfied as they would be in an
economy where UI extensions are eliminated during the Great Recession.
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